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These five technical airworthiness histograms are utilised for comparison. (a) is the EASA plot, (b) is the UK MAA, (c) is the ADF, (d) is the US Army and (e) is the US Navy. These plots are grouped by activity segment demonstrating relative strengths of the airworthiness organization.
Source publication
licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). Selection and peer-review under responsibility Abstract International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) serve to harmonize the safety regulation of civil aviation around the world. ICAO SARPs are only applicable to countries signatory to the 1944 Chicago Convention and only to ci...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... method of analysis allows for comparison of relative regulatory control of the activities undertaken within each phase (e.g., design, production and maintenance), enabling conclusions regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory frameworks. Figure 9 illustrates the same five regulatory framework assessments, however the test points are radially grouped by the activity phase; with Design (12 to 4 o'clock), Production (4 till 7 o'clock) and Maintenance (7 till 12 o'clock) showing comparative focus. The histograms are positioned the same; EASA (a), UK MAA (b), ADF (c), US Army (d) and US Navy (e). ...
Context 2
... analysis, while utilizing the same data sets, provides a method for identification of the regulatory areas of focus within the regulatory framework. For instance, EASA (Figure 9 (a)) are shown to have slightly more interaction with Design and Maintenance than on Production. The UK MAA (Figure 9 (b)) interact more heavily with Design, which is easily identifiable as the area of most regulatory control for the ADF (Figure 9 (c)), with the ADF Production oversight an immediately identifiable regulatory weakness. ...
Context 3
... instance, EASA (Figure 9 (a)) are shown to have slightly more interaction with Design and Maintenance than on Production. The UK MAA (Figure 9 (b)) interact more heavily with Design, which is easily identifiable as the area of most regulatory control for the ADF (Figure 9 (c)), with the ADF Production oversight an immediately identifiable regulatory weakness. With the US Army (Figure 9 (d)), it is apparent that they rely on product integrity for Design and Production, having less independence with behavioral and process integrity within those two activities. ...
Context 4
... instance, EASA (Figure 9 (a)) are shown to have slightly more interaction with Design and Maintenance than on Production. The UK MAA (Figure 9 (b)) interact more heavily with Design, which is easily identifiable as the area of most regulatory control for the ADF (Figure 9 (c)), with the ADF Production oversight an immediately identifiable regulatory weakness. With the US Army (Figure 9 (d)), it is apparent that they rely on product integrity for Design and Production, having less independence with behavioral and process integrity within those two activities. ...
Context 5
... UK MAA (Figure 9 (b)) interact more heavily with Design, which is easily identifiable as the area of most regulatory control for the ADF (Figure 9 (c)), with the ADF Production oversight an immediately identifiable regulatory weakness. With the US Army (Figure 9 (d)), it is apparent that they rely on product integrity for Design and Production, having less independence with behavioral and process integrity within those two activities. Maintenance has more regulator interaction for attestations. ...
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Citations
... This analysis conducts a comprehensive risk assessment and helps junior management or executive managers to further achieve the highest standards of safety. Recently, BTA has been widely used in risk assessment analysis in various fields, such as medical safety [37,38], petrochemical engineering safety [39,40], marine risk management [41], traffic safety [42], and aviation technical safety [43]. ...
The surrounding waters of Taiwan are evaluated as a moderate risk environment by Casualty Return, Lloyd’s Registry of Shipping. Among all types of maritime accidents, ship collisions occur most often, which has severe consequences, including ship damage, sinking and death of crews, and destruction of marine environments. It is, therefore, imperative to mitigate the risk of ship collision by exploring the risk factors and then providing preventive measures. This study invited domain experts to form a decision-making group, which helped with the risk assessment. The initial set of risk factors was selected from the literature. The expert group then identified seven representative risk factors using rough set theory (RST). The researchers worked with the experts to delineate the diagram of a bow-tie analysis (BTA), which provided the causes, consequences, and preventive and mitigation measures for ship collision incidents. The results show an integrated research framework for the risk assessment of ship collision that can effectively identify key factors and associated managerial strategies to improve navigation safety, leading to a sound marine environment.
... The bow-tie diagram captures a valuable conception for potential causes and analyses the past accidents (Mokhtari et al. 2011). Since the method is both proactive and reactive, most of safety practitioners have utilized for evaluating risks in different industries such as petrochemical, aviation, off-shore, etc. (Shahriar et al. 2012;Khakzad et al. 2013;Purton et al. 2014). maritime environment and maritime safety. ...
Mucilage is one of the harmful substances for marine environment since it prevents oxygen transfer by covering the area from the sea surface and causes significant threats for marine organisms such as fish, fish larvae and eggs. In recent months, the Turkish Straits, including the Istanbul and Çanakkale Straits and the Marmara Sea, have been exposed to serious mucilage events. This paper aims to investigate mucilage effects on maritime shipboard operations by using the bow-tie method, which is one of the practical risk analysis approaches. The method is capable of understanding potential root causes and consequences of mucilage since it provides a systematic approach. Besides its theoretical concept, the paper contributes to marine environment researches and safety inspectors to minimize mucilage effects by investigating potential root causes and consequences.
... If the initiating threats are placed on the left of the top event, and the consequences are placed on its right, the illustration of the model resembles a bowtie ( Figure 2). [24] Figure 2: Bowtie model, adapted from [24] ...
... If the initiating threats are placed on the left of the top event, and the consequences are placed on its right, the illustration of the model resembles a bowtie ( Figure 2). [24] Figure 2: Bowtie model, adapted from [24] ...
