Figure 1 - uploaded by Paul Hallwood
Content may be subject to copyright.
Source publication
This paper investigates the effect of positive marginal monitoring and enforcement costs, 'policing cost,' on the optimal exploitation of a fishery under the management of a marine protected area. It is shown that with positive marginal policing cost, the objective of maximum economic yield is no longer optimal, and that some dissipation of economi...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... the superscript designates a numbered zone. If the objective is to minimize the total social cost of a human activity, or to accept some given amount of sustainable rent degradation, maintenance of the inequalities in equation (2) is not rational policy. 8 Rather, the human activity should be shunted out of those zones where its marginal social cost, measured by dV i / dh , is relatively high to where it is lower, so reducing the total social cost of the activity. Such a policy of regulated access re- quires monitoring and policing and, presumably, the greater the number of different types of zones that have to be policed, the greater policing costs will be. This is es- pecially so when different types of human activities are allowed/disallowed in different zones. In this section, attention turns to the modeling of sustainable economic rent, and the economic consequences of biological spillovers. There are several ways to model the economic consequence of an MPA with associated biological and economic spillovers. A simple source-sink model is used here to illustrate the main points. In figure 1, distance from the center of a closed zone is measured on the x-axis, and rent per square unit area (say, per acre) of ocean floor is measured in dollars on the y-axis. The function f ( x ) measures sustainable economic rent per unit area as depending on absolute distance from the center of the closed zone. This declining function is consistent with the assumption that the value of spillovers from the closed zone declines with distance. In equation (1), f x < 0. It should be emphasized that figure 1 represents a cross section through the center of a “designated geographic area” shown in figure 2, which is drawn circular only to simplify the calcu- lations below. The function f ( x ) can be thought of as the outer edge of a “bubble” of sustainable economic rent that exists in three-dimensional space with its highest point centered over the origin. The rate of economic rent, f ( x ), is sustainable in the sense that human users can obtain it period after period. For example, rent is sustainable if fishers take only the annual growth in biomass, or, if hobbyist divers do not interfere with the oceanic objects that they view. As the baseline case, suppose that the designated geographic area in figure 2 is inefficiently managed initially to the extent that fishers and other human users of it reduce economic rent everywhere to zero. This assumption is consistent with the theory of the open-access fishery as discussed by Gordon (1954), and is assumed in many of the bioeconomic models cited earlier. It is also approximately consistent with the analysis of fisheries that use a total allowable catch (TAC) in combination with fishing restrictions, such as of type of gear, number of boats, or workers per boat. Thus, in order to capture the increased economic rents afforded by the catch limit, fishers engage in rent destroying practices, such as capital stuffing and derby fishing (OECD 1997). In order to increase economic rent from the baseline (zero) level, a closed zone is introduced over a biologically productive area chosen on the basis of the considerations discussed earlier. In figure 1, the distance 0 x 1 indicates the closed zone. It is assumed that, with time, the biological productivity of the closed zone increases, ul- timately to its maximum monetary level, I MAX . Such an assumption is consistent with the relevant field studies discussed by Ward, Heinemann, and Evans (2001). An observed problem with closed zones that are not accompanied with other zoning measures is that fishers will fish intensively right up to the edge of the closed zone. This is an example of “fishery displacement” by fishers excluded from the no-take zone and is a familiar assumption in bioeconomic models. Such inten- sive fishing effort (and possibly other human activities such as diving and anchor damage) destroys the potential sustainable economic rent beyond x 1 . If this is the case, the rent profile becomes I MAX Ax 1 x 2 , which is obviously less than it could be along f ( x ). While the managers of some fisheries appear to be content with this state of af- fairs, others are not. Thus, U.S. authorities governing the Gulf of Maine off the northeastern U.S. coast allow fishing right up to the boundary of the closed zones, but in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, closed zones may be further protected by adjacent restricted zones (Day 2002). Such a restricted zone is shown in figure 1 as the distance x 1 to x 2 . As a matter of policy, the objective of the restricted zone is to preserve as much of the sustainable economic rent as possible, subject to a policing cost constraint (as discussed later). Accordingly, some human activities are allowed in the restricted zone, but not others. Such zoning restrictions are consistent with equation (2) and later discussion. We are interested in the maximum amount of sustainable economic rent; i.e. , MEY, created in the restricted zone through biological and associated economic spillovers from the closed zone. To find this, we need to calculate the volume, V , which is a monetary measure of sustainable economic rent, created under f ( x ) between x 1 and x 2 rotated around the y-axis. 9 The necessary integration exercise ...
