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Party affiliation and voting behavior in the four votes

Party affiliation and voting behavior in the four votes

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After 1875, cheap grain from the United States and Russia flooded the European markets. Many countries like Germany, France, and Sweden turned to agricultural trade protection, while others, like the UK and Denmark, held on to a free trade position. Belgium adopted a middle position, leaving its grain markets open but protecting animal husbandry, d...

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Context 1
... and Socialist party. 2 Finally, the dummy variable OTH indicates membership of a variety of fringe groups and independent Representatives. Figure 4 presents the party affiliation and voting behavior of the different MP's in the four successive votes. Note that, contrary to the Socialist party in 1895, party discipline within both the Catholic and Liberal party was rather weak. ...
Context 2
... Representatives could rely on average more on the protection of religion in society to ensure reelection, and were as such less inclined to stand up for the agricultural interests. Figure 4 shows that the division of the Catholic party between a free trade oriented faction and a protectionist faction as well as the changing balance of power between these factions are the key to understanding Belgium's change in trade policy in the 1880s and 1890s. Figure 10 ...

Citations

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