Table 2 - uploaded by Patricia Beeson
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The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment as well as the monitoring intensity. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... table 1, lenders with a mean absolute deviation greater than 118 point are classified as high variance lenders, while those with a mean absolute deviation below that are classified as low variance lenders. Table 2 reports the cross-classification of lendefs by both measures of short-term shifts in posted rates. Forty percent of the lenders in our sample change relative position often, and the magnitude of these changes is relatively small; 13.7 percent make frequent, large shifts in posted rates; 28.7 percent make infrequent, small changes in their relative position; and the remaining 17.2 percent make infrequent, large changes in their relative position. ...
Similar publications
The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment as well as the monitoring intensity. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on...
The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment as well as the monitoring intensity. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on...
The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment as well as the monitoring intensity. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on...
The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment as well as the monitoring intensity. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on...
The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment as well as the monitoring intensity. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on...
Citations
How can economically costly discrimination persist in a competitive market? Previous research into this question has focused on market imperfections which prevent competitive forces from eliminating the economically costly behavior. In this paper we show that lending discrimination is not always costly (to the lender). This has two important implications. First, lending discrimination may persist indefinitely, even in a competitive market. Second, tests for lending discrimination based on profits (or default rates) may be unable to detect discrimination when it exists. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