Context 2
... the superscript designates a numbered zone. If the objective is to minimize the total social cost of a human activity, or to accept some given amount of sustainable rent degradation, maintenance of the inequalities in equation (2) is not rational policy. 8 Rather, the human activity should be shunted out of those zones where its marginal social cost, measured by dV i / dh , is relatively high to where it is lower, so reducing the total social cost of the activity. Such a policy of regulated access re- quires monitoring and policing and, presumably, the greater the number of different types of zones that have to be policed, the greater policing costs will be. This is es- pecially so when different types of human activities are allowed/disallowed in different zones. In this section, attention turns to the modeling of sustainable economic rent, and the economic consequences of biological spillovers. There are several ways to model the economic consequence of an MPA with associated biological and economic spillovers. A simple source-sink model is used here to illustrate the main points. In figure 1, distance from the center of a closed zone is measured on the x-axis, and rent per square unit area (say, per acre) of ocean floor is measured in dollars on the y-axis. The function f ( x ) measures sustainable economic rent per unit area as depending on absolute distance from the center of the closed zone. This declining function is consistent with the assumption that the value of spillovers from the closed zone declines with distance. In equation (1), f x < 0. It should be emphasized that figure 1 represents a cross section through the center of a “designated geographic area” shown in figure 2, which is drawn circular only to simplify the calcu- lations below. The function f ( x ) can be thought of as the outer edge of a “bubble” of sustainable economic rent that exists in three-dimensional space with its highest point centered over the origin. The rate of economic rent, f ( x ), is sustainable in the sense that human users can obtain it period after period. For example, rent is sustainable if fishers take only the annual growth in biomass, or, if hobbyist divers do not interfere with the oceanic objects that they view. As the baseline case, suppose that the designated geographic area in figure 2 is inefficiently managed initially to the extent that fishers and other human users of it reduce economic rent everywhere to zero. This assumption is consistent with the theory of the open-access fishery as discussed by Gordon (1954), and is assumed in many of the bioeconomic models cited earlier. It is also approximately consistent with the analysis of fisheries that use a total allowable catch (TAC) in combination with fishing restrictions, such as of type of gear, number of boats, or workers per boat. Thus, in order to capture the increased economic rents afforded by the catch limit, fishers engage in rent destroying practices, such as capital stuffing and derby fishing (OECD 1997). In order to increase economic rent from the baseline (zero) level, a closed zone is introduced over a biologically productive area chosen on the basis of the considerations discussed earlier. In figure 1, the distance 0 x 1 indicates the closed zone. It is assumed that, with time, the biological productivity of the closed zone increases, ul- timately to its maximum monetary level, I MAX . Such an assumption is consistent with the relevant field studies discussed by Ward, Heinemann, and Evans (2001). An observed problem with closed zones that are not accompanied with other zoning measures is that fishers will fish intensively right up to the edge of the closed zone. This is an example of “fishery displacement” by fishers excluded from the no-take zone and is a familiar assumption in bioeconomic models. Such inten- sive fishing effort (and possibly other human activities such as diving and anchor damage) destroys the potential sustainable economic rent beyond x 1 . If this is the case, the rent profile becomes I MAX Ax 1 x 2 , which is obviously less than it could be along f ( x ). While the managers of some fisheries appear to be content with this state of af- fairs, others are not. Thus, U.S. authorities governing the Gulf of Maine off the northeastern U.S. coast allow fishing right up to the boundary of the closed zones, but in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, closed zones may be further protected by adjacent restricted zones (Day 2002). Such a restricted zone is shown in figure 1 as the distance x 1 to x 2 . As a matter of policy, the objective of the restricted zone is to preserve as much of the sustainable economic rent as possible, subject to a policing cost constraint (as discussed later). Accordingly, some human activities are allowed in the restricted zone, but not others. Such zoning restrictions are consistent with equation (2) and later discussion. We are interested in the maximum amount of sustainable economic rent; i.e. , MEY, created in the restricted zone through biological and associated economic spillovers from the closed zone. To find this, we need to calculate the volume, V , which is a monetary measure of sustainable economic rent, created under f ( x ) between x 1 and x 2 rotated around the y-axis. 9 The necessary integration exercise ...
