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The Tunisian Revolution not only led to the fall of one of the region’s most entrenched dictators, but it also made Tunisia stand out among the countries of the Arab Spring as the country in which the taming of political dynamics by way of electoral processes has progressed furthest. While in Egypt extra-institutional forms of contention are common...
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... a smaller percentage of urban population. As Figure 1 shows, moreover, these clusters form regional concentrations with more marginal delegations situated in the center and the south, while comparatively better developed delegations are found at the coast and especially in the surroundings of Tunis and Monastir. Moreover, the vote in marginalized areas was captured by a group that shows many characteristics of a populist anti-party. ...
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Citations
... Tunisia has emerged as an intriguing case to study anti-system and anti-political establishment sentiments along with their consequences for the electoral battlefield and political instability. While elite compromise has enabled the emergence of a transitional 'pact' (Boubekeur, 2016;Jermanová, 2020), anti-establishment sentiments have remained an important element in Tunisian postauthoritarian electoral politics ever since the 2011 founding elections (Koehler & Warkotsch, 2014). In the 2019 presidential elections, the only Arab democracy witnessed a run-off between two political outsiders, Kais Said and Nabil Karoui, beating all other candidates who had support from their party establishments. ...
... Tunisia's democratic transition was made possible by compromises between elites in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. However, many Tunisians, particularly on the economic margins of society, have felt left out of the political process (Koehler & Warkotsch, 2014). Political discontent has become manifest in declining support for democracy (Meddeb, 2018). ...
Popular attitudes in support of authoritarian alternatives and weak party systems constitute important threats to democratic consolidation and the stability of new democracies. This article explores popular alienation from established political actors in Tunisia. Under what conditions do citizens support alternatives to the elites in power and the institutional infrastructure of a new democracy? Drawing on an original, nationally representative survey in Tunisia administered in 2017, this article examines three categories of popular attitudes in support of political outsiders.Military interventionism appears in people’s preferences for anti-system politics—the most immediate challenge to the country’s stability and democratic transition. Anti-political establishment sentiments are shown in people’s preferences for an enhanced role of the country’s main trade union as a civil-society alternative to political party elites. Finally, outsider eclecticism is the seemingly incoherent phenomenon of concurrent support for a civil society actor and the military as an ‘authoritarian alternative.’ Anti-establishment sentiments will continue to be an important element in Tunisian post-authoritarian politics, evidenced by the rise to power of Kais Said in the 2019 presidential elections and his 2021 decision to dismiss parliament. In turn, popular support for military intervention may have implications for the country’s domestic security and peaceful transition.
... The economy and unemployment rate, which were the key issues that led to the uprisings, have been sidelined for a time and the situation has worsened since 2011 in many places, which has contributed to a growing disinterest from politics and a distrust of the major parties (Alianak, 2014;Masri, 2018). This has been compounded by the fact that the political evolution of Ennahda has driven it closer to the middle class and led to the marginalization of many of those who started the protests, who see their grievances remain unaddressed (Koehler and Warkotsch, 2014;Marzo, 2018). The failure of the government to guarantee security, as shown by the terrorist attacks at the Bardo museum and Port-el-Kantaoui in 2015, have reinforced these fears as well as endangered tourism, one of the key sectors of the Tunisian economy (Ghanem, 2016;Stepan, 2018b). ...
Tunisia is often described as the outlier of the Arab Spring, the one case in which a form of political transition decidedly happened. The fact that this transition first led to the rule of the Islamist party Ennahda has reignited long-standing debates on the role of Islam in politics, the relationship between religion and democracy, and the consequences of their potential incompatibility for the future of Tunisian democracy. A sizeable literature has attempted to address these topics over the years, but it is of little help when trying to understand the events of the Arab Spring and the Tunisian transition, especially when it comes to their impact on the Islamist parties themselves. Borrowing from Villalón’s study of Islam and politics in sub-Saharan Africa, this paper argues that, instead of considering whether Tunisian actors fit within a preconceived notion of democracy, we should consider the process of political bargaining itself as democratic; focusing on the substance of democracy rather than its form sheds new light on the Tunisian case and helps explain various outcomes including the progressive liberalization of Islamist parties and the gradual but distinctive flourishing of democracy in the Tunisian context.
