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A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision—and, in particular, the distributi...
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Context 1
... first type of government-which we refer to as 'centralized municipalities'- concentrates all competencies in public good provision at one central level of local gov- ernment, such that the differing geographic reaches of various local public goods simply are ignored. That is, decisions on the amount of public good provision are taken and imple- mented by one encompassing municipal parliament, which is elected in one single election. We illustrate this on the left-hand side of Fig. 1. The municipal borders are represented by the dark black line, and indicate the boundary of public goods benefiting the entire munic- ipal population (referred to as 'municipal' public goods). The thin grey lines represent the boundaries of more localized public goods whose benefits only accrue to one intra-municipal community (referred to as 'community' public goods). 3 These intra-municipal communities do not, however, have their own representative bodies to decide over community public goods. Hence, both community and municipality public goods are decided and administered under central control (reflected by the fact that both are colored in a common grey shade in Fig. ...
Context 2
... first type of government-which we refer to as 'centralized municipalities'- concentrates all competencies in public good provision at one central level of local gov- ernment, such that the differing geographic reaches of various local public goods simply are ignored. That is, decisions on the amount of public good provision are taken and imple- mented by one encompassing municipal parliament, which is elected in one single election. We illustrate this on the left-hand side of Fig. 1. The municipal borders are represented by the dark black line, and indicate the boundary of public goods benefiting the entire munic- ipal population (referred to as 'municipal' public goods). The thin grey lines represent the boundaries of more localized public goods whose benefits only accrue to one intra-municipal community (referred to as 'community' public goods). 3 These intra-municipal communities do not, however, have their own representative bodies to decide over community public goods. Hence, both community and municipality public goods are decided and administered under central control (reflected by the fact that both are colored in a common grey shade in Fig. ...
Context 3
... second type of government-which we refer to as 'federal municipalities'-comes closer to the ideal-type described under the decentralization theorem, and consists of two bodies of government: i.e., one with responsibility over community public goods, and one with responsibility over municipal public goods. This setting is depicted in the right-hand side of Fig. 1 by the white and grey shades, respectively. Although the competencies within the municipality remain the same as before, the internal organization thereof is different. That is, there are now two independently elected parliaments deciding upon the amount of community and municipality public goods, respectively. Citizens therefore also have two votes (which, in the German case, are cast on the same Election Day): i.e., one to elect the members of the community council administering community public goods, and one to elect the members of the municipal parliament administering municipal public ...
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... the center of Fig. 1 depicts the intermediate situation of 'confederal municipali- ties'. These concentrate political authority over public good provision predominantly at the local level in the sense that each community within the municipality elects its own parlia- ment, which is then-as in federal municipalities-solely responsible for community public goods (as indicated by the white areas in Fig. 1). Unlike federal municipalities, however, there is no directly elected municipal government, but rather a joint administrative council with deputies sent by each community within the municipality, which decides consensually about municipal public goods. Hence, as for centralized municipalities, voters have only one vote. This elects the community council directly, and affects indirectly the composition of the joint administrative council at the municipal ...
Context 5
... the center of Fig. 1 depicts the intermediate situation of 'confederal municipali- ties'. These concentrate political authority over public good provision predominantly at the local level in the sense that each community within the municipality elects its own parlia- ment, which is then-as in federal municipalities-solely responsible for community public goods (as indicated by the white areas in Fig. 1). Unlike federal municipalities, however, there is no directly elected municipal government, but rather a joint administrative council with deputies sent by each community within the municipality, which decides consensually about municipal public goods. Hence, as for centralized municipalities, voters have only one vote. This elects the community council directly, and affects indirectly the composition of the joint administrative council at the municipal ...
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Citations
... Rules, laws, and statutory codes and policies that govern voting vary dramatically by states in the U.S. and thus these institutions predictably have differential effects on voter turnout at the state and local level. Indeed, a vast literature has demonstrated that voter turnout is influenced by the institutional design of elections, varying by features such as compulsory voting, voteby-mail, and weekend voting options (Michelsen, Boenisch, & Geys, 2014). ...
