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The purpose of this chapter is threefold: 1) to describe the schemes, showing how they evolved and how they have been classified in the traditional and the modern theories; 2) to propose a method for classifying them based on ancient and modern developments; and 3) to outline and show how schemes can be used to describe and analyze or produce real...
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... schemes merge the most common combinations between types of reasoning and material relations. For this reason, we need first to distinguish between these two levels, distinguishing between the various types of reasoning in Figure 9. A multi-logical perspective needs to be taken into account as a classification criterion, in which the logical form can be described using distinct types of reasoning, which in turn can include various logical rules of inference (MP, MT). ...
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... For instance, argumentation theorists think that the analogical argument is that two things are analogous in a certain respect because they are analogous in some relevant respects. These scholars have developed various versions of schemes and critical questions to analyze such arguments (e.g., Groarke and Tindale 2004;Walton et al. 2008). Philosophers of science introduce the tabular representation of analogical arguments, which consists of horizontal relations concerning the similarities between two things and vertical relations representing the causality among different respects of one thing (e.g., Hesse 1966). ...
The orthodox view holds that analogical arguments are a distinctive type of argument, while the eliminative view and its enhanced variant proposed in this paper contend that analogical arguments can be reducible to non-analogical arguments by eliminating the similarities proposition. This paper shows that the existing defense for the orthodox view fails to tackle the challenge posed by the eliminative view and its enhanced variant. The new defense for the distinctiveness of analogical arguments argues that an analogical argument is composed of both a conductive and principle-based argument. Consequently, analogical arguments remain irreducible, as the similarities proposition is not eliminated.
... Por fim, mas não menos importante, a propriedade lógica diz respeito ao funcionamento do raciocínio argumentativo, em especial à discussão sobre como os participantes de uma atividade argumentativa fortalecem suas posições ou enfraquecem as posições dos outros, ampliando ou subtraindo plausibilidade, ao recorrerem às formas que nossa sociedade e cultura forjaram e validaram como aptas para defender, questionar ou criticar posições. Logo, interessa ao analista da argumentação entender os padrões de raciocínio argumentativo distribuídos e consolidados sócio-histórica e culturalmenteos ditos esquemas argumentativos (Gonçalves-Segundo, 2023a;Perelman;Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2002;Rigotti;Greco, 2019;Reed;Macagno, 2008) -, os regimes de racionalidade ao qual estão subordinados (Koren, 2011;Seixas, no prelo), os modos pelos quais eles se estruturam e, por conseguinte, os modos pelos quais eles podem ser atacados/criticados. Neste artigo, a discussão sobre o lógico em relação ao argumento será proeminente, até por conta de ser uma das propriedades que menos se tem dado atenção na tradição de estudos da argumentação no Brasil. ...
... Por fim, mas não menos importante, a propriedade lógica diz respeito ao funcionamento do raciocínio argumentativo, em especial à discussão sobre como os participantes de uma atividade argumentativa fortalecem suas posições ou enfraquecem as posições dos outros, ampliando ou subtraindo plausibilidade, ao recorrerem às formas que nossa sociedade e cultura forjaram e validaram como aptas para defender, questionar ou criticar posições. Logo, interessa ao analista da argumentação entender os padrões de raciocínio argumentativo distribuídos e consolidados sócio-histórica e culturalmenteos ditos esquemas argumentativos (Gonçalves-Segundo, 2023a;Perelman;Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2002;Rigotti;Greco, 2019;Reed;Macagno, 2008) -, os regimes de racionalidade ao qual estão subordinados (Koren, 2011;Seixas, no prelo), os modos pelos quais eles se estruturam e, por conseguinte, os modos pelos quais eles podem ser atacados/criticados. Neste artigo, a discussão sobre o lógico em relação ao argumento será proeminente, até por conta de ser uma das propriedades que menos se tem dado atenção na tradição de estudos da argumentação no Brasil. ...
