Theoretical Organizational Structure for Agri-Business Parks 

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... and the technical levels. While some sources blame the 90 failure of the process on a lack of funds, insiders report that there was an investment of at least a million dollars in the reform process (in the form of 91 transport costs, leasing of buildings, etc). Personnel providing external technical support for the reform were characterized by Congolese public servants as lacking in the necessary political connections and „savoir - faire‟ 92 to have an impact. A new Minister for lands was appointed in December 2014, and he pledged his support for CONAREF in early 2015, but it remains to be seen whether he will have a major impact. Aside from a general problem of lack of high-level support for the reform, discussions around Article 16 of the Code Agricole , regulating foreign land leasing, were particularly problematic: DRC officials are facing pressure to relax the law, especially from governments of major investor companies 93 such as the Belgium and the Federation of Congolese Enterprises, which includes many foreign investors, and which engineered a high-profile 94 campaign against Article 16. However, the text of Article 16 came directly from the President‟s Office and is hence politically sensitive . 95 President Kabila made clear his own interest in the matter in a public letter released in 2011, which states, “ I ask that the imperative is made clear, that nationals control the shareholdings of Congolese-registered businesses eligible to be attributed land in Democratic Republic of Congo ” . 96 The law has reportedly 97 made potential investors nervous about the risks of investing in the DRC 98 and few new investments have been seen since late 2011. There is other evidence that the government resisted large-scale acquisition: China ‟ s ZTE was reported some years ago to be attempting to lease 3 million hectares of land in Equateur province, but the government of DRC was reportedly 99 unwilling to permit such a large deal to take place. In 2009, a senior ZTE 100 staffer stated that the company intended to lease up to a million hectares. 101 But it won rights in 2008 to grow oil palm only 100,000 hectares. More broadly, there is a perception that the DRC government has “ anti- entrepreneurial economic policies ” , which reflect an intention to avoid 102 competition in economic sectors dominated by political leaders. The National Agricultural Investment Plan (known by its French acronym, NPIA) is an attempt to encourage FDI in agriculture, while allowing the state to closely control foreign access to land. It is highly ambitious, and its success will depend on the government‟s ability to attract private investors. There is widespread cynicism about the NPIA, which was written by experts from multilateral organizations rather than Congolese civil servants, and is seen primarily as a means to attract investors rather than as a strategy deeply 103 rooted in the decision-making processes of the state. It is therefore, in many senses, a retrograde step from the more consultative approach taken in the development of the Code Agricole. The main focus of the NPIA is the concept of „agribusiness parks‟, large areas zoned for agricultural production (including through outgrower arrangements) and processing, and designated as special economic zones to provide tax breaks and other benefits. These areas, originally conceived of as „growth poles‟, have received $100 million 104 in loans from the World Bank. The NPIA plans to provide companies with leases in 21 agribusiness parks, totalling up to 640,000 square kilometers (247,100 square miles), or more than one-quarter of the total land area of the 105 country; though only one had been opened by mid-2015. Since the NPIA was published, the targeted number of Parks has increased to 26, in part due 106 to the enthusiastic support of the World Bank. The 80,000-hectare site at Bukanga-Lonzo near the capital, Kinshasa has seen some investment from South African firms including Africom Commodities Pty. Ltd, which has planted maize, the fertiliser company Triomf, and Suidwes, which 107 specialises in farming equipment and finance. Africom is contracted by the Government of the DRC, and hence is not bearing the financial risks of the 108 project itself. The government has spent $83 million on developing the initial phase of the Park, including installing electricity, with the aim of developing up to 50,000 ha for maize production. In a second phase, requiring another $100 million of investment, vegetable production will be initialised (including 1000 ha under irrigation), with a target of producing 109 500 tonnes of vegetables per day. In a separate component of this phase, another $120 would be required to allow for livestock production, estimated to have the potential for 45,000 chickens to be slaughtered and transported out of the site each day. In a third phase, a fresh vegetable market will be constructed at the