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Popular YouTube Channels by Arab non-believers and freethinkers, December 2020.
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This article uses the increasing visibility of Arab non-believers in the virtual public sphere as an opportunity to re-examine the key issues and dividing lines between believers, sceptics, and non-believers in Arab societies. It analyzes the currently four most popular Arabic-language YouTube channels created by freethinkers, nonbelievers, and ath...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... large number of subscribers, a consistently high number of views for different videos, as well as high like-to-dislike ratios mean that a given YouTube creator has a dedicated and engaged audience. The four YouTube channels portrayed in this article (see Table 1) were among the leading Arabic-language channels according to these criteria in the past five years and, at the time of writing, have a core audience that numbers at least in the tens of thousands. Three of the four protagonists portrayed below are of Egyptian and one of Syrian origin, but that does not seem to limit their audience to people from the respective country. ...Citations
... For instance, there has also been a rise in the visibility of "young people abandoning Islam" during "the last few years in Egypt, particularly after…2013," which has also resulted in public debates that frame atheism as a threat to the social and moral order (van Nieuwkerk 2018: 306). Sebastian Elsässer (2021) has noted the increased visibility of religion-skeptics and freethinkers since the late 2000s and highlighted the role that YouTube channels play for both, the increased visibility of nonreligion among Arab-speaking Muslims in various countries as well as the controversy over them. For Morocco, the rise of atheist visibility has been attributed to "the impact of the social media and the February 20 Movement [2011]" (Richter 2022: 289). ...
... Several scholars working in nonreligion have pointed to the impact of the prominence of "New Atheism" or "Neoatheism," which emerged prominently in the 2000s in the US and Europe, as an influential factor for the emergence of new atheist visibility elsewhere. The best-selling books of its most influential writers, including Richard Dawkins (2006), Sam Harris (2004), Christopher Hitchens (2007), and Daniel Dennett (2006, are thus discussed by atheists in the Philippines (Blechschmidt 2018), in Indonesia (Duile 2020), and in the Middle East (Elsässer 2021). New Atheists and their institutions have also often provided institutional support; for instance, the US-based Center for Inquiry (CFI) established a branch in Manila in 2008. ...
... Yet, it has also been pointed out that the influence of this radical rationalist and outspoken anti-religious current of mostly US-centered atheism in other places should not be overemphasized. Indeed, many nonbelievers, especially in many Muslim-majority countries including Bangladesh, reject such forms of atheism as being overtly anti-religious, anti-Islam, and disrespectful (see also Duile 2020;Elsässer 2021). Thus, in many places, the influence of New Atheism has been ambivalent. ...
... In addition to that, various case studies emerged that provided insights into the lived realities of nonreligion. In line with recent developments, I touch upon embodied (Vliek, 2020b), emotional (Binder, 2016), gendered (Khazaal, 2022;Van den Brandt, 2015), and digital (e.g., Elsässer, 2021) aspects of nonreligion. In addition, I aim to add a comparative and intersectional perspective (Crenshaw, 1990;Yuval-Davis, 2006). ...
... Several works have shown that former Muslims are more than their 'ex-Muslim identity' (Van Nieuwkerk, 2018;Vliek, 2018). Other scholars have researched the experiences of 'apostates' and 'militant atheists' (Cottee, 2015(Cottee, , 2018Elsässer, 2021) and the religiouslegal consequences of apostasy (e.g., Garces, 2010). ...
... Geographically, studies have either focused on a Muslim-majority or a Muslim-minority context. In the WANA 8 region, most studies have looked at Egypt (Al-Soukkary, 2015;Elsässer, 2021;Van Nieuwkerk, 2021) and Turkey (Celik, 2015;Hecker, 2023). In the Muslim-minority context, the UK context remains the most studied (Cottee, 2015;Vliek, 2020a). ...
This dissertation seeks to unravel how young nonbelievers in Morocco and the Moroccan diaspora engage in subtle forms of everyday activism to normalise being nonreligious. At its core, this involves analysing where and how this normalisation occurs, identifying ‘ordinary’ nonbelievers as contributors to this process, and understanding how such activism develops over time. To grasp the complexity of this phenomenon, this research employs a qualitative, intersectional, and comparative approach. The data draws from intermittent hybrid fieldwork conducted between 2019 and 2023 in Morocco and Western Europe, incorporating approximately fifty qualitative life story interviews, participatory observations, and social media analysis. Additionally, this research draws back on previously conducted data between 2016 and 2019, which enables a long-term perspective. The research group primarily consists of educated nonbelievers from urban middle-class Muslim backgrounds in Morocco and within the Moroccan diaspora. Though most may not explicitly identify as activists, their actions subvert religious norms and are therefore often perceived as dissent.
