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... jobs tend to be concentrated among highest-and lowest-skilled occupations (such as physicians and grocery store employees) both for natives and immigrants. As seen in Figure 3, immigrant workers in Western European countries represent a very large share of essential workers in the health sector, specifically among doctors and nurses, as well as ICT. However, the share of immigrant workers 16 is even larger in essential jobs that also have the lowest wages and the lowest levels of education. ...
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... This paper contributes to a broader literature on how COVID-19 has affected migration. Several studies have examined how the occupations that immigrants typically work in have been affected differentially by the crisis, and the implications of this for immigrant unemployment (Borjas and Cassidy, 2020;Fasani and Mazza, 2020) and the exposure of natives to COVID-19 health risks (Bossavie et al, 2020). Efforts to examine impacts in migrant-sending countries have been hampered by a shortage of data. ...
One of the central arguments of this book is that the EU free movement regime structurally promotes mobility. But what are the consequences for employment when this regime is suspended? This will be examined in more detail in this chapter using the example of an exogenous shock (the COVID-19 pandemic) and a politically induced shock (Brexit). Using three case studies on German agriculture, Austrian 24-hour mobile care, and the British transport sector, the “systemic importance” of migrant labour becomes apparent as well as more broadly the importance of freedom of movement for relatively frictionless transnational labour mobility.
Eines der zentralen Argumente dieses Buches ist, dass das EU-Freizügigkeitsregime strukturell mobilitätsfördernd wirkt. Was aber sind die beschäftigungspolitischen Folgen, wenn dieses Regime ausgesetzt wird? Dies soll in diesem Kapitel am Beispiel eines exogenen Schocks (Corona-Pandemie) und eines politisch induzierten Schocks (Brexit) näher untersucht werden. Anhand von drei Fallstudien zur deutschen Landwirtschaft, zur österreichischen 24-Stunden-Betreuung und zum britischen Transportsektor wird nicht nur die „Systemrelevanz“ migrantischer Arbeit aufgezeigt, sondern auch die Bedeutung der Bewegungsfreiheit für eine relativ friktionsfreie transnationale Erwerbsmobilität.
The large inflow of less-educated immigrants into the United States in recent decades may have affected US natives’ labor market outcomes in many ways, including their working conditions. Although the general consensus is that low-skilled immigrants tend to hold “worse” jobs than US natives, the impact of immigration on natives’ working conditions has received little attention. This study examines how immigration has affected US natives’ occupational exposure to workplace hazards and the compensating differential paid for such exposure from 1990 to 2018. Results indicate that immigration causes less-educated natives’ exposure to workplace hazards to fall, and instrumental variables results show a larger impact among women than among men. The corresponding compensating differential appears to fall among men, but not after accounting for immigration-induced changes in the financial returns to occupational skills.
This paper presents new estimates of the share of jobs that can be performed from home. The analysis is based on the task content of occupations, their information and communications technology requirements, and the availability of internet access by country and income groupings. Globally, one of every five jobs can be performed from home. The ability to telework is correlated with income. In low-income countries, only one of every 26 jobs can be done from home. Failing to account for internet access yields upward biased estimates of the resilience of poor countries, lagging regions, and poor workers. Since better paid workers are more likely to be able to work from home, COVID-19 is likely to exacerbate inequality, especially in richer countries where better paid and educated workers are insulated from the shock. The overall labor market burden of COVID-19 is bound to be larger in poor countries, where only a small share of workers can work from home and social protection systems are weaker. Across the globe, young, poorly educated workers and those on temporary contracts are least likely to be able to work from home and more vulnerable to the labor market shocks from COVID-19.