site, at a cost of $50 million. As can be seen from Figure 1, some 25,000 hectares in each Park are reserved for „local farmers‟. In the next two years, according to government officials, the state plans to develop agro-business parks in North Kivu, Rusizi (South Kivu), Equateur Province, Nkuli valley in Bas-Congo Province, and Bandundu. It is planned that 150,000 small-scale farmers will be involved in the production of 110 oilpalm in the Bas-Congo site. By April 2015, some 68,000 ha in Bas- Congo Province had in principle been ceded by approximately 500 local 111 people to the state. The establishment of such a Park in Walikale, North Kivu, is especially ambitious, given the insecurity that still affects part of that territory. Mozfoods, one of the investing companies, has stated that 50% of the production of one of the agro-processing zone will be exported to Europe, 30% to South Africa and 20% to Mozambique. From a land governance perspective, it is important that certain policy and legal reforms are made before these Parks are established. For example, as noted by the LGA report, there are no guidelines in Congolese law regarding procedures for consultation with local people, or identification of prior land claims, involved in the process of identifying land for concessions. NGOs such as Confèdèration nationale des producteurs agricoles du Congo (Conapac) have raised concerns that the development of these huge areas may involve the alienation of customarily owned land and displace local 112 communities. Some land disputes may be mitigated, to some extent, by the availability of jobs for local people in the agri-business parks, and compensation will presumably be paid for those losing access to land. However, it is not only the economic and livelihood aspects of such relationships that must be considered, but also the cultural and political resonance of „land‟ in rural DRC. Financial compensation may not satisfy all customary landowners, including customary leaders who will lose access to a large part of the lo cal „currency of power‟. Moreover, the concept is incredibly ambitious in its assumption that companies and state agencies can coordinate in every aspect of the agricultural commodity chain so that production can be marketed and transported effectively. Currently, the agricultural sector is characterised by “ institutional cacophony ” 113 with poor coordination between the numerous Ministries and agencies involved. Even with massive funding, it is not clear that a geographical and institutional focus on „agri -bu siness parks‟ will resolve inter - institutional miscommunication and conflicts and permit the necessary infrastructure and commercio-political networks to be established. The government‟s attempts to facilitate implementation of so many of these vast experiments is likely to divert energy and attention away from much-needed efforts to reform the land sector in the DRC. It is clear that sustained attention should be paid to the national legal and policy framework as well as the current status of existing medium- and large-scale concessions in the DRC, as discussed in the following section. As noted above, the alienation of land from customary systems, often without adequate consultation with local customary owners, verification of the status of the land (i.e. whether there are overlapping claims) or other legal due process, has continuously occurred in the DRC since the colonial period. Different forms of power – related to affiliations with customary institutions, state agencies, and private sources of wealth – are closely connected to the ability to acquire land in the DRC. The „global land - grab‟ narrative regarding FDI in land and farming in the DRC, while not entirely accurate, had the benefit of focussing the attention of many international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral donor organizations on the land tenure regime in the DRC, and the political economy of land acquisition. Partly as a result of observations that, at the local level, Congolese-owned concessions are often just as conflictual and controversial as foreign-owned concessions, more effort has been spent on understanding and addressing „land grabbing‟ by domestic actors. Local NGOs, who have long been informally collecting data on land- grabbing by domestic concessionaires , have more recently been supported in their efforts to systematically document commercial land concessions and 114 the disputes in which they are often embroiled. Unpublished NGO data on concessions in the Kivu regions, for example, includes considerable detail regarding the dimensions of the landholdings, as well as the dates that they were acquired and provisional information on the legal status of the concessions (for example, whether they are on file with the tax agency, or have proper land lease documentation). For example, one study of concessions in Eastern DRC tentatively concluded that only 20% of the landholdings investigated had fulfilled their legal obligations in terms of 116 ...