TABLE 1 - uploaded by Petra Moser
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Legal disputes, such as the Blackberry case, suggest that patent rights may become vital to the economic survival of even the most successful innovations. Although it is obvious that inventors do not choose to patent all their innovations, what or why they patent is poorly understood. This paper introduces a new data set of more than 7,000 American...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... are the omitted industry class. TABLE 7 -BRITISH AWARD WINNERS IN 1851, LINEAR PROBABILITY AND LOGIT REGRESSIONS (MARGINAL EFFECTS), DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR PATENTED EXHIBITS OLS Logit I II III IV V Logit I II III IV V -CITY SIZE AND PATENTING RATES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1851 0.0% ...
Context 2
... are the omitted industry class. TABLE 7 -BRITISH AWARD WINNERS IN 1851, LINEAR PROBABILITY AND LOGIT REGRESSIONS (MARGINAL EFFECTS), DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR PATENTED EXHIBITS OLS Logit I II III IV V Logit I II III IV V -CITY SIZE AND PATENTING RATES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1851 0.0% ...
Citations
... This model may be described as " closed " from an intellectual property (IP) point of view; IP is in fact created internally , used internally, and brandished only on occasion externally to ward off intruders or settle litigation claims. These mechanisms are not, however, the only ones firms (or individuals) may use to protect the rents which derive from the implementation of new resource combinations, and in some industries they are not even considered the most relevant (von Hippel 1988 , pp. 44–55; Grant 1998 ; Moser 2004) . In particular, in strategy studies a series of dynamic appropriation mechanisms which have been taken into consideration include (a) the possession or control of complementary assets necessary to produce or commercialize the innovation ( Teece 1986 ;) ; (b) the incorporation of a large amount of tacit and/or complex knowledge in the innovation ( Agrawal 2006) ; and (c) taking advantage of the lead time which the first mover disposes of 296 3 Institutional Contexts, the Management of Patent Portfolois by making additional investments in technological development, production processes, and market positions. ...
This chapter aims to increase our understanding of the relationships between firm strategies, the design of institutional
contexts on behalf of public agents, and the stimulation of diffused entrepreneurship within the economic system. In particular,
it analyzes the way in which firm patent portfolio management strategies may systematically hinder the emergence of entrepreneurial
endeavors within the economic system and, on this basis, critically discusses how the acknowledgement of these interactions
should influence the design of public policies at the economic system level. We argue that in economic contexts where intellectual
property rights (IPR) are influential, large firms may intentionally develop and strategically manage wide portfolios of patents
in order to purposely pre-empt the rise of direct competition and thwart the efforts of new potential entrepreneurs, rather
than merely to protect the fruits of their R&D. This strategy leads to patent proliferation, eventually hindering the emergence
of nascent entrepreneurship, thereby preventing the creation of new value in the system. The pre-emptive strategy described
may be observed in a variety of contexts in which global firms (such as IBM, Microsoft and other firms in the biotech, nanotech
and pharmaceutical industries) tend to aggressively invest in building and protecting wide ranged and overarching patent portfolios
directed primarily toward preventing potential competition.
... And although there were some inventors who obtained ten or more patents and although there was some trade in patents, the numbers were small especially in comparison to those in the United States, even though the U.S. lagged in economic development. 5 Moser (2006), using information on inventions exhibited at the 1851 Crystal Palace Worlds Fair, finds that only 11% ...
Do patents provide critical incentives to encourage investment in innovation? Or, instead, do patents impose legal risks and burdens on innovators that discourage innovation, as some critics now claim? This paper reviews empirical economic evidence on how well patents perform as a property system.