... The target level of safety in all classes of UAS operations is 10 -6 occurrences per flight hour, according to JARUS [86]. This is equivalent to the maximum ground fatality rate identified by Clothier et al. [24] Consequently, this occurrence rate is used to classify the transition from a contingency to an emergency (see chapter 4.1.3). Tbd. ...
While in the past Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) were mainly interesting for military and recreational purposes, commercial applications have come to the fore in recent years. Thus, the number and diversity of UAS operating in the airspace are growing. With an intensification of traffic, the risks for crashes and collisions increase, as well. The proposed Contingency Management concept in this thesis is designed as a scheme for mitigating contingencies of UAS during commercial operations. Through the systematic execution of scenario identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment planning, and treatment activity performance, it is possible to solve a contingency phase recursively and automatically. Continuously monitoring the situation and performing a treatment activity resulting from a chosen mitigation strategy, guarantees that Contingency Management only stops intervening if the contingency phase is terminated.
The presented Strategic Contingency Management adaption of the developed concept is an underlayer of Contingency Management and aims at rationally limiting the Contingency Management’s options for action. Strategically preselecting possible treatment strategies, and therefore also activities, reduces the tactical effort and increases the probability of reaching a close-to-optimal solution.
Schematically considering possible contingency scenarios also ensures a holistic view of the UAS-environment-system in risk assessment. By analyzing the context in which the scenario could occur, the Strategic Contingency Management establishes a quantitative treatment indicator, called Scenario Treatment Importance Number, to preselect possible strategies to be performed in the tactical phase. Quantifying the qualitative factor severity of scenario results in a semi-quantitative classification of treatment importance. This calculation allows differentiating contingency- and emergency scenarios to choose suitable strategies for mitigating the consequences of the considered undesired scenario.
Furthermore, functional requirements for the implementation of the proposed Contingency Management and Strategic Contingency Management concept are defined. Both concept and requirements are thus validated with relevant stakeholders who have experience in operating UAS in uncontrolled and controlled airspace. Subsequently, the Strategic Contingency Management concept and the derived requirements are refined to include the stakeholder’s feedback.
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... Each national aviation authority is responsible for the implementation, alongside with the industry's active role. This model has proven to be successful in civil aviation, as the positive outcomes in safety have resulted in the mitigation of the rate of accidents which has led to: a) the expansion of these regulations globally to include the military aircraft (Purton, Clothier, & Kourousis, 2014a;Purton et al., 2014b;Purton & Kourousis, 2014;Purton, Kourousis, Clothier, & Massey, 2014c); b) other industries like healthcare to acknowledge the successful example of aviation and take steps in following its example (Pronovost et al., 2003;Ross, 2014;Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). However, for most military operators around the world, this harmonisation/adaptation has yet to be realised. ...
Purpose:
Most military aviation organisations today have not evolved their safety management approach towards harmonising with civil aviation. Safety culture is the base for any civil aviation organisation, enabling employees to communicate effectively and be fully aware and extrovert on safety. Just culture and reporting culture both are related to safety culture. Both are parts of the awareness process, enhancing safety promotion. These distinct elements and the safety management systems (SMS) can serve well the military aviation. This paper aims to present and discuss the SMS philosophy, structure and elements as a solution for military aviation organisations.
Design/methodology/approach:
The feature of civil aviation SMSs are presented and discussed, with reference to the applicable frameworks and regulations governing the SMS operation. A discussion on the challenges faced within the military aviation organisations, with a brief examination of a European Union military aviation organisation, is presented.
Findings
The European Military Airworthiness Requirements, which are based on the European Aviation Safety Agency set of rules, can act the basis for establishing military aviation SMSs. A civil-based approach, blended, as necessary, with military culture is workable, as this is the case for many defence forces that have adopted such aviation safety systems.
Originality/value:
This viewpoint paper discusses the opportunities and challenges associated with the adoption of SMS by military aviation organisations. This is the first time that this issue is openly discussed and presented to the wider aviation community, outside military aviation.
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... Otherwise, qualitative analysis can also be performed with respect to various industrial accidents using the diagram. Due to the multi-functional and user-friendly features, BT concept finds its popularity in various industrial fields, particularly in petrochemical enterprises [29][30][31][32][33][34] where the diagram is commonly used to analyze occurring probability and risk extent of explosion and fire accidents. After potential dangers, associating causes and consequences have been identified, vulnerable points of risk management, and organizational control can be clearly unfolded by taking into account functions of associated safety barriers. ...
Explosion and fire accidents happen frequently in petrochemical enterprises. For improving risk management, Bow‐tie method is applied to analyze causes, consequences, and control methods of such disasters. Based on fault tree analysis, 42 combination scenarios of primary events leading to explosion and fire accident are achieved. Important order of primary events is determined. Event tree is developed where four consequences, with different occurrence probability and loss degree, are obtained considering of success or failure of emergency evacuation and automatic fire extinguishing system. Structure of Bow‐tie model is established where three accident sources, including limit concentration of liquefied petroleum gas, equipment fault or operation error and fire source, are taken into account. After identification of accident causes and consequences, precautionary and loss‐reducing measures are proposed. The model was applied to analyze explosion and fire accident occurring in Jinyu group of China, demonstrating poor connection between the pipe and oil tank truck and non‐explosion‐proof equipment resulted in the accident. The delayed emergency excavation and failure of automatic fire extinguishing system led to fully developed fire and heavy casualties. To reduce such disasters, controlling suggestions in terms of educational training, intelligent monitoring, equipment management, and safety management were provided for Jinyu group. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 38: 78–86, 2019
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