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In this paper, the effects of strategic consumer behaviors have been investigated and analyzed with regard to online retailers and offline retailers in a dual-channel supply chain. Four channel structures (i.e., no-promotion, a direct online channel, a retail offline channel, and dual channels introduced in the promotion sales period) are considere...
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... Xu et al. [40] studied some optimal operational decisions and supply chain coordination issues by including the idea that the manufacturer and retailer are selling their products through offline channels and online platforms. Lei et al. [21] investigated the impact of strategic consumer behavior between the online and offline retailers in a dual-channel supply chain for four different channel structures. They explained that not all promotional prices have fallen as expected, although the patience of the consumer has increased. ...
The rapid development of e-commerce and Internet technology impacts the consumer purchasing practices and the decision-making of the supply chain. In this regard, dealing with online reviews and reference price together for a competitive interaction in a two-period dual-channel scenario is one of the main challenges. To address this interaction, in the present research, we consider a dual-channel supply chain with a two-period. The selling price and the reference price impact on the retailer's demand in both channels. Whereas, the online reviews influence the demands of the direct channels only. The manufacturer, who announces wholesale prices and direct channel selling prices, is Stackelberg game's leader and the retailer is the follower. Two different decision-making strategies (I, II) are made by both players: (I) The manufacturer and the retailer both make all their decisions at the beginning of the selling season, (II) Here all decisions are made at the beginning of each selling period. In order to compare these strategies, we create a centralized policy as a benchmark scenario. The optimal solutions of the supply chain and each player are determined and analyzed. The numerical and sensitivity analysis suggests that the responsive pricing can bring additional benefits to both the players.
... Viswanathan and Wang [13] consider a single-supplier, single-retailer distribution channel and find that offering discounts allows perfect supply chain coordination. Lei et al. [14] analyze the effects of strategic consumer behaviors on online retailers and offline retailers in a dual-channel supply chain and find that a more patient consumer would not wait for a lower price in Period 2. Yi et al. [15] study the differential pricing of a dual-channel supply chain. The results show that the total profit of a supply chain under the centralized decision scenario is better than the decentralized decision scenario. ...
In the modern catering business model, restaurants usually use established platforms to promote their food and use two channels to sell their food: online and offline sales. We construct demand functions for online and offline, considering promotion and substitution relationships by a revised Bertrand model. We first consider three classic models: the decentralized decision model, the equilibrium decision model, and the centralized decision model. In the decentralized decision model, the platform decides both the promotional effort and the online discount; in the equilibrium decision model, the platform decides the online discount, while the food service provider decides the promotional effort. In the centralized decision model, the takeaway platform and the food service provider have maximized the overall profit as the decisive goal. We find that the online discount decreases in price when the impact factor of the online promotion is high but increases in price when the impact factor of the online promotion is low. Then, we analyze and compare the results under three models. We find that when the substitution factor is low enough, or the impactor factor of online promotion is low enough, the global optimal platform discount is higher than the equilibrium platform discount and the decentralized online discount; otherwise, the results are the opposite. In addition, the global optimal promotional effort is always higher than the optimal promotional effort in the decentralized model. When the substitution factor is low enough, or the impactor factor of online promotion is low enough, the global optimal promotional effort is higher than the equilibrium optimal promotional effort; otherwise, the result is the opposite.
... Lei et al. [13] studied the impact of the existence of strategic consumers on the dual-channel supply chain and analyzed the retailer's optimal strategy and maximum return under the delayed purchasing behavior of consumers. Xie et al. [24] studied the cooperation of the supply chain under the condition of uncertain market demand due to the existence of strategic consumers. ...
Consumers' strategic purchasing behavior has a great influence on the pricing and sales of new products. In order to study the impact of strategic consumers on the sales of 5G mobile phones, we establish a two-period pricing model. The supply chain contains two manufacturers, a communications operator and a mobile phone retailer. Cases where two manufacturers have the same or different pricing rights are researched by using the Stackelberg game and the Nash game model. Our research results are as follows:(1) We obtain the optimal 5G communication fees in two periods and find out how they change with the proportion of consumers changing. (2) We figure out the profits of the supply chain in two periods and analyze them. We find that the communication operator earns more than the others most of the time. (3) We investigate how the proportion of strategic consumer impact on supply chain profits and conclude that the optimal price and demand in a period will decrease as the proportion of consumers who only purchase products in the other period increases.
... The scenario about loss aversion was discussed substantially. A discussion about the online and offline SCM was discussed by Lei et al. [24]. They studied the consumers' strategies. ...
Presently, it is essential to increase customer service such that the Supply Chain Management (SCM) can earn more profit in a sustainable manner. In the supply chain, the manufacturer and the retailer are two players who try to maintain the joint profit of the Supply Chain (SC) without only thinking about their own respective profits. However, the retailer may not provide all information to the manufacturer. This research introduces the use of the advanced technology Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) in a retailer’s shop to obtain exact information about customer demand. A consignment policy is used to increase the manufacturer profit, and a fixed fee is offered to the retailer to generate more profit in coordination with the manufacturer. This study is conducted with and without the effect of RFID to show the benefit of SCM even when the retailer is unreliable. Both models are solved using the classical optimization technique. Numerical findings prove that SCM can benefit from the outcome of this study even for unreliability. Coordination within SCM can be maintained for a long time by using the proposed recommendations of this study.
This paper develops a dynamic pricing model to examine how strategic consumers affect the strategic interaction among firms under three dual-channel formats, that is, direct selling dual-channel, reselling dual-channel, and agency selling dual-channel. The results show that the retailer's selling prices display nonmonotonic relations to the acceptance of electronic channel. When strategic consumers have high patience, all firms prefer to decrease prices in both periods. The interaction of the acceptance of electronic channel and discount factor mediate the optimal mode choice for the firms. In most cases, the reselling dual-channel and agency selling dual-channel format are preferable for the retailer and the e-retailer, respectively.
