Table 3 - uploaded by Maria Massaro
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In the light of the unprecedented growth of mobile broadband services, radio spectrum regulation is undergoing a substantial review in the European Union (EU). The radio spectrum presents a three-level regulatory context. At international level, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulates the allocation of radio spectrum. At regional...
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... Secondly, WiFi4EU has resuscitated the debate about who should lead these types of pro-citizen initiatives (national versus local authorities, and also European). This debate is already a classic (Massaro, 2017) and dates back to the 50s and 60s, with the experts basically being divided between neo-functionalists, defending supranational interests, and the intergovernmentalists that stress the importance of the bargaining power of the EU Member States as a driver in the process of EU integration (Moga, 2009;Pollack, 2005;Rosamond, 2000). Currently, Multi-level governance has become one of the concepts most widely used to describe the EU system, emphasising the multiplicity of actors at different levels involved in EU activities (De Waele & Kuipers, 2013;Massaro, 2017). ...
... This debate is already a classic (Massaro, 2017) and dates back to the 50s and 60s, with the experts basically being divided between neo-functionalists, defending supranational interests, and the intergovernmentalists that stress the importance of the bargaining power of the EU Member States as a driver in the process of EU integration (Moga, 2009;Pollack, 2005;Rosamond, 2000). Currently, Multi-level governance has become one of the concepts most widely used to describe the EU system, emphasising the multiplicity of actors at different levels involved in EU activities (De Waele & Kuipers, 2013;Massaro, 2017). In particular, WiFi4EU needs to be consistent with the national regulatory frameworks, which primarily address vertical integrated incumbents and nationwide markets, and it may need adjustments. ...
This paper analyses the WiFi4EU initiative, the measure proposed by the European Commission (EC) to speed up public access to Wi-Fi throughout Europe in the coming years by subsidising the infrastructure. We set out to analyse how these measures are incorporated into the EU policies for building a Gigabit Society and the EC's regulatory tradition, and what the impact is likely to be. This innovative initiative has been drawn up in a climate of uncertainties and delays, and will have an effect upon the network deployments strategies of operators and countries. The article puts all of this into the context of the current European regulation debate and conducts a techno-economic analysis to assess the expected impact of the initiative. We have observed a slight shift towards developmental models in the EC regulatory framework and a step ahead towards multi-level governance. Furthermore, the techno-economic analysis has revealed the limited extent of Community aid and the considerable variability of the equipment deployed and the expenditure involved. We have also highlighted the questionable formulation of the allocation mechanisms, and we have included certain examples or suggestions for improvement.
... Wfi4EU has resuscitated the debate about who should lead these types of pro-citizen initiatives. This debate is already a classic (Massaro, 2017) and dates back to the 50s and 60s, the experts basically being divided between neo-functionalists, defending supranational interests, and the intergovernmentalists that stress the importance of the bargaining power of the EU Member States as a driver in the process of EU integration (Pollack, 2005;Moga, 2009;Rosamond, 2000). Currently, Multi-level governance has become one of the concepts most widely used to describe the EU system, emphasising the multiplicity of actors at different levels involved in EU activities (De Waele, & Kuipers 2013;Massaro, 2017). ...
... This debate is already a classic (Massaro, 2017) and dates back to the 50s and 60s, the experts basically being divided between neo-functionalists, defending supranational interests, and the intergovernmentalists that stress the importance of the bargaining power of the EU Member States as a driver in the process of EU integration (Pollack, 2005;Moga, 2009;Rosamond, 2000). Currently, Multi-level governance has become one of the concepts most widely used to describe the EU system, emphasising the multiplicity of actors at different levels involved in EU activities (De Waele, & Kuipers 2013;Massaro, 2017). EU Member States are using an array of public policy instruments to improve broadband availability and are taking steps to make these improvements in a variety of different ways as there is no one single European policy to promote broadband (Cava-Ferreruela & Alabau-Munoz, 2005). ...