One of the great promises of e-democracy is the potential it holds for increasing citizen participation. Much of the research related to this topic has focused on inputs, identifying the tools and technologies of e-democracy, or factors associated with adoption and/or diffusion of these technologies across units of governments or public organizations. By contrast there has been less research examining how these inputs translate into outcomes, or impacts that e-democracy has on changes in civic behavior or citizen engagement. Our study helps fill this knowledge gap by examining the impact that a specific set of information communication technologies (ICTs) have on a common form of civic engagement: voting. This research creates and tests two unique measures, the online election information index (OEII) and the e-registration service index (ERSI) to examine the extent to which local governments offer online information and utilities that help to educate voters and promote turnout. The index is tested on a sample of 396 county governments in the US to examine the extent to which governments' use of voting ICTs impacts voter participation, while accounting for other institutional and demographic factors that are known to shape voter turnout. We find that voter turnout is indeed higher in communities where local governments offer more voting ICTs, and the availability of these online resources may be particularly influential in boosting turnout in places where state policies serve to constrain or limit turnout.
... These findings are highly relevant for the many developed and developing countries currently questioning their decentralization efforts and reallocating tasks and powers to more central levels. By providing evidence that centralization reduces the probability of people reporting having political influence, my paper also contributes to a nascent literature that has shown the impact of (de)centralization on voters' political participation (Michelsen et al., 2014;Revelli, 2016). ...
Many countries are reallocating tasks and powers to more central levels of government. To identify centralization’s welfare effects, I use a difference-in-differences design that relies on time and cross-cantonal variation in the implementation of centralization reforms in Switzerland. I find that centralization provokes significant decreases in residents’ life satisfaction. I identify one mechanism driving the effect, namely the procedural disutility that individuals experience from having less influence over the formulation of political decisions. This effect is largest among individuals with higher expected benefits from being involved in the political decision process, with detrimental effects on local political participation.
... In such cases, central government is usually concerned with equity issues and co-ordination of service delivery. Without adequate central steering of subnational governments and with no mechanism that transfers resources to poor jurisdictions, decentralisation may lead to considerable differences in regional disparities in health, education and social service outcomes (Martinez-Vasquez, 2011 [62] ). With the intention of securing access to services in all parts of the country and to guarantee a minimum quality of services for all residents, laws and other normative steering mechanisms are frequently used to regulate their provision and financing. ...
This report offers a comprehensive overview of decentralisation policies and reforms in OECD countries and beyond. Sometimes called a “silent” or “quiet” revolution, decentralisation is among the most important reforms of the past 50 years. The report argues that decentralisation outcomes – in terms of democracy, efficiency, accountability, regional and local development – depend greatly on the way it is designed and implemented. Making the most of decentralisation systems is particularly crucial in the context of a “geography of discontent” and growing divides between places that feel left behind by globalisation and technological change and those that may benefit from the opportunities offered by megatrends. The report identifies 10 guidelines for making decentralisation work and allowing it to be conducive to regional development. Beyond the guidelines, the report proposes concrete tools for policy-makers, including detailed sets of recommendations, checklists, pitfalls to avoid and examples of good practices, both in unitary and federal countries.
... Municipal amalgamations are usually considered to be the result of electoral reforms that increase the population size of a municipality to improve local efficiency (Blom-Hansen et al. 2016;De Ceuninck et al. 2010;Tavares 2018;Vetter and Kersting 2003). Amalgamation can result in a centralized municipality that concentrates pre-merger jurisdictions under one authority with one municipal council as a representative body (see Michelsen, Boenisch, and Geys 2014). In this article, we call these parts of amalgamated municipalities "intra-municipal units," or just "units." ...
... Decisions on a number of public goods provisions are taken and implemented by one municipal council, which is elected in one election. Due to the reshuffle of powers in the council caused by amalgamation, some geographical communities, thus, can be ignored in the division of public goods (Michelsen, Boenisch, and Geys 2014). ...
... Therefore, political competition in an amalgamated municipality can be understood as the struggle for dominance over other intramunicipal communities to ensure benefits for one's own community. If there is no institutional guarantee of representation, the political power of citizens living in the more populated community increases, and there is a high risk that the unique interests of smaller geographical communities will not be represented by the decision-making body (Michelsen, Boenisch, and Geys 2014). A unit's underrepresentation, or even absence of representation, very probably leads to the unit-based community being disadvantaged in the distribution of public goods, and to dissatisfaction with the functioning of local democracy in an amalgamated municipality. ...
