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Sketch of the reactor core rotated by 90 degrees. The reflector top is at 100 cm, the position in which criticality is achieved. The Emergency shut-down rod is not inserted, but the hafnium absorber is inserted. 

Sketch of the reactor core rotated by 90 degrees. The reflector top is at 100 cm, the position in which criticality is achieved. The Emergency shut-down rod is not inserted, but the hafnium absorber is inserted. 

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Conference Paper
Full-text available
The deployment of any nuclear system presents inherent proliferation risks depending on its specific design, refueling procedures, and fuel types. Proliferation resistance is considered a particular need in the case of Small Modular Reactors (SMR) as they might be attractive especially for those countries that are “newcomers” in the nuclear industr...

Contexts in source publication

Context 1
... the basis of Bathke’s approach the nuclear material always shows a high (FOM 1 > 2) or medium-high (1<FOM 2 <2) level of proliferation attractiveness, depending on whether pre-ignition is a main concern for weapon development. It is clear that both criteria, each one in a different way, identify a significant proliferation risk for the fuel loaded in the UO core. In this section the proliferation risk associated with the use of MOX fuels is analyzed. The starting point is the reference UO 2 core design (section III.A), with the fuel assemblies replaced by MOX containing a mix of plutonium, 235 U, and 238 U in different wt% depending on their location in the core (see Table IX). The plutonium vector considered at BOL is reported in Table X; it is representative of the plutonium produced in traditional LWR fuels after an exposure of 45 GWd/t and 7 years of cooling/storage (Ref. 9). It should be noted that the 240 tot current fissile material has a Pu/Pu ratio greater than 30% i.e. the fuel can be categorized as MOX-grade according to Pellaud’s criteria. The maximum amount of plutonium has been limited to 14 wt% for safety reasons in order to avoid any risk of positive reactivity void coefficient in case of generation of coolant voids. This value has been determined on the base of the following correlation that gives the maximum allowable plutonium content T(wt%) 239 as a function of mass percentage C i of 4 isotopes Pu, 240 241 242 Pu, Pu and Pu (Ref. 9): The MOX assemblies loaded in the core have the same mechanical and geometrical characteristics as those in the UO 2 core. Minor modifications only concern the contents of Gd 2 O 3 (reduced from 8 wt% to 2 wt%). Thermal-hydraulic operating conditions, rated power and reactivity control systems are those already defined for the UO 2 core. Results of core simulations in steady state conditions up to the equilibrium cycle are reported in Table XI. As can be seen, the use of MOX fuels has an impact mainly on the effectiveness of boron and reactor kinetics (lower values for boron coefficient and β eff ). The cycle length is slightly shorter (burnup reduced by 1.82 GWd/t for the MOX core) while no significant alterations are observed for the values of the Doppler and the moderator temperature coefficient. Main results for the isotopic evolution of the plutonium content in the core during the first burnup cycle are presented in Table XII. Both Pellaud’s and Bathke’s criteria are used for the categorization of the nuclear fuels with respect to proliferation risks. According to Pellaud’s approach the abundance of 240 Pu in the MOX core is always higher than 30%, i.e. the plutonium is always of MOX-grade type; this would induce the conclusion that the fuel is not attractive for the development of nuclear weapons at each exposure level (this condition is preserved up to equilibrium cycle). Different conclusions can be deduced if Bathke’s criteria are used. As it can be seen from Table XII, MOX fuel shows a high attractiveness to proliferation (FOM 1 >2) in those countries that are technically advanced and able to deal with pre-ignition issues. The attractiveness level is reduced to medium-low (FOM 2 ~ 1) if the fuel is managed by a technically relatively unsophisticated proliferator. However, according to Bathke most states dedicated to develop a nuclear weapon would be able to develop the necessary technology to overcome pre-initiation due to spontaneous neutron emission over time. Therefore, in most cases, FOM 1 is the only Figure of Merit to be considered. In this sense, although the use of a MOX core in SMRs reduces the proliferation risk compared to UO 2 fuel, such a core would still be attractive for diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology to acquire nuclear weapons. For this analysis a generic sodium-cooled reactor model based on the publicly available design information of the Toshiba 4S was established using (Ref. 10) and (Ref. 11). The reactor core has 10 MWe output and an expected lifetime of 30 years without refuelling or reshuffling of fuel elements. Figure 5 shows the vertical section of the core modelled by using the Monte Carlo Neutron Transport Code MCNPX (Ref. 12). The long core lifetime of 30 years is possible due to the implementation of an adjustable annular reflector. The reflector consists of a reflecting steel region (yellow) with helium filled gas tanks above (red) to replace the sodium coolant (green) which is also a strong neutron reflector. Over the lifetime the whole annular structure moves progressively upwards (in Fig. 5 to the right due to rotation of the sketch) and hence covers new regions of the core. Criticality is reached by covering a part of the core large enough to reflect sufficient neutrons back into the core to obtain a self-sustaining chain reaction. Only half of each fuel rod is filled with actual fuel (dark blue), the other half is a gas plenum for resulting fission gases. The assembly of fuel rods can be better seen in Figure 6. The core consists of 19 subassemblies with the inner one filled with a hafnium absorber and space for the emergency shut-down rod. The fuel is a uranium- zirconium alloy with 10 wt% zirconium and an enrichment of 17 wt% and 19.9 wt% 235 U with the six outermost subassemblies having the higher enrichment. Each subassembly contains 169 fuel rods that are densely packed. The main core and assembly data for the SMR core are summarized in Table XIII. With this model of the reactor core different calculations, especially criticality calculations were executed to validate the geometry. The criticality in dependence of the reflector position and the neutron flux distributions show the expected behaviour. Fig. 6. Cross section of the reactor core. Each subassembly consists of 169 fuel rods with an enrichment 235 235 of 17 wt% U in the inner and 19.9 wt% U in the outer burning ...
