The Dead Sea study area. 

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Context 1

... Gertmann, 1999). Rainfall is limited to winter months; it varies from about 500 mm/year in the northwestern highlands to less than 100 mm/year in the valley floor (Isaac et al., 2000). Potential evapotranspiration in the valley floor is about 2,000 mm/year, and actual evaporation from the Dead Sea surface is about 1,300–1,600 mm. The temperature is about 40°C in summer and 15°C in winter (Assaf et al., 1998). Receiving only marginal rainfall the amount of water the Dead Sea contains depends on the inflows it receives. Before the 1950s the Dead Sea had received about 1,300 million cubic meters per year (MCM/year) of good quality freshwater from its major contributor, the Jordan River. Until the late 1990s, however, this amount has dropped to about 100–200 MCM/year of saline and polluted water (Hillel, 1994; Al-Weshah, 2000; Shavit et al., 2001). The reasons for this development are given in Figure 1: Israel had used nearly the entire inflow into the Lake Tiberias for use in the National Water Carrier. Similarly, Jordan has blocked the inflow from the Yarmouk to use its water for the King Abdullah Canal. In addition, several inflows from side wadis were reduced because of exploitation of their headwaters (cf. Orthofer et al., 2001). Another cause for the decline might be found in a reduced water discharge from below-surface inflows, but the interaction between enhanced groundwater abstraction in the populated western and eastern uplands and these underground springs are not yet understood. Following the depletion of inflows and the increased evaporation, the Dead Sea levels have fallen constantly since the 1950s, and in 1978 – after falling below the –400 m level – the Dead Sea had retreated from its shallow southern basin. Since then the southern basin consists only of man-made evaporation ponds, to which a net amount of about 200–250 MCM/year is pumped from the northern basin for exploiting the minerals (Gavrielli et al., 2002). It is estimated that the salt industries contribute 25–30% of the present total evaporation rates. Figure 2 shows the accelerating decline of the water level since 1976 according to the Israel Hydrological Service. The surface of the water body that before 1950 has been about 1,000 km has shrunk currently to about 650 km (Eidelman et al., 2006). At the same time as there is a decreasing water table in the northern basin, there is an increasing water level in the southern evaporation ponds. This striking discrepancy is caused by the slow but constant siltation of evaporation ponds (Raz, 2005). The decline of the water level of the Dead Sea in its northern basin is the obvious and easily visible symptom of the degradation. However, there are less visible consequences as well, most notorious the sinkhole that have developed along the shores. Sinkholes are rapidly developing caverns (with 3–10 m dia- meter and a depth of up to 10 m) that have already caused major infrastructural damage on roads, bridges, buildings, etc. Sinkholes are caused by lowered water tables and groundwater overexploitation (Bowman et al., 2000; Baer et al., 2002). Furthermore, as result of the lowering of the water level, the adjacent aquifers are seriously affected. Furthermore, the decline of the Dead Sea also affects the freshwater springs on its shores (e.g. Ain Fashkha, Ain Ain Turiba) that support a unique biodiversity. The decline of the water level has also already had a serious effect on tourism. The costs of the degradation are substantial: tourism facilities can only help- lessly look upon disappearing shorelines. Sinkholes have already cost major repair expenses on the more developed Israeli shores; the looming danger of more sinkholes discourages further investment. Planning and development has come to a stand still and has Israeli government and local leaders scrambling to find a technical solution to the sinkhole phenomenon. There is a strong disagree- ment with between the local residents and the Ministries of the Environment and Infrastructure regarding the most appropriate strategy for development in the region due to the sinking Dead Sea and the resultant sinkholes. One of the main problems with sinkholes is that they are currently unpredictable and thus often large areas have to be closed for agriculture or tourism. The increasing water table at the southern evaporation ponds requires protection of the tourism facilities through costly dams. This paper summarizes a few results from an interdisciplinary study done by an international team with Austrian, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, and UK scientists. It was hoped that collaboration of engineers with social scientists would help to analyze the driving forces of the decline of the Dead Sea water usage system and to outline options for a more sustainable water management. It is clear that any solution will not only have to rely on a sound physical basis, but will have to ensure social equity through the region. The study area is outlined in Figure 3. While the western side study areas follows the watersheds of the subbasins, the eastern (Jordanian) side of the study