Context 3
... the superscript designates a numbered zone. If the objective is to minimize the total social cost of a human activity, or to accept some given amount of sustainable rent degradation, maintenance of the inequalities in equation (2) is not rational policy. 8 Rather, the human activity should be shunted out of those zones where its marginal social cost, measured by dV i / dh , is relatively high to where it is lower, so reducing the total social cost of the activity. Such a policy of regulated access re- quires monitoring and policing and, presumably, the greater the number of different types of zones that have to be policed, the greater policing costs will be. This is es- pecially so when different types of human activities are allowed/disallowed in different zones. In this section, attention turns to the modeling of sustainable economic rent, and the economic consequences of biological spillovers. There are several ways to model the economic consequence of an MPA with associated biological and economic spillovers. A simple source-sink model is used here to illustrate the main points. In figure 1, distance from the center of a closed zone is measured on the x-axis, and rent per square unit area (say, per acre) of ocean floor is measured in dollars on the y-axis. The function f ( x ) measures sustainable economic rent per unit area as depending on absolute distance from the center of the closed zone. This declining function is consistent with the assumption that the value of spillovers from the closed zone declines with distance. In equation (1), f x < 0. It should be emphasized that figure 1 represents a cross section through the center of a “designated geographic area” shown in figure 2, which is drawn circular only to simplify the calcu- lations below. The function f ( x ) can be thought of as the outer edge of a “bubble” of sustainable economic rent that exists in three-dimensional space with its highest point centered over the origin. The rate of economic rent, f ( x ), is sustainable in the sense that human users can obtain it period after period. For example, rent is sustainable if fishers take only the annual growth in biomass, or, if hobbyist divers do not interfere with the oceanic objects that they view. As the baseline case, suppose that the designated geographic area in figure 2 is inefficiently managed initially to the extent that fishers and other human users of it reduce economic rent everywhere to zero. This assumption is consistent with the theory of the open-access fishery as discussed by Gordon (1954), and is assumed in many of the bioeconomic models cited earlier. It is also approximately consistent with the analysis of fisheries that use a total allowable catch (TAC) in combination with fishing restrictions, such as of type of gear, number of boats, or workers per boat. Thus, in order to capture the increased economic rents afforded by the catch limit, fishers engage in rent destroying practices, such as capital stuffing and derby fishing (OECD 1997). In order to increase economic rent from the baseline (zero) level, a closed zone is introduced over a biologically productive area chosen on the basis of the considerations discussed earlier. In figure 1, the distance 0 x 1 indicates the closed zone. It is assumed that, with time, the biological productivity of the closed zone increases, ul- timately to its maximum monetary level, I MAX . Such an assumption is consistent with the relevant field studies discussed by Ward, Heinemann, and Evans (2001). An observed problem with closed zones that are not accompanied with other zoning measures is that fishers will fish intensively right up to the edge of the closed zone. This is an example of “fishery displacement” by fishers excluded from the no-take zone and is a familiar assumption in bioeconomic models. Such inten- sive fishing effort (and possibly other human activities such as diving and anchor damage) destroys the potential sustainable economic rent beyond x 1 . If this is the case, the rent profile becomes I MAX Ax 1 x 2 , which is obviously less than it could be along f ( x ). While the managers of some fisheries appear to be content with this state of af- fairs, others are not. Thus, U.S. authorities governing the Gulf of Maine off the northeastern U.S. coast allow fishing right up to the boundary of the closed zones, but in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, closed zones may be further protected by adjacent restricted zones (Day 2002). Such a restricted zone is shown in figure 1 as the distance x 1 to x 2 . As a matter of policy, the objective of the restricted zone is to preserve as much of the sustainable economic rent as possible, subject to a policing cost constraint (as discussed later). Accordingly, some human activities are allowed in the restricted zone, but not others. Such zoning restrictions are consistent with equation (2) and later discussion. We are interested in the maximum amount of sustainable economic rent; i.e. , MEY, created in the restricted zone through biological and associated economic spillovers from the closed zone. To find this, we need to calculate the volume, V , which is a monetary measure of sustainable economic rent, created under f ( x ) between x 1 and x 2 rotated around the y-axis. 9 The necessary integration exercise ...