Context 2
... the basis of Bathke’s approach the nuclear material always shows a high (FOM 1 > 2) or medium-high (1<FOM 2 <2) level of proliferation attractiveness, depending on whether pre-ignition is a main concern for weapon development. It is clear that both criteria, each one in a different way, identify a significant proliferation risk for the fuel loaded in the UO core. In this section the proliferation risk associated with the use of MOX fuels is analyzed. The starting point is the reference UO 2 core design (section III.A), with the fuel assemblies replaced by MOX containing a mix of plutonium, 235 U, and 238 U in different wt% depending on their location in the core (see Table IX). The plutonium vector considered at BOL is reported in Table X; it is representative of the plutonium produced in traditional LWR fuels after an exposure of 45 GWd/t and 7 years of cooling/storage (Ref. 9). It should be noted that the 240 tot current fissile material has a Pu/Pu ratio greater than 30% i.e. the fuel can be categorized as MOX-grade according to Pellaud’s criteria. The maximum amount of plutonium has been limited to 14 wt% for safety reasons in order to avoid any risk of positive reactivity void coefficient in case of generation of coolant voids. This value has been determined on the base of the following correlation that gives the maximum allowable plutonium content T(wt%) 239 as a function of mass percentage C i of 4 isotopes Pu, 240 241 242 Pu, Pu and Pu (Ref. 9): The MOX assemblies loaded in the core have the same mechanical and geometrical characteristics as those in the UO 2 core. Minor modifications only concern the contents of Gd 2 O 3 (reduced from 8 wt% to 2 wt%). Thermal-hydraulic operating conditions, rated power and reactivity control systems are those already defined for the UO 2 core. Results of core simulations in steady state conditions up to the equilibrium cycle are reported in Table XI. As can be seen, the use of MOX fuels has an impact mainly on the effectiveness of boron and reactor kinetics (lower values for boron coefficient and β eff ). The cycle length is slightly shorter (burnup reduced by 1.82 GWd/t for the MOX core) while no significant alterations are observed for the values of the Doppler and the moderator temperature coefficient. Main results for the isotopic evolution of the plutonium content in the core during the first burnup cycle are presented in Table XII. Both Pellaud’s and Bathke’s criteria are used for the categorization of the nuclear fuels with respect to proliferation risks. According to Pellaud’s approach the abundance of 240 Pu in the MOX core is always higher than 30%, i.e. the plutonium is always of MOX-grade type; this would induce the conclusion that the fuel is not attractive for the development of nuclear weapons at each exposure level (this condition is preserved up to equilibrium cycle). Different conclusions can be deduced if Bathke’s criteria are used. As it can be seen from Table XII, MOX fuel shows a high attractiveness to proliferation (FOM 1 >2) in those countries that are technically advanced and able to deal with pre-ignition issues. The attractiveness level is reduced to medium-low (FOM 2 ~ 1) if the fuel is managed by a technically relatively unsophisticated proliferator. However, according to Bathke most states dedicated to develop a nuclear weapon would be able to develop the necessary technology to overcome pre-initiation due to spontaneous neutron emission over time. Therefore, in most cases, FOM 1 is the only Figure of Merit to be considered. In this sense, although the use of a MOX core in SMRs reduces the proliferation risk compared to UO 2 fuel, such a core would still be attractive for diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology to acquire nuclear weapons. For this analysis a generic sodium-cooled reactor model based on the publicly available design information of the Toshiba 4S was established using (Ref. 10) and (Ref. 11). The reactor core has 10 MWe output and an expected lifetime of 30 years without refuelling or reshuffling of fuel elements. Figure 5 shows the vertical section of the core modelled by using the Monte Carlo Neutron Transport Code MCNPX (Ref. 12). The long core lifetime of 30 years is possible due to the implementation of an adjustable annular reflector. The reflector consists of a reflecting steel region (yellow) with helium filled gas tanks above (red) to replace the sodium coolant (green) which is also a strong neutron reflector. Over the lifetime the whole annular structure moves progressively upwards (in Fig. 5 to the right due to rotation of the sketch) and hence covers new regions of the core. Criticality is reached by covering a part of the core large enough to reflect sufficient neutrons back into the core to obtain a self-sustaining chain reaction. Only half of each fuel rod is filled with actual fuel (dark blue), the other half is a gas plenum for resulting fission gases. The assembly of fuel rods can be better seen in Figure 6. The core consists of 19 subassemblies with the inner one filled with a hafnium absorber and space for the emergency shut-down rod. The fuel is a uranium- zirconium alloy with 10 wt% zirconium and an enrichment of 17 wt% and 19.9 wt% 235 U with the six outermost subassemblies having the higher enrichment. Each subassembly contains 169 fuel rods that are densely packed. The main core and assembly data for the SMR core are summarized in Table XIII. With this model of the reactor core different calculations, especially criticality calculations were executed to validate the geometry. The criticality in dependence of the reflector position and the neutron flux distributions show the expected behaviour. Fig. 6. Cross section of the reactor core. Each subassembly consists of 169 fuel rods with an enrichment 235 235 of 17 wt% U in the inner and 19.9 wt% U in the outer burning ...