... While it is widely recognized that Egypt experienced high levels of political polarization in the roughly two years after the fall of Mubarak, many authors emphasize negotiations and compromise in the Tunisian case (e.g., Marks, 2014;Murphy, 2013). The emphasis on elite-level compromises and pacts threatens to obscure the fact that there was very real political conflict in Tunisia as well and that elite compromises did not smoothly translate into popular demobilization (Koehler & Warkotsch, 2014). The assassination of two leftist politicians, Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi, by radical Islamists in February and July 2013, for which secular activists widely blamed the Ennahda-led government, are key events in the development of secularist-Islamist polarization in Tunisia. ...
... This suggests that arguments about the consensual, pacted nature of the Tunisian transition tell part of the story at best. Contrary to the classical notion of pacted transitions (Karl, 1990), the Tunisian elite pact embodied in the troika coalition did not result in the demobilization of public opposition (Koehler & Warkotsch, 2014). Quite to the contrary, political polarization increased during the first two post-revolutionary years, protests against the Ennahda-led government continued, and the constitution-making process was far from unchallenged. ...
In this article, we challenge existing analyses of military behaviour during the Arab uprisings. Egypt and Tunisia are often presented as cases where the military formed an explicit or implicit alliance with the opposition and thereby ‘defected‘ from the regime. In contrast to this interpretation, we show that in Tunisia, insubordination took the form of a police mutiny rather than military defection, while in Egypt the military did not defect from, but rather preserved the regime. Finally, we challenge the arguments about Tunisia being a ’pacted’ transition, while in Egypt polarization led to calls for the military to intervene. We show that in Tunisia there were also calls for the military to intervene, and in Egypt the decline of support for Mursi did not directly translate into support for military intervention. The military’s popularity rating had in fact declined substantially since 2011. Misinterpreting military behaviour has led scholars to underestimate the level of regime cohesiveness and the significance of other security agencies in the overthrow of rulers. Finally, it has fed into the (false) belief that the military could mediate the transition to democracy.
... However, it has been found that almost all Tunisians identify as Arab. 2 Tunisia also contains a regional cleavage between the wealthier coastal regions and the less-wealthy interior of the country (Koehler and Warkotsch 2014). In addition, within Islamist and non-Islamist groups there is a diversity of positions. ...
Rebuilding a contested state following an authoritarian breakdown requires widespread support for the new political system from all communal groups. A central theoretical assertion of the institutional design literature is that inclusion of communal groups in institutional frameworks creates support for a political system. However, empirical evidence to either verify or refute this claim is inconclusive. A survey of institutional design literature reveals an implicit distinction between de jure inclusion (inclusive frameworks) and de facto inclusion (inclusion in practice). To date, this distinction has not been sufficiently differentiated and systematically examined, with large-N studies most often examining the impact solely of de jure inclusion on support, and case studies failing to make a clear conceptual distinction between these two elements of inclusion. To address this gap in the research, this study asks: during a period of political transition in a contested state, does de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, build support for a political system? To investigate this question, the study undertakes a small-N comparative study of institutional design during political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa region. Four countries are selected that underwent rebuilding of their political institutions following authoritarian breakdown: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. Four hypotheses are advanced that capture the expectation that either de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, will build support for a political system. The hypotheses are investigated in two key institutional design moments in the selected countries: electoral system design and constitution-making. The study finds that de jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to create support of all communal groups for the political system, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient. In no case where de jure inclusion alone was observed, was support for the political system present. In all cases where de facto inclusion was present, there was support for the political system, regardless of whether or not there was de jure inclusion. The study contributes to our understanding of the rebuilding of contested states following authoritarian breakdown, suggesting that, alongside an emphasis on de jure inclusion in electoral system design and constitution-making, de facto inclusion deserves consideration.