... • a operação dialética de deslocar o ônus da prova para o outro lado, ou seja, para quem está alinhado à outra perspectiva, transferindo a responsabilidade por sustentar a posição alternativa a quem, na dinâmica argumentativa, não partilha da mesma posição, (ainda) não aderiu à nova tese defendida ou não a considerou como mais plausível do que aquela com a qual já se estava inicialmente alinhado -tal operação lastreia-se também em discussão sistemática realizada no âmbito da Pragmadialética (van Eemeren, 2018), na teoria do raciocínio presuntivo de Walton (2001de Walton ( , 2006, aprofundada no âmbito da sua conceituação de esquemas argumentativos Reed;Macagno, 2008), e na dinâmica actancial discutida no modelo dialogal de Plantin (2008). ...
Este artigo busca discutir o conceito de argumento, alvo de considerável controvérsia no âmbito dos estudos da argumentação. Nosso objetivo central é apresentar uma contribuição a esse debate a partir de uma proposta unificadora e integradora orientada pela seguinte definição: o argumento é uma unidade de fundamentação de uma resposta a uma questão argumentativa. Com base nessa definição, procuramos, então, discorrer sobre as propriedades do fundamentar, propondo que tal processo possa ser delineado a partir de três operações: a operação lógico-inferencial de atribuição de plausibilidade à tese, que articula a noção de argumento à noção de esquema argumentativo em termos de uma relação tipo-instância; a operação retórica de geração de influência, que incorpora a discussão em torno de comprometimentos e acordos ao modo de funcionamento do argumento; e a operação dialética de deslocamento do ônus da prova para o outro, que conecta a realidade racional à interacional e intertextual. Cada uma dessas operações é discutida do ponto de vista teórico e operacional, destacando categorias relevantes de análise para dar conta desse conjunto. A fim de mostrar a produtividade da proposta, agregamos a tal debate a análise ilustrativa de um diálogo concreto entre uma menina de quatro anos e seu responsável, publicado no perfil Fatos de Crianças do então Twitter (hoje, X).
... The vast majority of critical questions for assessing arguments from authority are designed to evaluate arguments based on expert opinion (Walton 1997;Walton et al. 2008). When comparing this research strand to the state of the art in critically questioning arguments from authority, studies on their deontic aspects appear to be scant and patchy. ...
Despite increasing interest in studying arguments from deontic authority of the general form “(1) $$\delta$$ δ is a deontic authority in institution $$\varOmega$$ Ω ; (2) according to $$\delta$$ δ , I should do $$\alpha$$ α , C : therefore, (3) I should do $$\alpha$$ α ”, the state of the art models are not capable of grasping their complexity. The existing sets of critical questions assigned to this argumentation scheme seem to conflate two problems: whether a person is subject to an authority of an institution in the first place and whether the command issued within the context of a particular institution is eventually binding. For this reason, we introduce (1) a set of Basic Critical Questions to scrutinize the former issue, and (2) a set of more detailed questions related to specific features, also referred to as “parameters”, of institutional environments (Intra-Institutional Critical Questions). We identify major elements of institutional environments in which authoritative utterances are made and the crucial parameters of arguments from deontic authority. The selected evidence from the decisions of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court helps us show how these parameters may be used to reconstruct subtypes of this argument scheme, with their associated sets of critical questions. In specific institutional contexts, such detailed schemes are capable of grasping the complexity of appeals to deontic authority and thus should be used rather than general schemes. The reconstruction of argumentation schemes with critical questions shows how particular arguments may successfully be attacked.
... In assessing the reasonableness of an argument, the analysis focuses on its inferential structure (scheme) through the application of a set of critical questions (van Eemeren, 2016). Contemporary argumentation studies employ as guidelines these questions, specified and tailored to specific features of each informal argument (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008), e.g., for practical argument: Does action X indeed lead to result Y? Is result Y really desirable? The authority of such questions is grounded in the rationality of critical dialogue, as well as epistemic and logical standards. ...
