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Source publication
Forthcoming journal article [Development and Change]
Context in source publication
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The United States tops the ranking of the 2016 edition of the Elcano Global Presence Index,
with an index value of 2,457 points. China is 2nd (therefore hanging on to the position it
reached last year and recording 727 points). These two countries are followed by Germany
(3rd, 623 points), the United Kingdom (4th, 566 points) and France (5th, 516 p...
Citations
Restructuring of the automotive industry in the post‐2000 period has led to the emergence of three strata of automotive manufacturing jurisdictions. Core automotive countries host the headquarters of global automakers. They retain most research and development (R&D) and high levels of production. By contrast, integrated peripheries offer low‐cost labour. While increasing levels of vehicle production have gravitated there, they have been unable to attract mandates for knowledge‐intensive portions of the automotive value chain. Finally, semi‐peripheries have neither a home‐grown automaker nor low‐cost labour. Consequently, they have been unable to gain mandates for R&D and struggle to maintain production. Thus, policy makers in non‐core countries consider a range of tools to either retain their position or ‘graduate’ from one category to another. Recently, the demand for battery electric vehicles (BEVs) has given rise to new vehicle manufacturers. Turkey is attempting to develop a BEV automaker and jump from an automotive integrated periphery country to one having a key attribute of an automotive core: a home‐grown automaker. This article reveals and discusses Turkey's generous incentives and assesses the challenges the Turkish BEV entrant will confront, as well as its potential to generate wider economic benefits. The authors also consider the application the Turkey case study has for our understanding of power and upgrading in automotive global value chains.
In September 2009, Turkey experienced a major reform of its pharmaceutical expenditure and price policy. By introducing a global budget, Turkey saved some 20 billion TL in public pharmaceutical expenditure in the 2010–2012 period. The lion’s share of this was achieved by introducing stricter price controls that reduced the profit margins of pharmaceutical producers and distributors (the populist policy solution), rather than by privatizing the cost of medicines through, for example, raising out-of-pocket payments (the neoliberal policy solution). This is a puzzle, given the Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi , AKP) government’s usual preference for lenient and business-friendly regulation. This article explains the policy reform with reference to (i) the pronounced electoral interests of the AKP’s political leadership in not substantially reducing access to public health services, (ii) the absence of powerful business interests in high medicine prices, and (iii) the absence of a developmentalist commitment to an industrial policy strategy for the pharmaceutical sector. This case study holds important lessons for scholars of Turkish politics. It suggests that externally the AKP’s economic and social policies are driven by the interests of its two major constituencies (namely, lower-class voters and “Anatolian capital”), while internally they are shaped by two camps of policy makers (namely, neoliberal-minded technocrats and election-focused party leaders).
