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The conventional wisdom about presidential campaigning in midterm Senate elections is that presidential efforts lack impact or have negative impact. We discuss conceptual problems with the conventional view and offer an alternative that views presidential campaigning as strategic. We test this alternative and find support for it. Further, we find t...
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In an election characterized by countless headlines, the refusal of Republicans to support their party’s nominee was a constant topic of discussion in 2016. Our paper looks to explain why Republican members of Congress joined the so-called #NeverTrump movement. In the first part, we document the varied—and often contradictory—explanations of the #N...
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... ) (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004;Jones et al., 2009) (Baker, 2017;Kriner and Reeves, 2015a,b) ( Lewis, 2008) (Berry et al., 2010; Kriner and Reeves, 2015a,b) (Cohen et al., 1991;Sellers and Denton, 2006;Abramowitz and Panagopoulos, 2020) ( , 2015, 2018) 2 2 Neustadt (1991) (Moe, 1985) (Tulis, 1987;Kernell, 2007) (Barrett, 2004;Canes-Wrone, 2006) (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2004;Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008) (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005a,b) Jones and Baumgartner (2005a) (dynamic agenda setting) (Stimson et al., 1995) (Bevan and Jennings, 2014) (Mayhew, 2004;Grimmer, 2013) (Fenno, 1978;Clinton, 2006;Kastellec et al., 2015) ( Bawn et al., 2012;La Raja and Schaffner, 2015) Eshbaughh-Soha and Miles (2011 (Petrocik, 1996;Damore, 2004) (Hayes, 2008;Thesen et al., 2017) Egan (2013) (issue ownership) Goggin et al. (2020) 3 (Mayhew, 2004) (Cohen et al., 1991, p. 167) Cook (2002) (Berry et al., 2010;Kriner and Reeves, 2015b) (Cohen et al., 1991;Sellers and Denton, 2006;Abramowitz and Panagopoulos, 2020) 4 (Jones and Baumgartner, (Riker, 1993 New York Times (Grynbaum, 2021) ...
... ) (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004;Jones et al., 2009) (Baker, 2017;Kriner and Reeves, 2015a,b) ( Lewis, 2008) (Berry et al., 2010; Kriner and Reeves, 2015a,b) (Cohen et al., 1991;Sellers and Denton, 2006;Abramowitz and Panagopoulos, 2020) ( , 2015, 2018) 2 2 Neustadt (1991) (Moe, 1985) (Tulis, 1987;Kernell, 2007) (Barrett, 2004;Canes-Wrone, 2006) (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2004;Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008) (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005a,b) Jones and Baumgartner (2005a) (dynamic agenda setting) (Stimson et al., 1995) (Bevan and Jennings, 2014) (Mayhew, 2004;Grimmer, 2013) (Fenno, 1978;Clinton, 2006;Kastellec et al., 2015) ( Bawn et al., 2012;La Raja and Schaffner, 2015) Eshbaughh-Soha and Miles (2011 (Petrocik, 1996;Damore, 2004) (Hayes, 2008;Thesen et al., 2017) Egan (2013) (issue ownership) Goggin et al. (2020) 3 (Mayhew, 2004) (Cohen et al., 1991, p. 167) Cook (2002) (Berry et al., 2010;Kriner and Reeves, 2015b) (Cohen et al., 1991;Sellers and Denton, 2006;Abramowitz and Panagopoulos, 2020) 4 (Jones and Baumgartner, (Riker, 1993 New York Times (Grynbaum, 2021) ...
大統領の政策アジェンダは選挙サイクルによってどのように影響を受けるだろうか。政治家にはそもそもアジェンダを設定しないという戦略もあり得るため、単に観察されたアジェンダを分析するのみではバイアスが生じ得る。この問題を乗り越えるため、本研究は、医療制度政策、移民・出入国管理政策、資源・エネルギー政策を事例に、1993年-2017年の大統領の週演説 (weekly address) データを対象に計量テクスト分析とベクトル自己回帰分析 (VAR) を用いて検証した。理論・仮説では、党派的な争点である医療制度政策、移民・出入国管理政策については、いずれの政策も歴代大統領は重視してきたが、医療保険政策と移民・出入国管理政策は有権者が重視するかは党派によって異なるため、選挙日が近づくほど党派によって差が大きくなることを、そして、有権者の関心に大きな差がないエネルギー政策においては、党派によって両者の差が大きくならないことを主張した。分析の結果、エネルギー政策については仮説が支持されたものの、医療保険政策、移民・出入国管理政策については一部が支持されなかった。大統領の政策アジェンダは選挙サイクルによってどのように影響を受けるだろうか。政治家にはそもそもアジェンダを設定しないという戦略もあり得るため、単に観察されたアジェンダを分析するのみではバイアスが生じ得る。この問題を乗り越えるため、本研究は、医療制度政策、移民・出入国管理政策、資源・エネルギー政策を事例に、1993年-2017年の大統領の週演説 (weekly address) データを対象に計量テクスト分析とベクトル自己回帰分析 (VAR) を用いて検証した。理論・仮説では、党派的な争点である医療制度政策、移民・出入国管理政策については、いずれの政策も歴代大統領は重視してきたが、医療保険政策と移民・出入国管理政策は有権者が重視するかは党派によって異なるため、選挙日が近づくほど党派によって差が大きくなることを、そして、有権者の関心に大きな差がないエネルギー政策においては、党派によって両者の差が大きくならないことを主張した。分析の結果、エネルギー政策については仮説が支持されたものの、医療保険政策、移民・出入国管理政策については一部が支持されなかった。
... When it comes to the campaign, presidential approval can drive presidents to be more or less absent from the campaign trail. At the same time, presidential campaigning can impact Senate electoral outcomes (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991;Hoddie and Routh 2004). Combined with the nationalization of congressional elections, this means that the president can focus efforts on the small number of competitive races, in districts where the president is popular, to assist with partisan electoral goals (Herrnson and Morris 2007;Mellen and Searles 2013). ...
