Table 1 - uploaded by Shiping Tang
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By synthesizing material forces with ideational forces more organically via a social evolutionary approach, we advance a deeper understanding about post-World War II American military interventionism. We argue that post-World War II American military interventionism — that is, the American elites’ and public’s support for America’s military interve...
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Context 1
... again resort to an indirect approach: we measure the impact of war on the civilian population with log of civilian death, with zero death normalized to 1 for log. We also create an artificial variable to capture the impact of war upon the civilian population, and this variable also serves as an approximate indicator of the total devastation suffered by a state during war (used in model 3 in both Table 1 and Table 2). This variable is the ratio of total civilian death versus total military casualties (dead and wounded). ...
Context 2
... order to evaluate which variable is most important in producing change in a particular dependent variable, we report standardized coeffi- cients throughout. Results from the World Ware I data (Table 1) show that geo-distance is the most important factor in reducing casualties in all the models, although it does not reach the cut-off significance level of p < .1 when regressed against total military casualties. When we regress it against the two indicators that capture war's impact on the civilian popula- tion, however, geo-distance becomes the only factor that shields the population from conflict, at a significance level of p < .05 and p < .1, ...
Context 3
... regressed against the indicators measuring war's impact on the civilian population, the power indicator shows a negative sign, although without reaching the cut-off significance level of p < .1. Most critically, model 2 and model 3 in Table 1 unambiguously show that geo- distance is the only decisive factor limiting the devastation of war upon a state. Geo-distance is negatively associated with the two dependent variables that capture the devastation of war with coefficients at -0.880 and -0.749 and reaching the significance level of p < .05 and p < .1, ...
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In 1945, there were 74 independent countries. Today there are 195. The breakup of colonial empires, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and various secessions all over the world have led to the creation of numerous new sovereign states since World War II. Historically, the expansion and contraction of states has resulted from the competition between...
Citations
... Because inventions or new institutions are made from ideas, the notion that mutations in the ideational dimension of social evolution are not strictly random applies to other levels, if not more so. 11 In some of my empirical works, I have addressed how ideas are formed quite extensively, from the generation of policy ideas to the generation of ideas behind institutions (Tang 2008b(Tang , 2011aTang and Long 2012). They are summarized in Chapter 6. Ultimately (in the neurobiology and neurophysiology sense), however, how ideas are generated is not explainable by social sciences. ...
... He defined process as "an actual or possible occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments unfolding in a programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally" (1997,22). Surely, a process can consist of un-orchestrated acts! 9 This section draws from Tang 2008aTang , 2009aTang , 2011aTang , 2011bTang , 2013aand Tang and Long 2012. Some social scientists managed to transgress all four levels (e.g., Elias 1939Elias [1994), but they are exceptions. ...
... Администрација у Вашингтону је током последњих неколико деценија увек ентузијастично заговарала политику интервенционизма, зато што су огромна премоћ САД у војној сили уз њено ефикасно глобално пројектовање, минималне сопствене жртве и одсуство патњи стварног ратног разарања услед мале вероватноће преношења сукоба на сопствено тло, омогућили да чак и неуспеси појединих прошлих интервенција (нпр. у Вијетнаму и Сомалији) никада не буду психолошка препрека обликовању јавног мњења у корист нових интервенција (Tang & Long, 2011). Ово не чуди, будући да је након укидања редовног служења војног рока у САД, пре више од четири деценије (1973), мање од једног процента становништва у војној служби. ...
This paper aims to understand how the American strategic culture and perception of security have been shaped over time and what its main features are. American strategic culture has been nourished from
the historical, geographical, and political realities of the country. Being a country founded by immigrants, making a great America was also part of the nation-building process. Moreover, the continent's geographical conditions have led the United States of America to be a more powerful state to intervene in political and military issues worldwide. According to Robert Kagan, the interventionist
character, the role of security provider, and disfavoring the international law and organizations are the American foreign policy's main features. In this respect, this paper focuses on these three aspects and evaluate them in its limitation. Although there are many studies upon American foreign policy, this study diverges itself from the existing literature by putting Robert Kagan’s interpretations to its center.
Emerging powers like China, India and Brazil are receiving growing attention as objects in International Relations (IR) discourse. Scholars from these emerging powers are rarely present as subjects in mainstream IR discourse, however. This paper interrogates the conditions for scholars in emerging powers to speak back to the mainstream discipline. It argues, first, that ‘theory speak’ is rare from scholars based in periphery countries perceived to be ‘emerging powers’. Despite increasing efforts to create a ‘home-grown’ theoretical discourse in China, India and Brazil, few articles in mainstream journals present novel theoretical frameworks or arguments framed as non-Western/Southern theory or even as a ‘Chinese school’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’. Second, scholars from emerging powers tend to speak as ‘native informants’ about their own country, not about general aspects of ‘the international’. Third, some scholars even speak as ‘quasi-officials’, that is, they speak for their country.