... Finally, scholars should give more attention to the role of human agency. Many descriptions of the events in Arab countries since 2011 recognize the importance of agency (e.g.,AbuRish 2014;Koehler and Workotsch 2014;Marks 2016;Volpi 2013), but do not draw broader theoretical conclusions, and broader theoretical analyses of the causes and consequences of the Arab uprisings often give human agency short shrift. One cannot understand the outbreak of the uprisings without considering the choice of the Tunisian citizen Mohammed Bouazizi who set himself on fire to protest the injustice of the Ben Ali regime, the actions of ordinary people who risked their lives to protest against autocrats for weeks or months in Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, or of those inJordanwhy did the arab uprisings turn out as they did? a survey of the literature to enact a constitutional reform requiring him to select the prime minister from among the largest popularly elected party in Parliament, or the Algerian leadership's decision to lift the 19-year-long emergency rule), or to take an uncompromising stance (e.g., the al-Assad's regime's attacks on peaceful Syrian protesters), were pivotal. ...
In a new POMED paper, "Why Did the Arab Uprisings Turn Out as They Did? A Survey of the Literature," scholars Kristen Kao and Ellen Lust of the University of Gothenburg delve into the literature on Arab autocracy and attempts at democratic change. Surveying more than 60 works published before and after the 2011 pro-democracy uprisings, Kao and Lust find that:
Six factors—the role of Islam, geopolitics, oil, regime institutions and coalitions, the military, and civil society—dominate explanations of the region's persistent authoritarianism and of why thus far, only Tunisia's democratic transition has succeeded.
Such analyses obscure major changes taking place in the region today and diminish the important roles played by citizens during and after the 2011 uprisings.
"Until human agency is taken into account more fully as a factor in democratic change, experts will continue to misconstrue the nature of politics and the potential for democratization in the Arab world," Kao and Lust argue.
This article introduces a theory on military role expansion in emerging democracies and poses a broad question: who wants the military to adopt which role in society and politics? Drawing on an original, nationally representative survey conducted in Tunisia, the article explores people’s preferences for the military to remain a security provider or serve in government and contribute to policing protests. Findings reveal that public support for military role expansion is substantial and varies across political cleavages. We test hypotheses to account for cleavages driven by the country’s authoritarian past versus partisan divides during Tunisia’s transition to democracy. Findings indicate that popular support for military role expansion is driven by anti-system sentiments prevalent in contemporary Tunisian politics: while voters prefer the military as a role model for security provision, non-voters support its enhanced role in politics. These observations have ample implications for the research programs on civil–military relations and the dynamics of democratic consolidation. Tunisia’s experience warrants greater attention to anti-system attitudes caused by people’s disillusionment with democratic procedures. In turn, authoritarian legacies do not appear to play a prominent role during such challenging transitions toward democratic consolidation.
During political transition, creating support across societal groups for a new political system is key to facilitate transition to a stable regime with functioning governance. Institutional design literature asserts that inclusion of key societal groups in institutional frameworks is central to create such support. However, empirical evidence to date does not clearly verify or refute this claim. A survey of the literature reveals an implicit distinction between de jure and de facto inclusion that has not been sufficiently differentiated or systematically examined. Based on a review of existing studies, this article makes the theoretical assertion that de jure inclusion alone, without de facto inclusion, is insufficient to build support for a political system. This theoretical claim is illustrated using two cases of recent constitution-making in North Africa (Egypt and Tunisia) and one in the Middle East (Iraq). The cases provide preliminary confirmation for the study’s theoretical assertion that de jure inclusion is insufficient to build political support. The findings suggest that a combination of de jure and de facto inclusion may be sufficient to create political support.