Municipal size and institutional design are important factors influencing representation at a local level. However, this has not been studied with regard to the long-term perspective. The article focuses on the effect of the center/periphery on the representation of units within an amalgamated municipality in local elections. The analysis is based on data from 2,298 amalgamated municipalities over three sets of elections (2006, 2010, 2014) in the Czech Republic. The article uses multilevel binomial logistic regression to estimate the effect of different types of intra-municipal (settlement) units in terms of central/periphery relations on their representation. Thanks to these unique data, the article presents information about the representation of differently disadvantaged units from the long-term perspective. The results show that political and cultural-economic centers of amalgamated municipalities, as well as settlement units of a bigger relative size, have a greater chance of being represented in the municipal council compared with political and cultural-economic peripheries and smaller units.
... Hajnal and Lewis (2003) conclude that in California, municipalities that outsource some of their municipal functionswhich reduce municipal influence and control over these functionshave lower electoral turnouts. Michelsen, Boenisch, and Geys (2014) conclude that in Germany, decentralized municipalities have higher voter turnouts than centralized municipalities. Local autonomy therefore appears to increase local electoral turnout. ...
Local autonomy in Europe has, on average, increased since 1990 and has decreased (a little) since 2009. The average population size of a European municipality has increased continuously during the last two decades. European countries with larger municipalities do not have more local autonomy. Citizens of large municipalities are less interested in local political matters. Inhabitants of small municipalities tend to be more interested in local political matters when their municipalities have more local autonomy while a similar strong correlation between local autonomy and local political interest cannot be established for larger municipalities. Finally, a discrepancy exists between the stated policy objectives of many European countries that support both decentralization and (more) local political participation on the one hand and actual policy results on the other hand that are not necessarily in line with increasing local autonomy and stimulating local political participation.
50 free online copies available here: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/SsnYrQWc2a5DigsyNMP2/full
... Die Formen der interkommunalen Zusammenarbeit sind vielfältig und können institutionell unterschiedlich ausgestaltet sein. Michelsen et al. (2014) beschreiben drei Arrangements für vertikale Kooperationen: (1) zentralisier- te Kommunen (Einheitsgemeinden), die im eigentlichen Sinne keine Kooperation mehr darstellen, (2) dezentrale, föderale Orte mit getrennten Legislativorganen der Orts- teile und des Ortsverbands (Verbandsgemeinden) sowie (3) ein zwischengelagertes, konföderiertes Modell (Verwal- tungsgemeinschaften, Ämter). 20 Der Kooperationscharak- ter wird zum Beispiel im Modell der beauftragenden und erfüllenden Gemeinde sichtbar, wie es in Thüringen gän- gig ist. ...
Zusammenfassung
Seit Jahrzehnten werden kommunale Gebietskörperschaften fusioniert, in der Hoffnung auf Kosteneinsparungen und eine höhere Leistungsfähigkeit der Verwaltung. In diesem Beitrag geben Sebastian Blesse und Felix Rösel einen Überblick über die bestehende kausale Evidenz zu den Effekten von Gebietsreformen auf öffentliche Ausgaben, Effizienz und Qualität der Verwaltung sowie zu den möglichen politischen Folgen der Zusammenschlüsse. Sie zeigen, dass Evaluationsstudien selten Effizienzrenditen von Gebietsreformen nachweisen. Allerdings ergeben sich unbeabsichtigte Nebenwirkungen auf die politische Partizipation: Die Bürger sind weniger zufrieden mit der Demokratie und gehen seltener zur Wahl, und die Ungleichheit zwischen den Ortsteilen nimmt zu. Vor diesem Hintergrund erörtern die Autoren alternative Instrumente wie interkommunale Zusammenarbeit, Funktionalreformen und Maßnahmen der Verwaltungsmodernisierung.
... Such a tradition is perceived by citizens as a social rule, they behave according to and vote on the basis of. Contrary to what Michelsen et al. (2014) identify for the German case, in Italy institutionally designed decentralization seems unrelated to voter turnout. ...
