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The liquidity strains that contributed to the meltdown of the mortgage market in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) re-emerged in the Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) Crisis. Some of these strains were acute. For example, the dependence of mortgage real estate investment trusts (REITs) on short-term funding amplified market disruption in March 2020. However, other liquidity pressures had only minor repercussions for the overall mortgage market because of reforms since the GFC, a heavy government presence, and strong house prices. The lackluster performance of the private-label mortgage-backed securities market provides a glimpse of how the market might have performed in the absence of the heavy government presence.
The liquidity strains that contributed to the meltdown of the mortgage market in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) re‐emerged in the COVID‐19 Crisis. Some of these strains were acute. For example, mortgage REITs’ dependence on short‐term funding amplified market disruption in March 2020. However, other liquidity pressures had only minor repercussions for the overall mortgage market because of reforms since the GFC, a heavy government presence, and strong house prices. The lackluster performance of the private‐label mortgage‐backed securities market provides a glimpse of how the market might have performed in the absence of the heavy government presence. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
This paper develops a formula to numerically estimate the unsubsidized, fair-market value of the toxic assets purchased with Federal Reserve loans. It finds that subsidy rates on these loans were on average 33.9 percent at origination. In contrast, by the 3rd quarter of the 2010, there was on average no subsidy in TALF loans. The theoretical model is used to predict the early redemption of Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) loans used to purchase commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). The predictions of the model are strongly supported by the data. In addition, this paper looks at the determinants of early redemption. CMBS originated inside the peak bubble years of 2005–2007 were much less likely to be redeemed early. The giant investment managers, Blackrock and PIMCO, were much more likely to redeem their TALF loans early than smaller investment managers.
