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Post-World War II Dynamic Nationalization in Latin America and Europe (Chilean parties denoted in white; coalitions in black).
Source publication
Chile’s parties have been characterized as ‘European’ in their development and institutionalization, but ‘Latin American’ in their high degree of political localism. Yet the specialized literature has not tested these tendencies nor developed a theory as to how they may coexist. Using the concept of party nationalization, we establish the veracity...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... extensive data for the post-war period continue to place Chile's parties and coalitions in the Latin American norm. Figure 3 shows Latin American parties whose scores Colombia (1935Colombia ( -1945 Peru (1931)(1932)(1933)(1934)(1935)(1936)(1937)(1938)(1939)(1940)(1941)(1942)(1943)(1944)(1945) CHILE Austria (1919)(1920)(1921)(1922)(1923)(1924)(1925)(1926)(1927)(1928)(1929)(1930) Finland France (1910)(1911)(1912)(1913)(1914)(1915)(1916)(1917)(1918)(1919)(1920)(1921)(1922)(1923)(1924)(1925)(1926)(1927)(1928) Germany Greece (1926)(1927)(1928)(1929)(1930)(1931)(1932)(1933)(1934)(1935)(1936) Ireland Italy (1918)(1919)(1920)(1921) Luxembourg (1919)(1920)(1921)(1922)(1923)(1924)(1925)(1926)(1927)(1928)(1929)(1930)(1931)(1932)(1933)(1934)(1935)(1936)(1937) Netherlands Norway Sweden UK Argentina Bolivia Brazil (1945)(1946)(1947)(1948)(1949)(1950)(1951)(1952)(1953)(1954)(1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959)(1960)(1961)(1962) Brazil CHILEPARTIES Colombia Costa Rica (1953Rica ( -2010 Dominican Republic (1962Republic ( -2010 Ecuador Guatemala Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Salvador Uruguay CHILE CHILE COALITIONS Austria Finland France Germany, West Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain (1977)(1978)(1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996) Sweden range from the single digits (Uruguay's three parties) to nearly 200 (Colombia's Liberal Party), but most are between 25 and 75. Chilean parties (post-dictatorship period displayed here due to space considerations) are at the top of the range; the most dynamically nationalized is the UDI, which has a score of 73.5, and the least is the PPD, with a score over 170. ...
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Citations
... where p i is the party's share of the national vote and PNS sw, i measures the nationalization of each party by standardizing for the number of territorial units in a country and also weighting for the size of the territorial units. 4 This measure builds upon the weighted party nationalization score (PNS w ) by adding an additional correction for the unequal sizes of units across countries to allow the comparison across countries with a different number of territorial units (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Siavelis 2014). This index is calculated according to the following formula: ...
Abundant research demonstrates that electoral rules have an impact on party system fragmentation. Building on these findings, and adopting a dynamic approach, this article investigates the effect of changes of the ballot structure on party system nationalization and shows that this effect is conditioned by levels of ethno-geographic concentration and political decentralization. Specifically, candidate-centered reforms hamper party system nationalization by making parties less likely to obtain similar vote shares across constituencies, whereas party-centered reforms tend to foster it. Moreover, concentration of ethnic groups at the district level or considerable political decentralization exacerbates the impact of candidate-centered changes. These effects are demonstrated through an analysis of an original dataset of electoral reforms and party system nationalization as measured with different indices across fifty-nine democracies and more than five hundred legislative elections. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc. All rights reserved.
... In this case, the common good is the electoral fate of the coalition government, parties and legislators. In Chile, electoral competition encourages a personalist vote in the districts (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, & Siavelis, 2014). Thus, it is imperative that the government maintain a collusive effort and harmonious coordination with its parties and legislators. ...
... Additionally, the meetings serve to establish the collective and individual requirements of the legislators of each party. The emerging literature on representation strategies in Chile (Luna, 2014;Morgenstern et al., 2014;Toro, 2007) notes that the constituency service undertaken by the parties and legislators is only possible because of the governmental distribution of political and economic resources. Therefore, addressing the parties and the executive equally allows legislators to reap direct and indirect benefits to maintain their votes and win re-election. ...
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