In the modern globalized world, political participation is of paramount importance for balanced socio-economic growth and for human development. The Indagine Multiscopo sulle famiglie, a survey by Italian public institutions (ISTAT and CNEL), provides a wide range of data to evaluate specific aspects of Italian life. This work uses a set of data from the Indagine to analyse political participation in Italy at a regional level, by means of a composite indicator using parametric (Pena’s distance) and non-parametric (Mazziotta–Pareto Index) techniques. We have obtained a ranking that shows the level of political participation in different territorial contexts. The aim is to analyse the relation between Italian regions and the political behaviour of their communities: political discussions, participation in political meetings and marches, voluntary activity or donations to political parties and so on. The ranking is not correlated to voter turnout. We can assume that the politically engaged minority are unable to convince and involve the rest. At the same time, these small groups do not alter the general mistrust in parties and, generally speaking, in politics, which is spreading across Italy and also Europe.
... Argues that voters consider the costs and benefits of voting in deciding whether to vote or not [42]. Thus people turn up to vote when they consider that the benefits of voting surpass the costs [43]. ...
This paper assesses the relative influence of the factors that spur voter turnout in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election. The influence of eleven variables (drawn from theories) on voter turnout was weighed using binary logistic regression. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2 (11)=74.57, p<0.01. The model explained 25.1% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in voter turnout and correctly classified 76.4% of cases. Males were 1.16 times more likely to turnout than females. Among the variables, political interest (p<0.0001) and political trust (p<0.0001) added significantly to the model. The results revealed that political interest and political trust influenced voter turnout more than other factors. However, socio-economic status had some effect on voter turnout. Thus increasing political interest and political trust were associated with an increased likelihood of voter turnout.
... Evidence from municipal reforms enriched the debate about the role of size, with the argument that size of population probably covers up more relevant structural factors influencing participation at the local level (Michelsen, Boenisch, & Geys, 2013;Swianiewicz, 2010; van Assche & Dierickx, 2007;van Ostaaijen, Gianoli, & Coulson, 2012). The varying distribution of political powers among disentangled residential areas in one municipality is one of the factors that increasingly attract scholars' attention. ...
... Special attention is paid to dominance relationships between individual units, which influence the political participation of their residents. Michelsen et al. (2013) showed that institutional design guaranteeing representation of the interests of distinct local communities within single municipalities through their own council increases turnout, compared to situations where communities' decisionmaking powers are transferred to the one whole-municipality council. B€ onisch, Geys, and Michelsen (2015) looked at the effect of varying sizes of intra-municipal units and showed that the absolute as well as the relative size of the dominant unit decreases overall turnout in amalgamated municipalities. ...
... Firstly, arguments in local reform debates are often linked to the behavior of geographically-defined groups of citizens. In amalgamated municipalities, inhabitants of disentangled resident areas (or "settlement units," as we mostly use in the text 1 ) have their own political preferences concerning the equal distribution of public goods into their areas as a matter of priority (Michelsen et al., 2013;B€ onisch et al., 2015;Olson, 1969). ...
https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1UcBy3Qu6uJtR5
... Henderson and McEwen (2010) study voter participation in regional elections across a number of OECD countries, and conclude that regions that gained power have recorded higher levels of voter turnout. Finally, Andersen et al. (2014) show that voter turnout tends to be higher in Norwegian localities where the stakes of elections (tax revenues from hydropower generation resources) are higher, and Michelsen et al. (2014) find that decentralization of local public good provision boosts voter turnout in German municipalities. ...
This paper exploits variation in tax limits across over 7000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to investigate their impact on voter turnout and local election outcomes. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data estimator on about 14,000 municipal elections during the 2001–2010 decade and on a quasi-experimental approach focusing on the fiscal limitation treatment of municipalities (local income surcharge freeze) in the years 2001 and 2006, where the trajectory of local turnout in the concurrent general elections is used as the counterfactual. The evidence suggests that tax limits provoke: (a) a modest fall in voter turnout in mayoral elections; (b) a mild decrease in the number of mayoral candidates; (c) a sizeable widening of elected mayors’ win margins and some improvement in mayors’ valence proxies. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis that the imposition of tax limits lowers the ideological stakes of local elections, favors party-line crossing, and promotes vote convergence based on the valence of candidates.