Context 4
... the superscript designates a numbered zone. If the objective is to minimize the total social cost of a human activity, or to accept some given amount of sustainable rent degradation, maintenance of the inequalities in equation (2) is not rational policy. 8 Rather, the human activity should be shunted out of those zones where its marginal social cost, measured by dV i / dh , is relatively high to where it is lower, so reducing the total social cost of the activity. Such a policy of regulated access re- quires monitoring and policing and, presumably, the greater the number of different types of zones that have to be policed, the greater policing costs will be. This is es- pecially so when different types of human activities are allowed/disallowed in different zones. In this section, attention turns to the modeling of sustainable economic rent, and the economic consequences of biological spillovers. There are several ways to model the economic consequence of an MPA with associated biological and economic spillovers. A simple source-sink model is used here to illustrate the main points. In figure 1, distance from the center of a closed zone is measured on the x-axis, and rent per square unit area (say, per acre) of ocean floor is measured in dollars on the y-axis. The function f ( x ) measures sustainable economic rent per unit area as depending on absolute distance from the center of the closed zone. This declining function is consistent with the assumption that the value of spillovers from the closed zone declines with distance. In equation (1), f x < 0. It should be emphasized that figure 1 represents a cross section through the center of a “designated geographic area” shown in figure 2, which is drawn circular only to simplify the calcu- lations below. The function f ( x ) can be thought of as the outer edge of a “bubble” of sustainable economic rent that exists in three-dimensional space with its highest point centered over the origin. The rate of economic rent, f ( x ), is sustainable in the sense that human users can obtain it period after period. For example, rent is sustainable if fishers take only the annual growth in biomass, or, if hobbyist divers do not interfere with the oceanic objects that they view. As the baseline case, suppose that the designated geographic area in figure 2 is inefficiently managed initially to the extent that fishers and other human users of it reduce economic rent everywhere to zero. This assumption is consistent with the theory of the open-access fishery as discussed by Gordon (1954), and is assumed in many of the bioeconomic models cited earlier. It is also approximately consistent with the analysis of fisheries that use a total allowable catch (TAC) in combination with fishing restrictions, such as of type of gear, number of boats, or workers per boat. Thus, in order to capture the increased economic rents afforded by the catch limit, fishers engage in rent destroying practices, such as capital stuffing and derby fishing (OECD 1997). In order to increase economic rent from the baseline (zero) level, a closed zone is introduced over a biologically productive area chosen on the basis of the considerations discussed earlier. In figure 1, the distance 0 x 1 indicates the closed zone. It is assumed that, with time, the biological productivity of the closed zone increases, ul- timately to its maximum monetary level, I MAX . Such an assumption is consistent with the relevant field studies discussed by Ward, Heinemann, and Evans (2001). An observed problem with closed zones that are not accompanied with other zoning measures is that fishers will fish intensively right up to the edge of the closed zone. This is an example of “fishery displacement” by fishers excluded from the no-take zone and is a familiar assumption in bioeconomic models. Such inten- sive fishing effort (and possibly other human activities such as diving and anchor damage) destroys the potential sustainable economic rent beyond x 1 . If this is the case, the rent profile becomes I MAX Ax 1 x 2 , which is obviously less than it could be along f ( x ). While the managers of some fisheries appear to be content with this state of af- fairs, others are not. Thus, U.S. authorities governing the Gulf of Maine off the northeastern U.S. coast allow fishing right up to the boundary of the closed zones, but in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, closed zones may be further protected by adjacent restricted zones (Day 2002). Such a restricted zone is shown in figure 1 as the distance x 1 to x 2 . As a matter of policy, the objective of the restricted zone is to preserve as much of the sustainable economic rent as possible, subject to a policing cost constraint (as discussed later). Accordingly, some human activities are allowed in the restricted zone, but not others. Such zoning restrictions are consistent with equation (2) and later discussion. We are interested in the maximum amount of sustainable economic rent; i.e. , MEY, created in the restricted zone through biological and associated economic spillovers from the closed zone. To find this, we need to calculate the volume, V , which is a monetary measure of sustainable economic rent, created under f ( x ) between x 1 and x 2 rotated around the y-axis. 9 The necessary integration exercise ...