Non-fictional narratives have an open-ended character that projects roles and values to those who participate in them. Narrative participation, in turn, entails narrative assessment and identification processes, through which adherence to values and positions may fail or be achieved. In the analysis of interviews with university students across Turkey, we draw on Fisher’s narrative paradigm to focus on how our participants carry out assessments of narrative credibility. To elucidate narrative coherence and fidelity, we take inspiration from an argumentative-rhetorical perspective, and focus specifically on the relationship among the criteria identified in the literature on narrative assessment. Our study of interviewee evaluations of COVID-19 narratives confirms the use of the coherence criteria, calls into question the fidelity criteria, and highlights the relevance of identification as a basic process for fidelity assessments. We conclude by discussing our limitations and directions for further research.
... The most common tool for analyzing and classifying arguments in argumentation theory is argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008;Macagno and Walton 2015;Macagno 2015). Schemes represent the most common patterns of genuine arguments, providing their generic and abstract structure as a combination of two or more premises and a conclusion. ...
... For coding purposes, the large number of schemes developed in the literature (more than 60, see Walton et al., 2008) was reduced to 15 based on two criteria: their genericity (the subcategories of more basic schemes are subsumed under the latter) (Macagno and Walton 2015), and their frequency in the observed corpora (Macagno 2019;Macagno and Gil 2021). The combination of these criteria results in a list of 15 schemes, which are at the same time abstract and frequent in sociopolitical communication contexts, thus allowing reliability in coding without losing precision. ...
Spotlighting case studies of manipulation practices at the onset of the Covid-19 crisis in different countries and socio-political circumstances, the authors expose context-specific discourse and argumentation strategies of 'infodemics’ (misleading information and fake news), public policy mismanagement, deceptive online and offline communication tactics, and conspiracy narratives, which end up disrupting community social cohesion. In addition to targeting manipulation-driven dissent across discourse genres through corpus-based investigations, a major strength of this volume consists in debunking manipulation while foregrounding compelling acts of counter-manipulation. The volume’s breadth of topics, depth of analytical insights and range of methodological frameworks provide unique perspectives by capturing crisis-related manipulations across a worldwide political and cultural spectrum (Austria, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States), with a focus on the scale and extent of multifaceted repercussions. Reaching beyond the boundaries of pragmatics and discourse analysis, this book should be a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners of rhetoric, argumentation, media studies, social and political sciences.
... Współcześnie zagadnienie to jest bardziej eksploatowane, a najbardziej znaczące wyniki nad rolą znaczenia i definicji w argumentacji, zwłaszcza w argumentacji prawniczej, osiągnęli Douglas Walton i Fabrizio Macagno (Walton 2001(Walton , 2005(Walton , 2008Macagno, Walton 2014, 2008a, 2008b oraz Edward Schiappa (Schiappa 1996(Schiappa , 2003, a także van Eemeren i Rob Grootendorst (2004). Ich prace dostarczają nowego aparatu pojęciowego oraz metod (jak np. ...
The overarching goal of this book is to differentiate and provide a highly detailed descriptive account of a specific class of arguments. To simplify, let us consider the following example: suppose one aims to persuade that “Julius Caesar was a criminal.” To support that claim various arguments may be formulated, such as:
a) Joseph Stalin murdered his political opponents who openly opposed him, thus he was a criminal. Julius Caesar did the same. Therefore, if Stalin was a criminal, then Caesar was also a criminal.
b) Most historians studying the history of the Roman Empire consider Julius Caesar to be a criminal, so he was one.
c) The majority of people believe Julius Caesar was a criminal, so he was one.
d) Anyone who murders or orders the killing of others is a criminal—regardless of whether it’s in defense of the country or to maintain power. Julius Caesar issued orders resulting in thousands of deaths, so he was a criminal.
Argumentation theory distinguishes and extensively describes different types of arguments, each with its own definition, argumentation scheme, subtypes, and criteria for evaluation. We may, therefore, identify that: example (a) employs the argument from analogy, (b) is an argument from authority (ad auctoritate), and (c) is an argument from popular opinion (ad populum). What about (d)? Is there a theory for such arguments?