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Citations

... and Polidoro et al84 regarded that some countries might choose to violate their obligations to NPT at any time, if needed, to obtain sensitive nuclear materials by breaking the sealed cores. IAEA85 and Glaser et al 86 considered that some specific characteristics of SMRs including remote application of SMRs, several SMRs on one site, shipment of fully assembled reactors and a possible high fissile content in the fuel (for longer operation time of reactor in some special nuclear energy application scenarios) may exert impacts on the PR of the associated fuel cycles. ...
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An increasing number of countries have taken nuclear energy as a preferred approach in response to the environment deterioration and energy supply deficit. The rapid expansion of nuclear technologies, however, would pose a great challenge to nuclear non‐proliferation, especially for the Generation IV nuclear reactor systems, which significantly differ from current nuclear fuel systems. This paper gives an overview of non‐proliferation research activities worldwide and outlines the existing problems, especially in non‐proliferation assessment. Because of numerous processes and various types of variables involved in nuclear fuel cycles (NFC), it is difficult to obtain a quantitative and objective assessment on non‐proliferation. In addition, the influences imposed by national nuclear policy on non‐proliferation have been rarely studied because of their large uncertainties, which may not precisely reflect the real non‐proliferation status in a specific country. In view of the above issues, we put forward an assessment framework by considering impact factors of national nuclear policy and by employing multi‐mathematical models to address some of the issues including subjectivity and uncertainties in the current assessment methodologies.
... As a comparison, in (Polidoro et al., 2013) FOMs were also calculated for separated plutonium from two thermal SMRs based on current technology: one fueled with conventional light water reactor fuel (UOX) and the other one with MOX fuel. For these two thermal reactor fuel types, the material attractiveness differs depending on whether or not a technically advanced actor is considered. ...
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This paper contributes to the literature on proliferation risks of small modular reactors. After a general discussion of SMR developments, in the main section of this paper we present an analysis of a generic sodium-cooled fast reactor designed to sustain an unusual lifetime of 30 years, similar to concepts such as the Toshiba 45. For this reactor, material composition over lifetime is calculated and its material attractiveness compared to (spent) fuel from other reactor types. Depletion calculations show that a significant amount of plutonium is produced over time with an isotopic composition highly attractive for military purposes.
Chapter
Employment and supporting the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation suffered a significantly reduction in several countries after Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident occurred in March 2011 in Japan due to the fear to a new nuclear disaster. Nowadays, nuclear energy has demonstrated that it is a secure energy source and it use for electricity generation is free of CO2 emissions. It is also a mature technology that can assures an energy supply when needed and without interruption. For all that, nuclear energy has become again a secure energy source for many countries in all regions of the world. In order to increase the safe operation of nuclear power plants, there are now three lines of investigation for the development of new type of nuclear power reactors. These are: (a) European Pressurised Reactor (EPR), a Generation III+ reactor; Generation IV reactors with six different types of designs (GFR, LFR, SCWR, VHTR, MSR and SFR); and the so called “Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)”, with tens of different concepts and designs at various stages of development in several countries.