This paper analyses the WiFi4EU initiative, the measures proposed by the European Commission (EC) to speed up public access to Wi-Fi throughout Europe in the coming years, ranging from rapid mechanisms to subsidising the infrastructure. We set out to analyse how these measures are incorporated into the EU policies for building a Digital Single Market and the EC’s regulatory tradition, and what the impact of this initiative is likely to be. As this innovative initiative will have an effect upon the network deployments strategies of operators and countries and it has been drawn up in a climate of uncertainties and delays, the article puts all of this into the context of the current European regulation debate and conducts a techno-economic analysis to assess the expected impact of the initiative. We have observed a slight shift towards developmental models in the EC regulatory framework. Furthermore, the techno-economic analysis has revealed the limited extent of Community aid and the considerable variability of the equipment deployed and the expenditure involved. We have also highlighted the questionable formulation of the allocation mechanisms, and we have included certain examples or suggestions for optimisation.
Although Zimbabwe opened its airwaves to private players in 2002, broadcasting spectrum frequency licensing has remained contentious with some stakeholders arguing the process lacks transparency and is deceptive to media reform. We therefore seek to answer two key questions in this article: What are the impediments encountered in liberating the broadcasting industry in Zimbabwe since independence? To what extent is Zimbabwe’s broadcasting frequency spectrum licensing regime transparent, open and participatory? The article analyses if the licensing regimen meets International Telecommunications Union (ITU), continental and regional benchmarks of transparency, openness, fairness and inclusivity in allocation and assignment of frequencies. It investigates and unpacks policies and principles concerning frequency spectrum allocation for broadcasting in Zimbabwe. Documentary analysis is employed in examining policy documents which outline terms of reference and requirements for frequency spectrum allocation. We also conducted in-depth interviews with broadcasting policy makers and industrial voices such as applicants who were denied licenses. Four stations (two awarded and two denied) licenses and were purposively sampled for in-depth interviews. Findings in this study reveal that the adjudication and scoring of the licensees is not transparent, neither is it open and bidders do not have a say in the licensing process. Whilst the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe and the Postal Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe admit that final adjudication is done by the authorities, they still claim that the Zimbabwean licensing model is open, transparent and participatory.
This article stresses the importance to understand the institutional context in which decisions on radio spectrum use are taken. In particular, this article focuses on the European Union's (EU) institutional context. The history of EU radio spectrum policy is narrated highlighting the tension between the EU integration process and protection of national sovereignty. This tension sets the stage to discuss two research areas which call for further attention: lack of legitimacy of EU law and use of soft power to promote EU integration. Investigating these areas may contribute to identify institutional barriers to better decision making for radio spectrum use.
Static spectrum allocation and secondary spectrum sharing are unlikely to sufficiently meet the growing need for the radio spectrum due to continuous increase in the number of wireless devices. Hence, new approaches for spectrum sharing at primary level are needed to improve spectrum utilization. In particular, to provide higher spectrum utilization, a government can motivate providers to participate in primary level sharing by introducing subsidy-based spectrum sharing (SBSS) markets. However, this market may give rise to the adverse effect of freeriding. In this paper, the goal is to minimize freeriding in a dynamic spectrum sharing environment using a novel heuristic algorithm that allows a set of providers to effectively participate in an SBSS market. In particular, the provider strategies and regulation on fees set by the government that minimize freeriding are analyzed. Simulation results verify the sustainability of the SBSS market by providing suitable strategies to the providers. A comparison between a game equilibrium to the strategies obtained from proposed algorithm shows the optimality gap. Moreover, a comparative analysis of conventional non-sharing spectrum market to the regulated SBSS market is provided to demonstrate the improvement of a provider's earning when its charging fee lies between a fair market fee and a regulated minimum fee.
ABSTRACT This article stresses the importance to understand the institutional context in which decisions on radio spectrum use are taken. In particular, this article focuses on the European Union's (EU) institutional context. The history of EU radio spectrum policy is narrated highlighting the tension between the EU integration process and protection of national sovereignty. This tension sets the stage to discuss two research areas which call for further attention: lack of legitimacy of EU law and use of soft power to promote EU integration. Investigating these areas may contribute to identify institutional barriers to better decision making for radio spectrum use.