Argument in the example (d) establishes the meaning of “criminal” by extending it to those who lead troops into battle or kill in self-defense, and in this way, Caesar can also be included in the extension of a “criminal” (regardless of whether he committed genocide or simply won battles).
Although there are many concepts in argumentation theory and informal logic that explain various aspect of such arguments (e.g., persuasive definitions and persuasive quasi-definitions, attributions, classification arguments, etc.) there is no theory for such arguments—or rather—there was no until now. This book is aimed to provide a concept, classification, and assessment criteria for arguments which fix the meaning to support persuasion—namely, semantic arguments.
Semantic arguments manifest themselves as a common and very powerful means of persuasion in various areas of human activity, including political discourse, advertising, science, law, and philosophy. This can be illustrated through an analysis of some examples: e.g., the redefinition of “planet” proposed in 2008 to exclude Pluto from the scope of this concept, the redefinition of the term “wetland” put forward by G.W. Bush in 1988, modifications of the definition of “human being” in disputes about abortion, or the definition of “vehicle” in cases of accidents involving electric scooters. The book’s goal is to provide a model of semantic argument—differentiating arguments that fix meaning for persuasive purposes, providing definition and scheme, constructing a comprehensive classification, and developing assessment criteria. This broader aim also fills a gap in argumentation theory regarding our understanding of semantic arguments and their actual and potential applications.
... To determine the move space, informal dialectical theories (e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004;Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008) draw on conceptual, analytical, and evaluative tools that include argumentation schemes, critical questions, and fallacies. When arguers give reasons, they invariably draw upon a repertoire of argument schemes, the acceptability of which varies with a discursive domain or field. ...
Different approaches analyze the strength of a natural language argument in different ways. This paper contrasts the dialectical , structural , probabilistic (or Bayesian), computational , and empirical approaches by exemplarily applying them to a single argumentative text ( Epicureans on Squandering Life ; Aikin & Talisse, 2019). Rather than pitching these approaches against one another, our main goal is to show the room for fruitful interaction. Our focus is on a dialectical analysis of the squandering argument as an argumentative response that voids an interlocutor’s right to assertion. This analysis addresses the pragmatic dimensions of arguing and implies an argument structure that is consistent with empirical evidence of perceived argument strength. Results show that the squandering argument can be evaluated as a (non-fallacious) ad hominem argument, which however is not necessarily stronger than possible arguments attacking it.
... The explanatory and interpretative dimensions of presupposition can be represented by a specular reasoning grounded on the notion of presumption (Donnellan 1966;Strawson 1971, 58-59;Kempson 1975, 166-167). Presumption is commonly regarded as the conclusion of a defeasible scheme of reasoning (Walton et al. 2008) called "presumptive reasoning," and described as follows (Walton 1993;Rescher 2006, 33 Speaker's presuppositions can be considered as the conclusion of presumptive inferences, which can be assessed as reasonable or not. In particular, the speaker's decision to take some propositions for granted can be explained as based on the prediction of their acceptance by the hearer. ...
Presuppositions are at the same time a crucial and almost neglected dimension of arguments and fallacies. Arguments involve different types of presuppositions, which can be used for manipulative purposes in distinct ways. However, what are presuppositions? What is their dialectical function? Why and how can they be dangerous? This paper intends to address these questions by developing the pragmatic approaches to presupposition from a dialectical perspective. The use of presuppositions will be analyzed in terms of presumptive conclusions concerning the interlocutor’s acceptance of a proposition, which can be assessed as reasonable or unacceptable. Their dialectical function is described in terms of dark side commitments attributed to a collective "voice" representing what is commonly shared. For this reason, they count as attempts to include the presupposed contents into the hearer’s commitment store, which in some circumstances can reverse the burden of proof. The different manipulative strategies grounded on controversial presuppositions will be examined by showing the distinct roles that the latter play and the relationship between the degrees of presuppositional implicitness and the speaker’s burden of retraction.