... Political scientists have long attempted to estimate the causal effect of a presidential campaign visit on the probability that a candidate wins [Cohen, Krassa and Hamman (1991), Herrnson and Morris (2007), Keele, Fogarty and Stimson (2004), Sellers and Denton (2006)]. Particular attention has been paid to the 2002 midterm election, when George W. Bush campaigned extensively for Republican candidates. ...
Presidents often campaign on behalf of candidates during elections. Do these campaign visits increase the probability that the candidate will win? While one might attempt to answer this question by adjusting for observed covariates, such an approach is plagued by serious data limitations. In this paper we pursue a different approach. Namely, we ask: what, if anything, should one infer about the causal effect of a presidential campaign visit using a simple cross-tabulation of the data?We take a Bayesian approach to this problem and show that if one is willing to use substantive information to make some (possibly weak) assumptions about the nature of the unmeasured confounding, sharp posterior estimates of causal effects are easy to calculate. Using data from the 2002 midterm elections, we find that, under a reasonable set of assumptions, a presidential campaign visit on the behalf of congressional candidates helped those candidates win elections.
... First, lower approval ratings encourage presidents to speak more frequently with the intent of improving their political situation (Eshbaugh-Soha 2010). When approval ratings are low, presidents may wish to speak about the decisions of a federal institution that is typically more well regarded than either the presidency or Congress (Kelleher and Wolak 2007), 9 much as members of Congress may wish to campaign with presidents who are more popular than they are in their legislative districts (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991;Eshbaugh-Soha and Nicholson-Crotty 2009;Keele, Fogarty, and Stimson 2004). Job Approval t-1 comprises the monthly average Gallup job approval rating of the president, lagged one month (Gallup 2013b). ...
Despite the centrality of speeches to the American presidency, no research has specifically investigated the frequency of presidential public commentary about Supreme Court decisions. We do so and also examine why presidents discuss Supreme Court cases in their public comments from the Eisenhower to Obama administrations. Our empirical findings support our theoretical expectations in two primary ways. First, presidents speak most frequently after cases have been decided. Second, the monthly volume of presidential remarks on Court cases is shaped to varying degrees by presidents’ desires to bolster their reelections, policy goals, and historical legacies. By shedding new light on why presidents comment publicly on Supreme Court cases, this research contributes to our understanding of presidential speechmaking, executive–judicial branch interactions, and how norms and institutions shape the behavior of political actors.
... We focus our attention on the second of these categories, campaign rallies, which take place during the roughly two-month period prior to a midterm election. The literature in this area divides roughly into one of two themes: the effects of midterm presidential travel (Cohen, Hamman, & Krassa, 1991;Herrnson & midterm travel (Eshbaugh-Soha & Nicholson-Crotty, 2009;Hoddie & Routh, 2004). Our work falls into the latter category but it is helpful to review the theoretical foundations of the former category first. ...
... Scholars focusing on presidential efforts to assist their co-partisans disagree about whether or not such efforts actually have the intended effect. Cohen et al. (1991) examined presidential efforts on behalf of Senate candidates from 1966-1986 and found that presidential visits may help a candidate's fundraising efforts and exert an influence on a candidate's vote share under specific conditions. 1 The authors argue that the effects of a presidential visit are likely to be most pronounced in the most competitive races. In such races, Cohen and colleagues argue, a campaign appearance by the president may convert a loss to a victory for the president's co-partisan. ...
... Competitive congressional districts in states that also have a competitive Senate or gubernatorial contest, may be more likely to draw the interest of the president than a single competitive house race might. Stated as a series of hypotheses: (Cohen et al., 1991). ...
Due to limitations in both time and resources, presidents who wish to assist their copartisans’ electoral endeavors must make strategic choices when offering their assistance. Much research has attempted to explain why presidents devote their limited resources during a midterm election, yet we know little about the factors that lead to a presidential visit to a particular congressional district. Our research addresses this gap in the literature by narrowing the focus to the congressional district level. We ask the following: Are the same factors that lead to a presidential visit at the state level operational at the district level? The results suggest they are not. Moreover, we find that while presidents do indeed behave rationally when they make appearances for their copartisans, visits are more likely to occur when there are multiple higher-level competitive races in a district, and presidents are more likely to go where they are already popular.
