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Recent advances in economic theory, largely motivated by experimental findings, have led to the adoption of models of human behavior where decision-makers take into consideration not only their own payoff but also others’ payoffs and any potential consequences of these payoffs. Investigations of deontological motivations, where decision-makers make...
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Context 1
... bridge our theorem to experimental evidence, our first study uses subjects in a laboratory. We asked subjects to choose an amount for a charitable recipient (as illustrated in Fig. 2), a third-party aid organization. We found that subjects became 50% more charitable as the decision becomes more hypothetical. Our second piece of evidence uses an online anonymous experiment, allowing large samples and very low implementation probabilities; but a difference is that d is observed by the experimenter even in the ...
Context 2
... but, in state C, R knows d; he can infer it from x 2 . Superscripts indicate the realized state, so that the payoffs are Figure 3 illustrates this. This general experimental design could be used for many morally relevant decisions; here, we apply our identification method to the dictator game and thus to the moral decision to share. As shown in Fig. 2, the DM receives an endowment of and must decide how much to give to R. She may choose any d such that 0 ≤ d ≤ and the resulting payoffs are x 1 C = − d and x 2 C = d . For = 1, the game thus reduces to the standard dictator game. In state N, a predetermined, exogenous will be implemented, where 0 ≤ ≤ , and x 1 N = − ...
Citations
... Second, our study adds to a recent set of experiments that have sought to detect moral concerns as drivers of behavior, where moral concerns are distinct from distributional preferences (Capraro & Rand, 2018;Bursztyn, Fiorin, Gottlieb, & Kanz, 2019;Miettinen, Kosfeld, Fehr, & Weibull, 2020;Chen & Schonger, 2022;Feess, Kerzenmacher, & Timofeyev, 2022;Bénabou, Falk, Henkel, & Tirole, 2023;Bénabou, Falk, & Henkel, 2024;Van Leeuwen & Alger, in press). The most closely related experiments are those by Miettinen, Kosfeld, Fehr, & Weibull (2020) and Van Leeuwen & Alger (in press), who also posit a utility function with a Kantian moral concernà 5 la Homo moralis (Alger & Weibull, 2013), and who also seek to disentangle this concern from distributional preferences. ...
We conduct a laboratory experiment using framing to assess the willingness to ``sell a lemon'', i.e., to undertake an action that benefits self but hurts the other (the ``buyer''). We seek to disentangle the role of other-regarding preferences and (Kantian) moral concerns, and to test if it matters whether the decision is described in neutral terms or as a market situation. When evaluating an action, morally motivated individuals consider what their own payoff would be if -- hypothetically -- the roles were reversed and the other subject chose the same action (universalization). We vary the salience of role uncertainty, thus varying the ease for participants to envisage the role-reversal scenario.
... The preference for efficiency, akin to most of the distributional social preferences explored in economics, is rooted in consequentialist motivations. Hypothetical imperatives, preferences over strategies due to their consequences, characterize this preference, in contrast to categorical imperatives, preferences over strategies irrespective of their consequences, which Kant (1785) called deontological motivations (Chen and Schonger, 2022). The Kantian preference is represented by the utility function u(x) = π(x, x), implying that an agent assesses different courses of action by considering their own material payoff if the course of action were universalized to all other agents (Alger, 2022). ...
We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short run, individuals' subjective preferences simultaneously determine who they are matched with and how they behave in the social interactions with their matched partners, which results in material payoffs for them. Material payoffs in turn affect how preferences evolve in the long run. To properly model the "match-to-interact" process, we combine stable matching and equilibrium concepts. Our findings emphasize the importance of parochialism, a preference for matching with one's own kind, in shaping our results. Under complete information, the parochial efficient preference type -- characterized by a weak form of parochialism and a preference for efficiency -- stands out in the evolutionary process, because it is able to force positive assortative matching and efficient play among individuals carrying this preference type. Under incomplete information, the exclusionary efficient preference type -- characterized by a stronger form of parochialism and a preference for efficiency -- prevails, as it provides individuals with an incentive to engage in self-sorting through rematching in any matching outcomes that involve incomplete information and inefficient play.
... The distinction is theoretically clear-cut, but apparently too strict for categorizing human behavior. Results from incentivized experiments (Erat and Gneezy, 2012;Gneezy et al., 2013;Chen and Schonger, 2022;Falk et al., 2020) and recent findings from moral philosophy based on survey data (Conway and Gawronski, 2013;Love et al., 2020) show that the decisions of most people depend on norms and on consequences. Consequentialists prefer outcomes that can be implemented without violating a social norm by e.g. ...