Context 5
... economic rent, V , is the maximum sustainable rent that can be created through biological spillovers assuming fishers and other human users of the restricted zone abide by the rules of the restricted zone. That is, they don’t partake of illegal activities that reduce economic rent below f ( x ). It is reasonable to assume that without policing activity, fishers and other human users of the restricted zone will engage in illegal activities, thus reducing the level of sustainable economic rent. Support for this proposition is widespread (see Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Charles, Mazany, and Cross 1999; Nielsen 2003; and Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). We are now interested in the benefits of policing activity in the restricted zone. If illegal activity occurs, rent is reduced below f ( x ) in figure 1. 10 This cost is modeled on the simplifying assumption that the actual intercept, I , of f ( x ) is below I MAX , the whole f ( x ) function shifting downward. The cost of illegal activity in the restricted zone is calculated in two steps. First, evaluation of the previous equation ...
Citations
... See also [10]. Besides, [11] investigated the effect of positive marginal monitoring and enforcement costs, 'policing cost', on the optimal exploitation of a fishery under the management of a marine protected area and shown that with positive marginal policing cost, the objective of maximum economic yield is no longer optimal and that some dissipation of economic rent is socially optimal. See also [12] and [13] showed the conceptual issues imperative to marine harvest refuges with application from temperate reef fishes. ...
... European Journal of Statistics and Probability, 12 (1)[10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29] 2024 Print ISSN: 2055-0154(Print), ...
Sensitivity analysis of marine reserves and its implications as a fishery management tool was examined. A fishing free zone was established analytically which led to stability of the fishing free zone by employing linearization, first order differential equation and Jacobian matrix and unstable fishing free zone was obtained. We then apply some protection in the fishing zone and obtain a stable environment with the same techniques. Finally, the use of MATLAB helps us to discover that fishing effort has significant influence on fish biomass. The result reveals that as fishing effort increases, both the fraction of fish stock in the fishing zone and fraction in the reserves zone approaches their respectful extinction limits. It was equally examined that when the biomass in the open zone is heavily fished then there is a significant disparity in stock density between the two zones. An increased flow of transfer from the reserved zone to the fishing zone result in the catch reaching its maximum level as the transfer reaches its peak. Finally, there is predator interference which may lead to extinction of the prey, meanwhile, the protected zone does not allow predator and thus the fishing environment has no implications.
... As predicted by theory, for any particular MPA location, the enforcement level employed declines with an increasing fine level because the fine reduces the expected income from fishing in that site, which implies that the manager achieves the optimal outcome at a lower budget (Sutinen and Andersen 1985;Hallwood 2004; here, figure 5). For both managers, high fines mean that lower enforcement levels are necessary to achieve the same impact as MPAs without fines. ...
Using a spatially explicit framework with low/middle-income country coastal characteristics, we explore whether aspatial policies augment the impact of marine protected areas (MPAs) and identify when MPAs create income burdens on communities. When MPAs are small and budget-constrained, they cannot resolve all of the marinescape’s open-access issues, but they can create win-win opportunities for ecological and economic goals at lower levels of enforcement. Aspatial policies—taxes, gear restrictions, license restrictions, and livelihood programs—improve the MPA’s ability to generate ecological gains, and licenses and livelihood policies can mitigate MPA-induced income burdens. Managers can use MPA location and enforcement level, in conjunction with theMPA’s impact on fish dispersal, to induce exit from fishing and to direct the spatial leakage of effort. Our framework provides further insights for conservation-development policy in coastal settings, and we explore stylized examples in Costa Rica and Tanzania.
... MPAs are said to provide multiple benefits including: " Protection of habitats, conservation of biodiversity, protection or enhancement of ecosystem services, recovery of depleted stocks, export of individuals to fished areas, insurance against environmental or management uncertainty and sites for scientific investigation, baseline information, education, recreation and inspiration " (see Lubehenco et al [9]). Hallwood [6] investigated the effect of positive marginal monitoring and enforcement costs, 'policing cost', on the optimal exploitation of a fishery under the management of a MPA, and shown that with positive marginal policing cost, the objective of maximum economic yield is no longer optimal, and that some dissipation of economic rent is socially optimal. Tuck et al. [20] shown that in a two local population meta-population with unidirectional larval transfer, the optimal exploitation of the harvested population should be conducted as if it were independent of the reserved population. ...
