FIGURE 5 - available via license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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Validation of the same attack input on the DC motor system with two real number representations in 1s. Red rectangle denotes the boundary of the unsafe region. The trace under fixed-point arithmetics enters unsafe region due to fixed-point overflow.
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Coverage-guided grey-box fuzzing for computer systems has been explored for decades. However, existing techniques do not adequately explore the space of continuous behaviors in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), which may miss safety-critical bugs. Optimization-guided falsification is promising to find violations of safety specifications, but not suita...
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... within 1s of system operation. We used 64-bit signed fixed-point representation for all the variables in the program. We adjusted the integer precision using a counterexample-guided loop to find violations very hard in a long timeout. We used 40 bits for the integer Our implementation runs for about 2 seconds to discover a violation as shown in Fig. 5. We validated the attack sequences under the double-precision float-point representation. We can find that the controller under float-point arithmetics could control the armature current back to the reference value. The trace under fixed-point arithmetics entered the unsafe region under the same attack vector. To discover the reason ...
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This paper presents an inclusive review of the cyber-physical (CP) attacks, vulnerabilities, mitigation approaches on the power electronics and the security challenges for the smart grid applications. With the rapid evolution of the physical systems in the power electronics applications for interfacing renewable energy sources that incorporate with cyber frameworks, the cyber threats have a critical impact on the smart grid performance. Due to the existence of electronic devices in the smart grid applications, which are interconnected through communication networks, these networks may be subjected to severe cyber-attacks by hackers. If this occurs, the digital controllers can be physically isolated from the control loop. Therefore, the cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in the power electronic systems employed in the smart grid need special treatment and security. In this paper, an overview of the power electronics systems security on the networked smart grid from the CP perception, as well as then emphases on prominent CP attack patterns with substantial influence on the power electronics components operation along with analogous defense solutions. Furthermore, appraisal of the CPS threats attacks mitigation approaches, and encounters along the smart grid applications are discussed. Finally, the paper concludes with upcoming trends and challenges in CP security in the smart grid applications.
