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The number of cancer fatalities caused by inhalation during the passage of a plume initially containing 10 kilograms of PuO 2 aerosol for various deposition velocities and average population densities, for a risk factor of 3-12 cancers deaths per milligram of WgPu inhaled.
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If the area around the release is evacuated after the plume passes to avoid chronic exposure to deposited plutonium, there will almost certainly be no acute health effects from a worst-case accident, even close to the site and under worst-case weather conditions. This is especially true of civilian populations, which are usually no closer than a fe...
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... factors [1 + I r (∞)/I] should therefore probably be used to multiply the cancer death estimates in table 1 except for the largest values of v (≥ 0.1 meters per second) and in urban areas where the contaminated areas would probably be decontaminated. Table 5 gives the number of cancer deaths from inhalation during and after the plume passage under these assumptions. ...Citations
... As the most important isotope of plutonium, 239 Pu is a key fissile component in nuclear devices. The most likely and dangerous entry route for plutonium is inhalation (Fetter and Von Hippel, 1990;Voelz and Buican, 2000). Once inhaled, plutonium is able to remain in the lungs or lymph system, or be absorbed by the blood and transported to the liver or bones, depending on its size and increasing the probability of cancer (Stewart et al., 1965;Fetter and Von Hippel, 1990;Voelz and Buican, 2000;Liu et al., 2011). ...
... The most likely and dangerous entry route for plutonium is inhalation (Fetter and Von Hippel, 1990;Voelz and Buican, 2000). Once inhaled, plutonium is able to remain in the lungs or lymph system, or be absorbed by the blood and transported to the liver or bones, depending on its size and increasing the probability of cancer (Stewart et al., 1965;Fetter and Von Hippel, 1990;Voelz and Buican, 2000;Liu et al., 2011). It is commonly assumed that particles having aerodynamic diameter (AD) 10 µm and less are respirable. ...
... Meanwhile, the reaction product (PuO 2 ) is dispersed into the atmosphere in the form of aerosols Haschke and Martz, 1998). For example, several accidents happened in 1960s in which high explosive in nuclear warheads exploded and contaminated the environment with plutonium (Fetter and Von Hippel, 1990). Therefore, evaluation of the plutonium aerosol source term (the total mass and size distribution of aerosols) is of main importance for accident prevention, risk assessment and emergency response. ...
An experimental method is developed for the purpose of simulating plutonium aerosol source terms with conventional metals in laboratory. In this method, metal samples are aerosolized by high explosive detonation in a containment vessel. Aerosols having aerodynamic diameter (AD) less than 10 µm are then collected by a cascade impactor and analyzed by atomic absorption spectroscopy. Two sets of experiments were conducted. In the first set, five candidate metal samples (Ag, W, Sn, Ce, and V) were tested. It is found that the cumulative mass distribution of silver under certain conditions was in good agreement with that of plutonium from the Operation Roller Coaster-Double Track experiment. Thus, silver is chosen as a surrogate to simulate the plutonium aerosol source term. In the second set, silver aerosol source term was studied in detail with different test configurations. The results demonstrate that the peak of the mass-size distribution of silver is in the AD range 1.1–3.3 µm. The amount and fraction of relatively small silver aerosols decrease significantly with time due to coagulation and deposition. Interestingly, the amount of silver in aerosols could be expressed as a quadratic function of the peak detonation pressure.
© 2016 American Association for Aerosol Research
... Fetter and von Hippel employed this model in the context of plutonium dispersal in nuclear-warhead accidents in their 1990 paper. 17 Its utilization with respect to radiological dispersal devices raises the potential for forming a basic understanding of dispersal of a radioactive plume after an RDE. This is because both the temporal and the spatial evolution of the radioactive cloud are fundamental features of the wedge model. ...
A potential terrorist attack utilizing a Radiological Dispersal Device would spread fear and panic on a massive scale, in addition to creating a widespread, severe, and long-lasting economic burden. The main purpose of the present study is to make some assessments of the radiological impact of such an incident, with a primary focus on the public health risk. We discuss the possibility of utilizing radioactive sources or nuclear fuel in such an incident and make a comparison of the relative impact associated with each source.
... In all four cases, the nuclear weapons were fragmented and contamination was largely in the form of radioactive particles. Indeed, the greatest radiological risk posed by such accidents are the dispersion of fine Pu particles that may be inhaled (Fetter and von Hippel, 1990). The risks associated with deposition of U and Pu in the marine environment are believed to be relatively minor (AMAP, 1997). ...
... The braking parachutes of two bombs failed and they struck ground at high speed. Thus, two of the bombs detonated conventionally on impact on land (Fetter and von Hippel, 1990). The conventional explosion and subsequent fire (Garcia-Tenorio et al., 2004) caused the dispersion of Pu and U over an area of approximately 2,30 km 2 . ...