... As one might expect, the Democratic candidate is more likely to win in a state that is populated by a Democratic and/or liberal majority. Other structural characteristics include the influence (or lack thereof) of presidential coattails (Stewart 1989; Chressanthis and Shaffer 1993; Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991; Campbell and Sumners 1990), the current strength or recent growth of the economy (Bardwell and Lewis-Beck 2004; Bennett and Wiseman 1991), as well as the size and diversity of the state (Stewart 1989). In addition to structural factors, researchers have found that a number of candidatespecific attributes are likely to influence the outcomes of a particular Senate election. ...
Congressional elections scholars have spent considerable time exploring how voters pay attention to campaigns. We add to this literature by conceptualizing public attention as a relative measure between two candidates. Borrowing from epidemiology and research in public policy, we propose a new indicator of public attention based on trends in Internet search activity. Such a conceptualization allows for us to insert public attention into the larger theoretical picture. We test this measure by statistically analyzing Senate elections between 2004-2010, finding a positive and significant relationship between relative attentiveness and electoral success that is robust across multiple specifications.
... Congress. This paper highlights the president, who most credibly fills the role of the proposer in Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) seminal model, and who has further opportunities to influence the distribution of federal outlays both later in the appropriations process and after a final bill is enacted. We analyze a large database that tracks the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 21-year period. ...
... As it does for so many others who study distributive politics, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) initiates our analysis. Published almost 20 years ago, Baron and Ferejohn's model extends Rubinstein's (1982) classic work to tackle the fundamental question of how a legislature distributes benefits among its members. ...
Empirical research on distributive politics emphasizes party and committee leaders in Congress. This paper highlights the president, who most credibly fills the role of the proposer in Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) seminal model, and who has further opportunities to influence the distribution of federal outlays both later in the appropriations process and after a final bill is enacted. We analyze a large database that tracks the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 21-year period. Using a district fixed-effects estimation strategy, we find only sporadic evidence that committee chairs, party leaders, and majority party members receive larger shares of federal outlays. Instead, we find consistent and robust evidence that districts receive systematically more spending when they are represented by legislators in the president’s party.
... The President also can build coalitions by dolling out Presidential patronage, in the form of fundraising assistance and campaign support (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman, 1991;Davidson and Oleszek, 2000), well-publicized visits to the White House (Neustadt, 1960;Covington, 1987), rides on Air Force One (Walsh, 2003), placement of federal construction projects, and the geographic distribution of other federal programs (Edwards, 1980). Similarly, the President is able to facilitate log rolls across bills, promising not to veto (or to offer support for) one bill for support on another (Cameron, 2000). ...
... Compared to presidential election years, midterm cycles focus attention and resources more narrowly on congressional races. According to convention wisdom, the president focuses his travel during midterm years on electing more of his party to Congress (Cohen et al. 1991;Apple 2002;Time 2002;Keele, Fogarty, and Stimson 2004), particularly as his copartisans often find winning office more difficult during these elections (Hoddie and Routh 2004). The two years of a midterm cycle occur too far from the next presidential race for the president to further his own reelection. ...
... The expected benefit of visiting this type of state is much higher. The president thus focuses his travel itinerary on these competitive races (Cohen et al. 1991;Keele et al. 2004;Hoddie and Routh 2004), helping his party realize a collective goal of electing more of its members to Congress. ...
... A second independent variable is the size of the partisan margin in the Senate. The third is the president's success in Congress, measured by his winning percentage on roll call votes in the midterm legislative session on which the president took a position (Cohen et al. 1991;Stanley and Niemi 2002). We expect these two measures to be negatively related to the number of campaign visits and positively related to official visits. ...
We investigate presidents' midterm domestic travel between 1982 and 2002. The president concentrates campaign appearances in states with competitive Senate races. These campaign visits appear to boost the candidates from the president's party. Yet, the president is not always working to further his party's collective goals. His individual electoral interests lead him to make official noncampaign visits to strengthen his own electoral support in some states. Self-interest also encourages the president to campaign for his party's candidates in states with numerous electoral votes, regardless of their chances of winning. Such campaign visits may help the president's own electoral fortunes but inefficiently further his party's collective interests.
... tial " lame duck " status from Congress, presidents modify their rhetorical congruency strategy to respond to shifting political circumstances (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991; Light 1999). In order to test theoretical assertions about the delivery of the public presidency, several factors pertaining to modes of conveyance are also examined. ...
Several studies have examined the relationship between presidential action and public opinion; however, few explore a direct and continuous connection between presidential rhetoric and public opinion. To measure presidential rhetorical congruence with opinion, I construct a data set of matched opinion and policy statements from Presidents Eisenhower to Clinton. Confirming expectations (while contradicting others), I find no differences in congruent position taking between presidents who served earlier (Eisenhower to Ford) from those who served later (Carter to Clinton). Importantly, the election effect discovered in the president’s first term is repeated in the second term in advance of midterm or presidential elections. Methods of public communication present mixed results; statements made on television are less likely to be congruent with public opinion in the first term (but more likely in the second term) while statements made in public speeches are positive for second-term presidents, both points suggesting presidents do not “go quietly” into retirement.