... They may also consume media on popular portals like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, including the "Black Ducks" talk show (black duck corresponding to black sheep in English) hosted by atheist personality Ismail Mohamed, the Arab Nonreligious Network, Arab Atheist Broadcasting, and Arab Atheists Forum and Network. Elsässer (2021) describes several different YouTube programs with distinct approaches and appeals, from Hamed Abdel-Samad's more didactic Hamed TV to Qusayy Bitar's agnostic/rationalist show to Sherif Gaber's humorous but explicitly atheistic channel (for which he was arrested in 2018). In Morocco, the Free Arabs online program also uses comedy to lampoon religion, with recurring skits like "The Fatwa Show" (featuring a clueless imam issuing silly fatwas) and "Al Bernameg" (The Show, a local variation of Jon Stewart's comedy-news "The Daily Show"). ...
Living as a nonbeliever or atheist in an Islamic milieu is daunting. Yet, a burgeoning ex-Muslim community in the Islamic world continues to find ingenious ways to assert their disbelief.
... Personal communication with Ibrahim Muhammad, 2017). These YouTube channels helped create a lively virtual community, which inspired greater confidence in Arabic-speaking atheists to be public and make demands on society (Elsasser 2021). ...
Atheism has stirred up controversy in the Arabic-speaking world since the 2011 uprisings, when atheists there began appearing in public. What role does Arabic mass media play in the modern politics of minorities such as atheists, given the heated debates that it hosts on atheism? This question is important because perceptions of media frames influence the behavior of politicians and the electorate—and, as a result, laws that affect minority groups such as atheists. This article focuses on Lebanon, where eight of the nine television channels are affiliated with and funded by religious–political parties. It explores the existence of bias against atheists on televised Lebanese talk shows and news reports (2010–2022). Our findings reveal significant bias (69% overall and over 85% in speaker prominence bias), with channels that promote communal religious practice exhibiting the highest levels. Ultimately, our findings demonstrate that television, as the most influential Lebanese and Arabic mass medium, likely affects the public’s negative perceptions of Arabic-speaking atheists. Our findings reflect the decrease in objectivity in conflict-based media and such media’s poor understanding or intentional disregard for media’s crucial role in building a fair, democratic society.
... All society components have a methodology of thinking, typology, and behavior patterns that qualify to be called "religion" (Stolz & Usunier, 2019). Dogmatic, orthodox, and obedient religion (which we might call holiness) significantly tolerates emotional disturbances (Elsässer, 2021). People generally trouble themselves with a deep belief in aesthetics, shoulds, and obligations (Fazi, 2021). ...
This article describes a religious movement figure in post-Reformation Indonesia (1998), namely Habib Rizieq Shihab, who had a mass organization considered radical, namely the Islamic Defenders Front. This article answers the accusation that Shihab was anti-state politics, anti-Pancasila, anti-the Republic of Indonesia, and was intolerant of anyone different from the movement he had led. This study uses the content analysis method, namely analyzing the ideas in Shihab's writings and lectures to reveal his Islamic political ideology. This study found that Shihab's theology was Ashary and Shafiy Sunni with Alawiy Tareqat order. The Muslim Brotherhood influenced Shihab's thoughts and Al-Maududi's ideas, namely, aspiring to an Islamic state or formalizing religious constitutional law into a condition known as Islamic law. At the local level, Shihab was influenced by the local scholar M. Natsir. However, Shihab's political Islamic thought results gave distinctive features and differed from the existing typology. Shihab accepted Pancasila as the basis of the state. However, the "Shari'ated Indonesia" concept was a theistic concept perceived as implementing the Islamic caliphate vision and mission and the reincarnation of the 1945 Jakarta Charter Pancasila.
