Table 2 - uploaded by Ismael Aguilar-Benitez
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[1] In many developing and developed cities, nonpayment for water services undermines the financial health of water utilities; in poorer areas, it also hinders the water utilities' ability to serve poor households. However, nonpayment has not received much attention in the literature so far. In this paper, we analyze nonpayment for a unique data se...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... Basic statistics for the data set of 28,358 household accounts used to estimate our panel data models are presented in Table 2. We see that retired households tend to consume slightly more than working ones, and that ''Residencial'' users consume more water than ''Domestico'' users, except when they are retired. ...
Context 2
... Although the utility-wide impact of nonpayment on water use is fairly modest, it is not negligible in this arid region: it represents approximately 35,800 m 3 per month based on a simple calculation that takes into account the percentage of metered households in each of our four household categories (see Table 1), average monthly water consumption (from Table 2), and percentage of water overconsumption (using results for FE models, at the bottom of Table 3). This is enough to serve approximately 1,400 Nuevo Laredo households who do not receive water services from the city and who buy at least some of their water from expensive water vendors. ...
Citations
... Studies exploring the determinants of water bill nonpayment (rather than late payment) have found consistently that consumer satisfaction with service quality plays an important role in reducing nonpayment in Uganda (Mugabi et al., 2009), Guatemala (Vásquez, 2015), and Nicaragua (Vásquez & Alicea-Planas, 2017). The results regarding household income are mixed, with positive impacts in Nicaragua (Vásquez & Alicea-Planas, 2017) and no effect in Mexico (Aguilar-Benitez & Saphores, 2008). Naturally, these findings are of limited relevance for late payment in developed countries. ...
This paper examines a small random liquidity shock to reveal the effect of liquidity constraints on late payment behavior. In Jerusalem, water bill due dates are randomly determined and therefore may occur just before or after social security paydays. We compared the likelihood of late payments by low‐income households when they receive their social benefits a day after the water bill due date to the likelihood of late payment by the same households when they receive their benefits a day or more before the water bill due date. Using a large administrative data set, we found that a small random liquidity shock leads to a substantial increase in late payments of more than 10 percentage points among income support recipients and around 6 percentage points for old‐age pension recipients with supplementary income. The mismatch between utility payment due dates and paydays may result in interest charges and high late fees, contributing to the poverty penalty.
... Seulement 17 % proviennent des unités de dessalement (16 unités) au coût de 72 DA/m 3 (Kherbache et Oukaci, 2018). 5 Burt et al., 2018 ;Vasquez et Alicea-Planas, 2017 ;Jensen et Chindarkar, 2017 ;Vasquez, 2015 ;Aguilar-Benitez et Saphores, 2008 ;Fankhauser et Tepic, 2007 ;Kayaga et al., 2004 ; Jensen et Morrisey, 1990. réglementaires) et 4,86 % à 8,83 % des factures ne sont pas payées (partie 2). ...
Cette évaluation fournit une estimation des effets des facteurs déterminants des difficultés financières des abonnés à honorer leur facture d’eau. Ces difficultés sont mesurées à l’aide de la durée et du risque de retard de paiement dans deux bases de données (la population et un échantillon) de la commune de Béjaïa, en Algérie. Nous appliquons la spécification de Cox à la durée et le modèle Probit au risque de retard. Les résultats montrent que ces difficultés varient significativement selon plusieurs facteurs identifiés dans plusieurs études empiriques. Classification JEL : Q25, L95, C33, C13, D12
... Further, the accumulated invoices for long time may lead the utility management to call with the customer and provide deep discount if he or she will pay the total balance i.e. all unpaid invoices. A study from Nuevo Laredo, Mexico showed that only 50% of households on average paid their water bills on time, which compared to 79% for electricity where penalties and disconnections are enforced (Aguilar-Benitez & Saphores, 2008). ...
... Further, the accumulated invoices for long time may lead the utility management to call with the customer and provide deep discount if he or she will pay the total balance i.e. all unpaid invoices. A study from Nuevo Laredo, Mexico showed that only 50% of households on average paid their water bills on time, which compared to 79% for electricity where penalties and disconnections are enforced (Aguilar-Benitez & Saphores, 2008). ...
This paper empirically evaluates the ability of the major strategies that are implemented
by Palestinian Water Services Providers to motivate the customers to pay their water
invoices. a questionnaire over those strategies has been directed to the water sector key experts, and
the employees that work in the Palestinian Water Service Providers. A regression analysis has
been conducted to measure the significantly of those strategies. The findings showed that the
strategies of installation prepaid meters, subscriber meter disconnection, implementation advanced
technology for meter readings &processing, increasing the number of collection centers, quality of
water services, supporting in other services provided and customers’ satisfaction, all those variables
are significantly considered as effective strategies to motivate the customers to pay their water
invoices. However, the elements of late payment penalties, early payment discount, persuasive
materials and incremental tariff blocks are not significantly associated with this motivation.
