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Selective forces are represented as a spectrum that goes from internal to external factors in line with Toulmin's characterization. At the bottom of the spectrum, a number of factors discussed by philosophers are organized, with other transmission biases, within CET's model of content, context, model and frequency biases (except the wider socio-economic biases on the right). The location and labeling of these factors is only provisional. For example, 'social values' are included in the category 'content and context biases' because their status is not fully clear as discussed above. The upper part of the diagram presents the three major categories of evolutionary but non-selective forces which are discussed below. All these forces combined together concur to generate the evolutionary forces of scientific change
Source publication
Researchers in cultural evolutionary theory (CET) have recently proposed the foundation of a new field of research in cultural evolution named ‘epistemic evolution’. Drawing on evolutionary epistemology’s early studies, this programme aims to study science as an evolutionary cultural process. The paper discusses the way CET’s study of science can c...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... largely agrees with the evolutionary philosophies of science presented in the last century by Kuhn (1970;1977), Hull (1988;2001) and Toulmin (1967;1972) who have all advanced a dynamic characterization of the interrelation between epistemic and socioepistemic factors as shown in Fig. 1. For them, there is not a sharp distinction between 'internal' or epistemic and 'external' or sociological consideration when epistemic evolution is concerned (Toulmin 1972). Rather, internal and external considerations can be seen as a spectrum of evolutionary forces that dynamically interact together. To isolate one element as more ...
Citations
... To answer this question, I will apply conceptual tools from cultural evolution theory as they have recently been applied to epistemic evolution and in par tic u lar to science dynamics (Richerson et al. 2013;Mesoudi et al. 2013;chapters 2-4 in Love and Wimsatt 2019;Fadda 2021). Cultural evolution theory applies models and meta phors drawn from evolutionary biology to explain the evolution of culture, including the history of science. ...
... There are substantial differences between theoretical and biological variation (Thagard 1980) that I will not discuss here. From my perspective, the main advantage of evolutionary philosophies of science is that they allow us to offer integrated accounts of traditionally opposed perspectives of science, namely, internalist narratives based on the rationality of scientific pro gress and externalist reconstructions of the social norms governing scientific communities (Fadda 2021). In what follows, I embrace evolutionary explanations as loose analogies that help or ga nize the many factors at play in the origination of evolvability research into two broad, nonmutually exclusive, explanatory kinds, namely, (1) "selectionist" explanations, and (2) "evolvability" explanations. ...
... Changes in epistemic standards concern how conceptual innovations meet novel technological and conceptual niches, but dissemination of scientific ideas also depends on social criteria that bias their se lection by individual scientists. In cultural evolution, "context biases" refer to so cio log i cal factors, such as the status or prestige of individuals, or the frequency of ideas in a given community, that play a role in the dissemination of ideas (Fadda 2021). For instance, prestige biases appeal to the disposition of individuals to instantiate the practices of successful individuals. ...
Essays on evolvability from the perspectives of quantitative and population genetics, evolutionary developmental biology, systems biology, macroevolution, and the philosophy of science.
Evolvability—the capability of organisms to evolve—wasn't recognized as a fundamental concept in evolutionary theory until 1990. Though there is still some debate as to whether it represents a truly new concept, the essays in this volume emphasize its value in enabling new research programs and facilitating communication among the major disciplines in evolutionary biology. The contributors, many of whom were instrumental in the development of the concept of evolvability, synthesize what we have learned about it over the past thirty years. They focus on the historical and philosophical contexts that influenced the emergence of the concept and suggest ways to develop a common language and theory to drive further evolvability research.
The essays, drawn from a workshop on evolvability hosted in 2019–2020 by the Center of Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, in Oslo, provide scientific and historical background on evolvability. The contributors represent different disciplines of evolutionary biology, including quantitative and population genetics, evolutionary developmental biology, systems biology, and macroevolution, as well as the philosophy of science. This plurality of approaches allows researchers in disciplines as diverse as developmental biology, molecular biology, and systems biology to communicate with those working in mainstream evolutionary biology. The contributors also discuss key questions at the forefront of research on evolvability.
