Table 1 - uploaded by David Rinaldi
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Summary of the instruments providing financial support to EU Member States EU common MFS instruments EA member states' MFS instruments
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CEPS Research Reports provide in-depth analyses of a wide range of key policy questions facing Europe, drawing on state-of-the-art research methodologies and the latest literature. As an institution, CEPS takes no position on questions of European policy. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a pers...
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Citations
... EFSM: This temporary facility (in place until 2013) was funded through up to €60 billion of bonds issued by the European Commission on behalf of the EU. It constituted an integral part of the various rescue packages for the Eurozone (Alcidi et al., 2017), and contributed €22.5 billion of the €85 billion bailout package to Ireland (Breen, 2012). As the EFSM was guaranteed through the EU budget, the outs faced the same liability as the ins (Thompson, 2011). ...
What are the policy consequences of constitutional differentiation in core state powers? We argue that the most important consequence is not necessarily the exclusion of the constitutional outs from the policies of the ins, but their reintegration by different means. The outs often have strong functional and political incentives to re-join the policies they opted out from, and the ins have good reasons to help them back in. We develop a theoretical framework that derives the incentives for reintegration from the costs of a policy exclusion. We use a novel dataset of reintegration opportunities to map trends and patterns of reintegration across policy fields and member states. We analyze selected cases of reintegration to probe the plausibility of our theoretical argument.
... This conditionality consisted of country-specific and time-varying mixes of three ingredients: fiscal consolidation, financial sector restructuring and recapitalisation, and structural reforms. A full analysis of the content of the bailout programmes is beyond the scope of this section and the reader can be referred to the abundant literature covering the topic (Alcidi et al., 2017;Chang et al., 2019;Eichengreen, 2012;Ioannou et al., 2015;Moro, 2014;Sapir et al., 2014;Steinberg and Vermeiren, 2016). ...
To overcome the euro area (EA) crisis, the core pushed the periphery to cut labour costs. However, this paper documents that internal devaluation (ID) only mildly improves exports and it can significantly harm firms’ non‐price competitiveness factors. This raises the question of whether ID entered the bail‐out conditionality only for economic reasons or also with political motivations. We argue that the economic crisis reignited a trust‐confidence crisis between the core and periphery countries, with the latter emerging as non‐credible reformers. While some adjustment to regain competitiveness was necessary in the periphery, it is hard to conceive that the policy mix adopted was the outcome of taking all costs into account. Political reasons appear to have exerted a notable influence and this may undermine the effectiveness, ownership and sustainability of present and future reforms. Recovering competitiveness in the euro area (EA) is vital to sustaining social progress and political stability.
... The focus of this paper is the analysis, within this latter category of "structural reforms", of those policy measures adopted in order to reform civil servants' career development. We abstract from the fiscal performance and financial system conditionality imposed on the countries under stress (a comprehensive analysis of the conditionality can be found, among others in, among others, EAPN 2013, Sapir et al. 2014, Alcidi et al. 2017). ...
This article examines how civil servants’ career development was treated in the loan-driven EU reform recommendations for Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland and Spain in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Neither the European Commission (EC), nor the ‘Troika’, made any proposals for reforming the career development of those countries’ civil services. This omission is dysfunctional given the otherwise ambitious reform agenda the EC required from these countries in order to grant them financial support.
... Jak wskazują doświadczenia państw pozostających poza strefą euro, takich jak Węgry czy Rumunia, w sytuacji kryzysu finansowego kraje te mogą polegać jedynie na znacznie mniejszym -i mniej elastycznym -instrumencie bilansu płatniczego (Art. 143 TFUE), którego moc pożyczkowa dopiero niedawno została zwiększona do maksymalnej kwoty 50 mld euro (Alcidi et al., 2017). Alternatywnie państwa spoza strefy euro zobowiązane są zwrócić się o wsparcie bezpośrednio do Międzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego (tak jak zrobiła to Polska w 2009 r. uzyskując elastyczną linię kredytową, za dostęp do której przez 8 lat zapłaciła blisko 2 mld zł), na którego zarządzanie mają mniejszy wpływ, a którego pożyczki są często bardziej kosztowne od tych, otrzymywanych przez kraje strefy euro. ...