This paper describes a prey-predator type fishery model with prey dispersal in a two-patch envi-ronment, one of which is a free fishing zone and other is protected zone. Different consequences of reserve are described by the simulation processes. Our simulation clearly indicates that prey-predator interactions do matter when the implementation of a reserve is considered. It is also observed that reserves will be most ef-fective when coupled with fishing effort controls in adjacent fisheries. Optimal harvesting policy is discussed.
... Consequently, the larger the desired stock size (above the open-access equilibrium) the greater the necessary expenditure on enforcement (Sutinen & Andersen, 1985). More generally, the optimal level of enforcement is attained when the marginal cost of enforcement is equal to its marginal benefit (Becker, 1968;Sutinen & Andersen, 1985;Hallwood, 2005). Other models of fisheries enforcement have considered differences between input controls (e.g. ...
Rules governing human behaviour are at the heart of every system of natural resource management. Without compliance, however, rules are meaningless so effective enforcement is essential if conservation is to be successful. There is a large body of theory concerning enforcement and compliance with rules spread over several disciplines, including psychology, economics and sociology. However, there have been few attempts to extend this theory to conservation applications and there is little practical guidance for managers and conservation planners on the optimal design of enforcement programmes. We review approaches to understanding why individuals break rules and how optimal policy choices can reduce rule-breaking, highlighting research which has specifically dealt with natural resources. Because of the difficulty of studying rule-breaking behaviour directly, modelling approaches have been particularly important and have been used to explore behaviour at the individual, group and institutional levels. We illustrate the application of models of enforcement and compliance to conservation using the African elephant Loxodonta africana as a case study. Further work is needed to create practical tools which can be applied to the design of enforcement measures in conservation. Particular challenges include understanding the importance of violations of rationality assumptions and incorporating intertemporal choice in models of decision making. In conclusion, we argue that a new field of robust theory and practice is urgently needed to ensure that issues of enforcement and compliance do not undermine conservation initiatives.
... Support by fishers may have a favourable influence on enforcement costs (e.g. Causey 1995;Ticco 1995;Bohnsack 1996b;Parrish et al. 2001;Hallwood 2004), developing in some cases a phenomenon of self-surveillance by users (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999). For many authors, the success of a MPA is conditioned by the support of users (e.g. ...
... Support by fishers may have a favourable influence on enforcement costs (e.g. Causey 1995;Ticco 1995;Bohnsack 1996b;Parrish et al. 2001;Hallwood 2004), developing in some cases a phenomenon of self-surveillance by users (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999). For many authors, the success of a MPA is conditioned by the support of users (e.g. ...
The present booklet reviews the socioeconomic literature dedicated to various aspects of marine protected areas (MPAs) related toecosystem preservation, fisheries management, recreational activities, and distributional consequences of MPAs and methodologicalissues for cost-benefit analysis and its application to MPAs, and the specific problem of economic valuation of non-market values.
... Other factors such as the distance from the shore, the size and the type of MPA are also considered. Causey 1995;Ticco 1995;Bohnsack 1996b;Parrish et al. 2001;Hallwood 2004), developing in some cases a phenomenon of self-surveillance by users (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999). For many authors, the success of a MPA is conditioned by the support of users (e.g. ...
This publication has been developed in the framework of the project EMPAFISH (SSP8-006539) supported by the Commission of the European Communities within the Sixth Framework Programme.
Marine protected areas (MPAs) provide both conservation and economic benefits. Recent international conservation actors have called for a dramatic increase in the area of MPAs from almost 8% to 30% of marine area by 2030 in a policy called 30X30. Both the economics and conservation science literatures consider MPA decisions and MPA impact, although the economics literature focuses on fishery economic outcomes. This review uses an optimization framework for MPA decisions as a lens through which to evaluate the economics literature on MPAs in the context of the 30X30 expansion decisions. We argue for more economic analysis of MPA policy questions, including those around siting, design, restrictions, and management choices; impact evaluation; responses of people; low-income country settings and incomplete enforcement; spatial settings without metapopulations; and conservation rather than harvest objectives.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Resource Economics, Volume 14 is October 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
A model for the economics of marine conservation is developed and tested using data from a global sample of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Results from logistic regressions indicate that significant determinants of positive MPA effects vary among MPA subgroups. These significant regressors include enforcement in later time periods and certain “goodwill building activities” carried out by MPA management, as well as a number of institutional and socioeconomic characteristics of the communities. Policy implications and recommendations for additional research are discussed.