area has been cut off at the 250 m elevation line. This was necessary because on the Jordanian side the Wala, Mujib, and Haza subbasins stretch vastly into eastern Jordan which has made it difficult to collect the base data. Following that, the population distribution has a marked shift toward the Palestinian part of the study areas in the northwest with many people living the urban habitations in the mountains; these are physically part of the Dead Sea basin, but de facto part of a different social and economic system. The physical goal for stabilizing the Dead Sea water level in the long term is fairly well known: in order to prevent further degradation of the Dead Sea and to ensure at least its current water table, it needs a net water inflow of about 600–1,000 MCM/year (Gavrielli et al., 2002). More inflow may be conducted through two options. One option is to (at least partially) restore the flow of the River Jordan to around 450 MCM/year, which has been found to be a realistic possibility in a previous study (Orthofer et al., 2001). The stopping of the evaporation by mineral works would provide an additional 200–250 MCM/year. A major problem for this option is that “economically valuable” water (that could be used for the urban sector, for agriculture and industrial development) is being discharged into the Dead Sea, where it becomes immediately “economically useless.” As long as water is considered a commodity, some politicians in the region consider it necessary that someone pays this bill that could be estimated at about $45 million. The second option is currently discussed at global level: pumping about 1,800 MCM/year sea water through a 240 km long conduit from the Red Sea to replenish the missing inflow, to use the gravity pressure for desalination through reverse osmosis, and to produce electricity. The project would generate about 800 MCM/year desalinated water while the remaining 1,000 MCM/year of brine would be dumped into the Dead Sea. This “solution” is a large centrally controlled investment of about $50,000–10,000 million. It is targeted at providing additional freshwater for the urban sector Jordan rather than at preserving the Dead Sea. There are a number of negative impacts that are expected, including an unsustainable regional social development because of “new water riches” and environmental problems associated with the change of the elemental composition of the Dead Sea water that may lead to algae blooming (Gavrielli et al., 2002) and temporary precipitation of gypsum. In this paper we will present two options for a future development. First, we summarize the narrative scenarios that were discussed with focus groups. The qualitative information of these scenarios was translated into quantitative and semiquantitative data. A system dynamic model was established that allows tracing the development over time. Of the many model components, only a few key indicators were selected to demonstrate similarities and differences of the two scenarios. Of course, our quantitative model can only reflect the quantitative (essentially physical) dimensions of the consequences of development options. Qualitative impacts – such as changes of traditions, perceptions, or a development toward more of less equity are necessarily omitted in this simu- lation. This paper focuses on three indicators, namely, the Dead Sea inflow– outflow balance, the Dead Sea water level, and the water used in the different user sectors. Narrative scenarios are “an attractive alternative to the false precision promised by point-estimate forecasts” (Schnaars, 2001) because their qualitative nature is often more appropriate in thinking about the future than quantitative methods. We chose to use scenario development as a way to outline possible futures of the Dead Sea basin that would allow looking past our own blind spots and seeing alternative solutions that were not being discussed before. The advantage of this approach is the ability to create multiple futures under different sets of assumptions. Thus we refrained from deciding which future was the “most likely,” but focused on outlining which futures were “possible” and had rele- vance for decisions being made today. This gives a more integrative view of the possible futures without falling into the trap of trying to predict specific out- comes 20 or 25 years into the future. Following the methods suggested by Schwartz (1996), Kleiner (1999), and we have defined driving forces that have a major impact on the system, that are independent of each other (uncorrelated), and that are highly uncertain. With these requirements, we have identified three driving forces, each one of them with two options: • The level of cooperation – “high” or “low” • The role of agriculture – “central” or “limited” • The type of investment – “high impact” or “low ...

Context 2

... is clear that any solution will not only have to rely on a sound physical basis, but will have to ensure social equity through the region. The study area is outlined in Figure 3. While the western side study areas follows the watersheds of the sub- basins, the eastern (Jordanian) side of the study area has been cut off at the 250 m elevation line. ...