Contributors:J. David Aponte, W. Scott Armbruster, Geir H. Bolstad, Salomé Bourg, Ingo Brigandt, Anne Calof, James M. Cheverud, Josselin Clo, Frietson Galis, Mark Grabowski, Rebecca Green, Benedikt Hallgrímsson, Thomas F. Hansen, Agnes Holstad, David Houle, David Jablonski, Arthur Lander, Arnaud LeRouzic, Alan C. Love, Ralph Marcucio, Michael B. Morrissey, Laura Nuño de la Rosa, Øystein H. Opedal, Mihaela Pavličev, Christophe Pélabon, Jane M. Reid, Heather Richbourg, Jacqueline L. Sztepanacz, Masahito Tsuboi, Cristina Villegas, Marta Vidal-García, Kjetil L. Voje, Andreas Wagner, Günter P. Wagner, Nathan M. Young
... Though they are often called "biases" and lead to what can appear to be reasoning errors when evaluated in isolated episodes of learning, modeling work suggests that when such heuristics are prevalent in a population they can collectively produce results that are beneficial, both for the individuals whose social learning they are guiding and for the cultural repertoire of the group those individuals belong to ; see also Skyrms 2014). Recent philosophical work has taken up the question of whether or not these kinds of selective social learning heuristics can be assimilated to traditional perspectives on rationality and epistemic virtue (Levy & Alfano 2020, Fadda 2020. Other philosophical research has critically examined the explanatory work done by appeal to such heuristics, and looked at how these biases relate to different forms of social influence (Padalia 2014, Chellappoo 2021. ...
Human behavior and thought often exhibit a familiar pattern of within group similarity and between group difference. Many of these patterns are attributed to cultural differences. For much of the history of its investigation into behavior and thought, however, cognitive science has been disproportionately focused on uncovering and explaining the more universal features of human minds-or the universal features of minds in general.
This entry charts out the ways in which this has changed over recent decades. It sketches the motivation behind the cultural turn in cognitive science, and situates some of its central findings with respect to the questions that animate it and the debates that it has inspired. Woven throughout the entry are examples of how the cognitive science of culture, and especially its elevated concern with different forms of diversity and variation, continues to influence and be influenced by philosophers.
One cluster of philosophical work falls within the traditional subject matter of philosophy of science, in this case of the cognitive and social sciences. Philosophers have analyzed and assessed the methods and evidence central to the scientific study of cognition and culture, and have offered conceptual scrutiny, clarification, and synthesis. Research in a second vein sees philosophers themselves contributing more directly to cognitive scientific projects, (co)constructing theories, helping build computational models, even gathering empirical data. A third kind of work is naturalistic philosophy or philosophy of nature, wherein philosophers seek to use results from the cognitive science of culture to inform or transform debates over long-standing philosophical questions, including questions about the nature of philosophy and philosophical methodology itself.
... Antonio Fadda (2020) analyses cultural evolution theories as they are proposed by evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides et al. (2010), Henrich and McElreath (2003), Mesoudi et al. (2013), Boyd and Richerson (1985), and Claidière and Sperber (2007). These scholars propose to incorporate the field of evolutionary epistemology into their area of research by understanding individual cognition and epistemic evolution as aspects of and thus as part of cultural evolution studies. ...
This special issue for the Journal for General Philosophy of Science is devoted to exploring the impact and many ramifications of current research in evolutionary epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology (EE) is an inter- and multidisciplinary area of research that can be divided into two ever-inclusive research avenues. One research avenue expands on the EEM program and investigates the epistemology of evolution. The other research avenue builds on the EET program and researches the evolution of epistemology. Since its conception, EE has developed three schools of thought: adaptationist, non-adaptationist, and applied EE. Although diverse in outlook and theoretical background, these research avenues and schools share the same agenda of understanding how knowledge evolves, and how it relates to the world. In this paper, we first explain wherefrom evolutionary epistemological schools of thought developed, and then we highlight current debates in EE by briefly reviewing the papers that form part of this special issue.
Globalization of the world needs the modernization of laws, theory, and philosophy, especially since World War II. This could increase researchers' attention towards the modernization of philosophy. The goals also include examining the mediating impact of modern societies among the links of globalization, modernization of laws and theories, and modernization of philosophy in Vietnam. This study has taken the quantitative method and received the data from researchers in philosophy, politics and sociology (university lecturers, researchers and activists in the field of philosophy, politics and sociology) of Vietnam using questionnaires. The smart-PLS was executed to test the relationships between the understudy constructs. The results indicated that globalization, modernization of laws, and theories positively and significantly associated with the modernization of philosophy in Vietnam. The outcomes also revealed that modern societies significantly mediate the links among globalization, modernization of laws and theories, and modernization of philosophy in Vietnam. These results motivate the regulators to focus on the modernization of philosophies in terms of globalization and modernization of laws, theories, and societies.