... Despite that atheism phenomenon or the denial of the existence of God is not new in Arab Islamic history, many atheist groups and movements were elevated in more than one era in the Islamic times, including a number of leading philosophers such as Abu Bakr Al-Razi, Al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd [11]. The growth of the Arab world's atheism phenomenon between 2000-2020 has been largely linked to modern media, namely digital media and television channels, which have allowed new atheists and young generations to freely express their views and openly reveal their own atheism, a matter Arab audience are not used to [21]. Considering the increasing attention given to Islam by the New Atheists in their books and through their various media, as well as the unlimited access the public now has to such content on the Internet, it should be of no surprise that atheistic beliefs are on the rise in Muslim countries and are being promulgated covertly if not openly [2].This study aims at building a vision of atheism in the Arab-Islamic world through a revealing the features of the media speech on atheism and atheists in television talk shows many Arabic-speaking channels, which will provide knowledge about the concept of atheism and the image presented by the mass media on atheism and atheists. ...
Despite that atheism phenomenon or the denial of the existence of God is not new in Arab Islamic history, many atheist groups and movements were elevated in more than one era in the Islamic times, including a number of leading philosophers such as Abu Bakr Al-Razi, Al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd [11]. The growth of the Arab world’s atheism phenomenon between 2000-2020 has been largely linked to modern media, namely digital media and television channels, which have allowed new atheists and young generations to freely express their views and openly reveal their own atheism, a matter Arab audience are not used to [21]. Considering the increasing attention given to Islam by the New Atheists in their books and through their various media, as well as the unlimited access the public now has to such content on the Internet, it should be of no surprise that atheistic beliefs are on the rise in Muslim countries and are being promulgated covertly if not openly [2].This study aims at building a vision of atheism in the Arab-Islamic world through a revealing the features of the media speech on atheism and atheists in television talk shows many Arabic-speaking channels, which will provide knowledge about the concept of atheism and the image presented by the mass media on atheism and atheists. The image atheists reflect about themselves, the strategies they present to prove their existence and survival, hence, the concepts, expressions, and images presented by the counterparties. This study depends on the perspective of descriptive social studies from the qualitative perspective, by analyzing the speech of a group of Arab television channels that offer talk shows allocating the phenomenon of atheism and host atheists in debates. The results showed that although the television programs broadcasted in this phase cannot be separated from the context of the official campaign against atheism, it was clear that there was a clear polarization in the editorial policies of television channels that reflected the contradictions of official political speech in Arab countries between official religious calls to confront the phenomenon of new atheism on the one hand and the confrontation with religious extremism on the other.
Atheism has had a strong presence on YouTube since its founding in the mid-2000s, which coincided with the rise of the new atheism movement, and lay atheists were quick to use the platform to spread new atheist ideas. Drawing from a sample of sixty-five atheist YouTube channels located and observed through online ethnographic methods, this article views YouTube videos as educational resources for atheists. It investigates different types of educational videos and ways of thinking about science, philosophy, and religion that atheist content creators utilize and promote. The analysis reveals that they consistently frame these domains of knowledge through the truth claims they make and generally construct them within a hierarchical framework, with scientific knowledge at the top and religious knowledge at the bottom. Overall, their educational content reproduces new atheist discourses around these subjects, revealing the continuing influence of new atheism, two decades after its emergence. Furthermore, the popularity of videos that debunk arguments from religious apologists suggests that the intended audience of these videos includes both atheists, who are expected to need to learn to defend their atheism in debate with religious others, and “potential atheists”, religious believers who can be deconverted using rational arguments.
Slavic Witches and Social Media examines the role of social media in the spiritual practices of modern Slavic witches and draws a comparative analysis between contemporary neopaganism and Catholicism in Poland.
This volume presents a fresh and comprehensive examination of Slavic witches within the context of the growing popularity of neopagan religions and the integration of social media in religious practices. It delves into contemporary witchcraft in Poland, including the prominent Wicca tradition, native Slavic beliefs with their diverse pantheon of deities, extensive demonology, and profound respect for nature, as well as individual, eclectic paths.
Through a digital religion study, this book investigates how neopagans and Catholics incorporate social media into their spiritual journeys. Its vivid portrait of a Slavic witch provides a deeper understanding of their beliefs, practices, and engagement with social media platforms. This book is dedicated to scholars in the fields of religious sociology, digital religion, and ethnography with a deep fascination for exploring folk magic and Slavic traditions and their adaptation to the emerging digital landscape.
It is an insightful resource for researchers in theology, communication, and new media, as well as for all researchers and individuals who share an interest in the captivating realm of contemporary witches and witchcraft.