... Informal and formal arguments both consist of a conclusion (which corresponds to the claim in model of Toulmin, 2003) and at least one premise, in which context the premises provide support for the conclusion (Walton, 2005). An argument is cogent when the premises plausibly explain the conclusion, and the conclusion can be derived from the premises using logical reasoning (Walton and Macagno, 2015;Macagno et al., 2018). Each argument should be seen as an external representation of internal reasoning. ...
Theory
Argumentation is crucial for all academic disciplines. Nevertheless, a lack of argumentation skills among students is evident. Two core aspects of argumentation are the recognition of argument structures (e.g., backing up claims with premises, according to the Toulmin model) and the recognition of fallacies. As both aspects may be related to content knowledge, students studying different subjects might exhibit different argumentation skills depending on whether the content is drawn from their own or from a foreign subject. Therefore, we developed an instrument to measure the recognition of both argument structures and fallacies among the groups of preservice teachers and business economics students in both their respective domains (pedagogy and economics), and a neutral domain (sustainability). For the recognition of fallacies, we distinguished between congruent and incongruent fallacies. In congruent fallacies, the two aspects of argument quality, i.e., deductive validity and inductive strength, provide converging evidence against high argument quality. In incongruent fallacies, these two aspects diverge. Based on dual process theories, we expected to observe differences in the recognition of congruent and incongruent fallacies.
Aims
We investigated whether these two abilities are domain-specific and whether the recognition of fallacies depends on the congruence of two aspects of argument quality.
Methods
267 preservice teachers and 56 business economics students participated in the study. For the recognition of argument structures, participants assigned the five statements constituting one argument to the corresponding component according to the Toulmin model. For the recognition of fallacies, we created arguments and incorporated a common fallacy into some of them: formal fallacy, overgeneralization, irrelevance, or circularity. Participants rated whether the argument was cogent or not, which was followed by a brief justification.
Results
Domain specificity could not be found for either of both abilities. For the recognition of fallacies, two dimensions were found: a congruent dimension (formal fallacies and overgeneralizations) and an incongruent dimension (irrelevance and circularity).
Discussion
The instrument measures the recognition of both argument structures and fallacies in these two groups across domains. The recognition of fallacies differs depending on whether the deductive validity and the inductive strength of the argument are equally indicative of argument quality or not.
... For different reasons, these competencies have never been well integrated within primarily argumentation-based approaches to CT. They have not been well integrated because the incorporation of causality and skills such as decision making and problem solving remain disproportionately minor compared to the basic forms of formal and informal reasoning; we need only go through the content and space occupied by formal and informal argumentation in relevant works in the field (see Bassham et al. 2023;Bowell and Kemp 2002;Epstein 2006;Fisher 2011;Freely and Steinberg 2013;Foresman et al. 2017;Govier 2014;Jackson and Newberry 2012;Johnson 2000;Johnson and Hamby 2015;Kenyon 2008;Moore and Parker 2021;Tittle 2011;van Eemeren et al. 2007;Walton 2006;Walton et al. 2008). However, other CT perspectives did understand the relevance of post-decisional mechanisms following substantial contributions from cognitive science (see Ennis 1996;Facione 1990;Halpern 1989;Paul 1995). ...
In this paper, we propose an application of critical thinking (CT) to real-world problems, taking into account personal well-being (PB) and lifelong formation (FO). First, we raise a substantial problem with CT, which is that causal explanation is of little importance in solving everyday problems. If we care about everyday problems, we must treat the identification of causal relationships as a fundamental mechanism and action as a form of solution once the origin of the problem is unequivocally known. Decision-making and problem-solving skills should be the execution of the causal explanations reached. By acting this way, we change reality and achieve our goals, which are none other than those imposed by our PB. However, to achieve changes or results, we must have these fundamental competencies in CT, and these are not innate; we must acquire and develop them, that is, we must train ourselves to have CT competencies according to the demands of today’s world. Finally, in this paper we propose a causal model that seeks to identify and test the causal relationships that exist between the different factors or variables that determine the CT-PB-FO relationship. We present some results on the relevance of causality and how to effectively form and address real-world problems from causality. However, there are still questions to be clarified that need to be investigated in future studies.