... Indeed, the fissile core (pit) itself may consist of a HEU/weapon grade Pu composite (Bukharin, 1998). The physico-chemical form of this composite material is classified information, but the Pu in nuclear weapons is usually taken to be in metallic form (Fetter and von Hippel, 1990;. Metallic U and Pu would be expected to be oxidised in explosive fires such as occurred in the Palomares and Thule accidents, thereby explaining the XANES results. ...
... Tel.: +39-081-676440, Fax: +39-081-676346 Radiat Environ Biophys (2002) 41:125–130 DOI 10.1007/s00411-002-0156-5 O R I G I N A L PA P E R cancer may be induced after a latency time of many years by considerably smaller inhaled amounts [3]. A number of simple models have been used to predict the risk from plutonium explosions or fire [7, 8]. In this paper, we elected to use a Gaussian plume model for plutonium dispersion, as implemented in the HOTSPOT code [9]. ...
The possible use of radioactivity dispersal devices by terrorist groups has been recently reported in the news. In this paper, we discuss the threat of terrorist attacks by plutonium, with particular attention to the dispersal of plutonium by explosion or fire. Doses resulting from inhalation of radioactive aerosol induced by a plutonium explosion or fire are simulated using a Gaussian plume model (the HOTSPOT code) for different meteorological conditions. Ground contamination and resuspension of dust are also considered in the simulations. Our simulations suggest that acute effects from a plutonium dispersal attack are very unlikely. For late stochastic effects, the explosion poses a greater hazard than fire. However, even in the worst-case scenario, the dispersed plutonium would cause relatively few excess cancers (around 80 in a city of 2 million inhabitants) after many years from the explosion, and these excess cancers would remain undetected against the background of cancer fatalities.
... Nuclear Weapon State cooperation on de-alerting Proposals for 'de-alerting' nuclear forces are now widely discussed and supported. 7 Moreover, they are reportedly being actively discussed and pursued in bilateral discussions between the USA and Russia. Progress in this area can be achieved through a process of unilateral ad-justments and declarations. ...
... Moreover, the alternative to production of LEU __ heavywater reactors that burn natural uranium fuel __ are not necessarily more proliferation-resistant, since plutonium can be produced in them more easily. 7 q France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom have pursued efforts to recover plutonium from civil spent reactor fuel and convert it into MOX fuel (mixed ...
... Complete nuclear disarmament, if it is achieved, is likely to be the last stage in a lengthy step-by-step process in which the completion of each step is rigorously monitored by the all states involved before proceeding to the next. 7 The conclusion of a cutoff convention would be a major step towards the safeguards regime required for a NDT. It seems likely that under such a convention the IAEA would not apply safeguards to power and research reactors in the nuclear weapon states (for instance to the 110 light water power reactors in the US) but would safeguard all "sensitive" nuclear facilities in those states __ in other words, in all those (relatively few) reprocessing and enrichment plants that were kept in operation for the production of civilian plutonium or low enriched uranium. ...
In this work, we identify, isolate, and characterize hot particles from bulk soil samples collected from a non-critical nuclear detonation site. Several non-destructive techniques were used to identify and isolate the nuclear fuel particles from soil samples. Digital autoradiography was used to indicate and localize individual “hot particles”, while γ-spectroscopy was employed to confirm plutonium presence. In addition, scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive spectroscopy were used to study the surface morphology and elemental composition of the hot particles. Initial sample analyses indicate that explosively dispersed non-critical fuel morphology may be markedly different from other non-critical accidents.
First Nuclear Reactor in Oklo. Earth’s first heat-producing nuclear reactor was accomplished without the assistance of humans. It produced 100 kW for 150,000 years, 1.8 billion years ago in Oklo, Gabon. The residue of fission fragments in the soil and the reduction in 235U content from 0.7 to 0.4 % proves the hypothesis. This happened without cooling pumps, fuel-rods and emergency-core-cooling systems. This natural thermal reactor operated merely because a good, rich deposit of uranium was concentrated in a watery estuary. Natural-uranium at that time was 4 % 235U, before it decayed to today’s 0.7 %. Water was needed to place uranium into solution, carry it downstream and concentrate it the estuary basin. This multi-step process concentrated the moderately rare uranium into a robust uranium ore. Water also slowed (moderated) high-energy fission neutrons to low velocities, to enhance the probability to fission. A reactor needs only a good concentration of fissionable materials (235U, 233U, 239Pu) in a reasonable geometry, with a moderator (H2O, D2O, graphite). No nuclear engineers were needed for the Oklo nuclear reactor.
In this chapter two possible new arms-control agreements are considered: a ban on nuclear reactors in earth orbit; and a ban on laser Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The work being reported here has been done mostly by working groups of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Committee of Soviet Scientists as part of their Joint Research Project on Arms Reductions.
