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The author is reviewing the use of risk analysis in the maritime industry. The review focuses on the implementation of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) in the regulatory system for ships at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Results of FSA studies are discussed as well as experience with the FSA process as such.
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Context 1
... (1993), Statoil (1995). Figure 5 is an example of the application of this model. In Norway (2000) it is demonstrated that most ship types have societal risks in the ALARP area. ...
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Citations
... Maritime risk and safety are governed by the regulations and codes of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which adopts a goal/ risk-based approach to ship design. As a part of the rule-making process, IMO provides a risk-based five steps approach called the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) framework to assess the risks of a ship design or operation and propose cost-effective options to control these risks (Breinholt et al., 2012;Skjong, 2011). In the context of FSA, quantitative risk assessment methods are preferred as they allow conducting a cost-benefit analysis to select the RCOs (IMO, 2018b). ...
While the concept of smart shipping is expected to shape the future of the maritime industry, its safety is still a major concern. New risks might emerge when shifting from human controllers onboard, to autonomous software controllers and remote human controllers. The uncertainties associated with the emerging risks require an efficient decision-making methodology to ensure ship safety. This paper proposes a framework for selecting Risk Control Options (RCOs) of ships with higher degrees of autonomy in the context of marine risk assessment and Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). The framework uses the System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) for the hazard analysis and the identification of RCOs, while Bayesian Network is employed in the framework for estimating the system risk. Integrating STPA and BN offers the possibility to cover most of the steps of both risk assessment and FSA and permits the prioritization of the identified RCOs. The proposed method is applied to a concept of an autonomous seawater cooling system (SWC) as an illustrative case study. The results indicate that the RCOs including sensors health monitoring and software testing should be prioritized to reduce the risk. This is unveiled by the STPA analysis which shows the risk contribution of the associated causal scenarios.
... In 2013, IMO has approved the revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) that now contain a risk criteria for oil spills [40] in addition to the cost-effectiveness criteria on safety, already available in the last version of the guidelines. After the first introduction of FSA, several studies have been performed using this methodology to support decisions about the implementation of international regulations, as reviewed by Skjong [41]. Traditionally, FSA studies include comprehensive risk models developed to assess probabilities and consequences of specific accidental events using mainly Fault Tree and Event Tree models, as done for example by Antão & Guedes Soares [42]. ...
This paper addresses the broad aspects of safety of maritime transportation from the identification to the management of risks related particularly to the maritime traffic in coastal waters. A brief overview of present-day maritime accident statistics are presented and the methodologies that have been adopted in the maritime sector to analyze ship accidents are reviewed. The paper also reviews the models and tools that have been used for simulation of ship navigation and for accident probability prediction based on Automatic Identification System (AIS) data and the analysis and modelling of the influence of human and organisational factors on ship accidents. The development of maritime risk models based on Bayesian Networks and the various elements that influence an effective response to maritime accidents are also addressed.
The societal risk acceptance criteria (SRAC) are used in the shipping industry as a ruler to judge whether the actual ship risk is in control. To exploringly refresh SRAC for general cargo ship formulated by International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2000, a comprehensive analysis was performed by using the accident data recorded in the Marine Casualties and Incidents (MCI) module of the Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) database from 2005 to 2019. The risk levels of four typical accident factors, including initial event, ship size, classification society, and geographical zone, were evaluated. The results illustrate that the SRAC established in this study for general cargo ship fatality accidents are found stricter than that by IMO presented in 2000. Fire/explosion and capsizing show the highest societal risk levels in the initial events, and large general cargo ships face higher societal risk. In addition, ships that do not belong to the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) are at a higher risk than IACS ships. And the societal risk levels of fatality accidents in East & Southeast Asia and injury accidents in Europe, the Mediterranean & Black Sea are higher than those in the other zones.