... Na korzyści te w największym stopniu składa się wyższe ryzyko wystąpienia bańki cenowej na rynku mieszkaniowym przy przedwczesnym przystąpieniu Polski do strefy euro. Według szacunków Cecchettiego (2008) odchylenie cen nieruchomości od trendu o ponad 5 proc. może wywołać spadek PKB nawet o 4 proc. ...
We analyse the costs and benefits of the decision to delay adopting euro by Poland. We assume that - as per the EU Treaties - all Member States with a time-limited derogation from full EMU Membership eventually will join the common currency area. We distinguish between costs and benefits which are more or less measurable (transaction costs, debt servicing), those which may materialise under specific circumstances and those which are non-measurable. We find that assessment of measurable factors weighs in favour of euro adoption, but that benefit diminishes with time. Potential costs and benefits are contingent on policies and the use of macro-prudential instruments specifically. Institutions and structural factors explain the divergent experience of current Member States in this respect. Non-measurable costs and benefits are predominantly political in nature. They are determined by the value politicians and citizens attribute to factors such as independence of economic and monetary policies or influence over shaping the future EMU (including the new elements thereof, such as the Eurozone budget). Our analysis incorporates the extensive EMU reform since the economic crisis, and its impact on the scope of convergence criteria.
... Nowym mechanizmem wsparcia, z którego mogą korzystać kraje strefy euro w sytuacjach kryzysowych, jest Europejski Mechanizm Stabilizacji Finansowej (European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, EFSM), który dysponuje kapitałem w wysokości 500 mld euro. Obecnie Polska ma dostęp do znacznie niższych funduszy [w ramach programu BoP -Balance-of-payments assistance programme, Europejskiego Instrumentu Stabilności Finansowej (European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF) oraz Europejskiego Mechanizmu Stabilizacji] 84 . Z drugiej jednak strony można mówić o zwiększeniu podatności Polski na wystąpienie tzw. ...
Common public debt in Europe is on the rise. Could it open a new chapter in fiscal integration? Over the past 15 years it has gained in prominence to provide collective funds for financial assistance and investment projects to meet common objectives, in particular when national budgets were stretched. This article reviews how the political focus of the Member States on keeping the financial position of the European Union (EU) under tight control has given way to large-scale common public debt issuance as the logical but still exceptional response to a crisis, pandemic, or war that demands collective action. To open a new chapter in fiscal integration, Member States will need to grant the EU a permanent option to borrow capital within pre-defined limits as well as a standing source of tax revenues for fulfilling its stabilisation, redistribution, and allocation functions. A central fiscal capacity with a permanent role for common public debt in turn requires effective central fiscal surveillance to secure sound national public finances.
The Debt Crisis in the Eurozone in Years 2010‑ 2018. Genesis, Dynamics and Tools to Overcome the Crisis
The global financial crisis significantly contributed to the outbreak of the Eurozone debt crisis in 2010 and exposed the institutional weaknesses of the entire zone that had existed since its inception. In 2010‑2018, the European Union focused essentially on four basic forms of crisis management in the Eurozone: financial support for indebted economies, aid programs for crisis‑stricken countries, measures by the European Central Bank to overcome the crisis and system reform of the Eurozone and the Economic and Monetary Union. The research objective of the article is to analyze the dynamics of the debt crisis in the Eurozone. The author would like to answer the following research questions: How much have the aid programs of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund contributed to overcoming the debt crisis? Has this crisis really been overcome? How deep were the structural reforms of the indebted economies? The author also defines the research hypothesis that the debt crisis in the Eurozone has not been finally overcome, since in many countries government debt is still on a high level.
There is no need for Europe to replicate the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can provide the backstop for sovereigns, even without a financial contribution from the IMF. In this sense, the ESM already constitutes to a large extent a ‘European Monetary Fund’. Other IMF activities, such as surveillance and policy coordination should remain with the European Commission, the Eurogroup and other existing bodies. The financial resources of the ESM will be required as a backstop only intermittently, in times of great financial market instability. The need for this will evolve as a function of the nature of financial markets and their cross-border integration. It is not possible to forecast with any precision when the next financial crisis might break out and what form it will take. Any evolution of the ESM should thus aim at enhancing flexibility in its instruments while clarifying its overall mandate (financial stability), rather than changing the details of the rescue mechanism or its institutional structure. The financial stability function of the ESM should be extended to the central institutions of the Banking Union, with an ultimate backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Moreover, the ESM should be viewed as the natural instrument for unifying the euro area’s representation in the IMF.