... Social accountability is defined as "an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement", that is in which ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations participate directly or indirectly in exercising accountability. Unfortunately, "social" may have controversial overtones in the context of water services because there is a widespread belief that access to water services is a right and therefore it should be available and affordable (or even free) for all who need it (see the literature review in Aguilar & Saphores (2007). Furthermore, this concept does not specify what could be observed and evaluated to assess accountability. ...
... Although water and sanitation services require large investments and consequently need good collection rates for financial viability, most PI systems do not collect payment data. This is surprising since non-payment and affordability are of concern all over the world and not only in developing and transition countries (see Aguilar & Saphores, 2007). ...
We analyze the performance of two water utilities located at the USA Mexico border with a focus on public accountability. We evaluate selected performance indicators and explain how public accountability mechanisms can be associated with those outcomes. We find strong hierarchical accountability relationships between policymakers and water services providers but weak feedback mechanisms from customers to policymakers; moreover, structural barriers to political accountability resulting in weak accountability mechanisms may explain different facets of the relatively poor performance of both water utilities. Our findings suggest the need for these water utilities to build a closer relationship with their customers and to implement customer service indicators to track their performance.
This paper applies ordinal logistic regression to a survey collected from 225 rural households across four different districts of Nepal to analyze the nonpayment behavior of households at rural water schemes. This study finds that non-payment behavior is highly influenced by a household’s perception of how others pay rather than their own paying ability. This shows that the trust issue, which stems from an apparent n-prisoners dilemma, negatively reinforces free-riding behavior among the households. Further, the study also indicates that cultural and geographical distribution influence households relative positions on the nonpayment spectrum.
In this study, a framework for assessing water sustainability in a watershed is suggested and applied in Piperiya watershed of Chhattisgarh, India. The framework involves the various issues and responses related to watershed hydrology (H), environment (E), life (L), and policy (P). Further, in hydrology, quantity and quality aspects are considered. A methodology has been proposed for assessing the quantity-based water sustainability index using the concepts of dependable flow and the performance parameters such as reliability, resilience, and vulnerability. The proposed methodology introduces the concept of index of optimism of the decision-maker while estimating the performance parameters. For assessing the water quality sustainability index, the weightage of quality parameters is assessed through the analytical hierarchy process (AHP), and thereafter, the quality index is assessed using the concept of fuzzy logics. A new rule base (involving five parameters and five states) is suggested for aggregation of quality parameters. The sustainability aspects related to E, L, and P are assessed using the concept of pressure, state, and response. This has been assessed using the historical secondary data. After assessing the sustainability at H, E, L, and P levels, a new fuzzy rule base (involving four parameters and five states) is suggested to aggregate the HELP parameters and to assess the overall water sustainability index for the watershed. The proposed methodology is explained through the case study of Piperiya watershed.KeywordsEnvironmentHydrologyLifePolicyReliabilityResilienceSustainabilityVulnerabilityWatershed
Nonpayment behavior by consumers may jeopardize the financial sustainability of water utilities. Yet, little is known about factors underlying nonpayment behavior. This paper identifies determinants of nonpayment in Nicaragua using negative binomial regression models that account for overdispersion in the number of outstanding payments of water bills. We found that the average household had 37 outstanding monthly payments. Nonpayment was found to be inversely associated with consumer satisfaction with the current quality of water service and household income. However, nonpayment was found to be disassociated from the perceived consequentiality of not paying water bills on time. Policy implications are discussed.
Most of the literature about urban water demand has focused on estimating the determinants of the water demand for domestic use and there is little empirical evidence on the water demand for commercial use (Worthington, 2010). The analysis has focused on urban areas and not on protected areas, particularly in arid regions. Water resources are fundamental to the development of productive activities input, generating added value and the amount of supplies needed by the staff working in the commercial sector. In addition, the agencies responsible for the provision of drinking water and sewerage face serious economic problems such as nonpayment by the users benefited; the meters are insufficient to accurately measure water supply, resulting in a lower billing to water utilities and a restriction on controlling demand. This situation deserves further treatment applied. This paper aims to analyze the response of commercial water consumers to changes in prices in the short and long run. It also measures the effect of nonpayment, the proportion of users with meter and other variables such as average temperature and precipitation on the level of consumption. A dynamic water demand function specifying the average price was estimated using panel data. The results indicate that the price negatively impacts the consumer with a low magnitude. The price elasticity of short and long run were less than one, with -0.07 and -0.18, respectively. Temperature elasticity was 0.09, the semi-elasticity of nonpayment was 0.20 and the ratio of users who have meters was 0.23.