The distinction between consequentialism and deontologism is fundamental for moral philosophy and has also attracted attention in the economic analysis of moral decisions. We consider voting games where people can earn money by taking morally questionable decisions. Our predictions are taken from a simple behavioral game-theoretic model and depend on the underlying moral preferences. For both kinds of moral theories, we consider a strict and a moderate version. Moral absolutism prohibits certain behavior under any circumstances. Moderate deontologists face internal moral costs whenever they violate a norm but take trade-offs with consequences into account. Strict consequentialists care only about consequences. Moderate consequentialists face moral costs from violating a norm if and only if their violation yields negative consequences for others. We test our predictions experimentally for lying on the outcome of a lottery and taking money designated for donation. Our data support moderate deontologism for lying and moderate consequentialism for donation. We attribute this to telling the truth being a duty which, if violated, always leads to moral costs, while voting for taking the money yields moral costs if and only if people actually get it.
This article highlights a potential and significant economic–theoretical bias in the widely used strategy method (SM) technique. Although SM is commonly employed to analyze numerous observations per subject regarding rare or off-equilibrium behaviors unattainable through direct elicitation (DE), researchers often overlook a critical distinction. The strategic equivalence between SM and DE is applicable in the context of monetary payoff games, but not in the actual utility-based games played by participants. This oversight may lead to inaccurate conclusions and demand a reevaluation of existing research in the field. We formalize the mapping from the monetary payoff game to this actual game and delineate necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic equivalence to apply.
Despite fierce politicization in arms‐exporting democracies, we lack systematic research on mass public preferences on arms transfers. We propose that citizens either apply a deontologist (rejecting transfers categorically) or consequentialist (trading‐off economic, strategic and normative aspects) calculus of preference formation. Conducting population‐representative survey experiments () in Germany and France, two global top‐five major arms exporters, we find that 10–15 per cent of respondents follow deontologist considerations, a preference structure potentially relevant for all foreign policies involving the use of military force. Still, a majority shows differentiated preferences, giving largest weight to normative considerations, with assessments affected by moderating features (e.g., scenarios of just war). Principled rejection of arms trade and a large consequentialist weight for normative factors are more pronounced in Germany compared to France, indicating that public opinion might pose a stronger constraint for government policy in this country. Respondents' preferences match opinion polls on post‐Russian invasion Ukraine armament, indicating high external validity of our experiments.
Who is tempted by versus resilient to investment premiums from ‘sin stocks’ that produce social harm? We present a correlational (N = 218) and experimental study (N = 646) to examine a) willingness to invest in sin stocks without a return premium, b) how temptation increases as premiums increase, and c) moderation by individual differences in deontological and utilitarian sacrificial dilemma inclinations and dark personality traits. People exhibit an aversion to sin stocks without a premium, but most become increasingly willing to invest as premiums increase. However, people high in deontological inclinations demonstrated resilience, with lower baseline investment and lower responsivity to premium returns. Conversely, people high in utilitarian inclinations and Dark Triad traits showed higher responsivity to premium returns. Results suggest two independent aspects contribute to sin stock investment decisions: deciding whether to invest in sin stocks or not, and sensitivity to return premiums.
Energy demand-side management is crucial for deep decarbonization. Consumers’ behavioral intentions and real pro-environmental behaviour have been widely discussed separately. However, few studies assessed the intention-behaviour gap and limited empirical evidence has been provided on how to promote the intention-behaviour on residential electricity demand response (DR) project. Here, we identified four intention-behaviour relationship by k-means cluster and analyzed the impacts of normative social influence and peer influence on the intention and behaviour based on large scale incentive-based DR experiment and matching questionnaires data in China. We found that the intention-behaviour gap exists in 77.94% respondents, only 16.09% respondents belong to inclined actors who has both high intention and high electricity savings behaviour. Peer influence and normative social influence can significantly increase intention to participate the DR project and energy-saving behaviour during peak hours, and the impact is larger for respondents with high family endowments and educational level. Specifically, 30.6% of the electricity saving behaviour has been explained directly by the peer influence, while normative social influence electricity saving behaviour through behavioural intention. Besides these, effort expectancy and facilitating conditions also play an important role in promoting the intention and electricity-saving behaviour. Our study further provides feasible solutions to facilitate the residential DR for policymakers.
