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After opposition leader Juan Guaidó challenged Nicolás Maduro's leadership in January 2019, what has happened in Venezuela at the political, economic, and social levels? What has been the international response to the Venezuelan crisis? This paper aims to provide an overview of domestic processes that took place in Venezuela in 2019. It begins by h...
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... In a bold move, it invoked Article 233 of the constitution, which states that "when the president-elect is absolutely absent before taking office, a new election shall take place (…) And while the president is elected and takes office, the interim president shall be the president of the National Assembly." On that legal basis, the opposition established an interim government led by Juan Guaidó who happened to be the president of the National Assembly at that moment (Boersner, 2020). However, the opposition failed to muster sufficient popular support and to coordinate the heterogeneous groups and parties in its own ranks. ...
In the process of institutional transformation advanced by Chavismo in Venezuela, there has been a profound change in both the military doctrine and the structure of the Armed Forces. The military has become a political actor with a strong influence in the distribution of power and resources. In this process Venezuela has become a Garrison State in which the “military factor” determines the scope and characteristics of social interaction. The militarization of society is a characteristic of the current political process in Venezuela, especially regarding the obvious belligerence of the Armed Forces. The country is on the verge of turning into a “military barrack” where the rights of the citizens are glaringly restricted.
... In a bold move, it invoked Article 233 of the constitution, which states that "when the president-elect is absolutely absent before taking office, a new election shall take place (…) And while the president is elected and takes office, the interim president shall be the president of the National Assembly." On that legal basis, the opposition established an interim government led by Juan Guaidó who happened to be the president of the National Assembly at that moment (Boersner, 2020). However, the opposition failed to muster sufficient popular support and to coordinate the heterogeneous groups and parties in its own ranks. ...
In this chapter, we analyze the historical context of the crisis in Venezuela. The country was formerly regarded as a stable democracy and as an exception in a mostly autocratic region. By now, the situation is the opposite: Venezuela is in a state of crisis and autocratic rule, while the rest of Latin America is mostly democratic. The dramatic decline of the country is the result of populist misrule during the presidency of Hugo Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro. However, the roots of the present crisis run deeper. After the end of the military dictatorship in 1958, the main political actors agreed on a transitional pact, which, over time, turned into an increasingly unrepresentative arrangement of power sharing. With the oil boom of the 1970s, corruption became endemic and disaffection with the political elites increased. When the oil-fueled economic model collapsed in the 1990s, the cracks in the democratic system became apparent. After the election of Hugo Chávez, Venezuelans hoped for a fresh start and for a renewal of the constitutional order. Instead, the country entered a path of economic decline and democratic regression.
... En enero de 2019, la mayoría de la AN-2015 no reconoció a Maduro, por lo que no se juramentó ante el Poder Legislativo para el período 2018-2024, sino que lo hizo el TSJ. Por su parte, la mayoría opositora de la AN-2015 declaró ausencia absoluta del Presidente de la República, nombrado al diputado Juan Guaidó (Voluntad Popular) como Presidente Encargado de Venezuela con un gobierno interino (GI) (Boersner 2020b). ...
... Durante el 2019, la oposición profundizó su estrategia de máxima presión con el fin de desplazar a Maduro del poder así como la búsqueda de una ruptura del apoyo al gobierno de Maduro en el sector militar Justicia en 2017 por oponerse a las sentencias 155 y 156 de la Sala Constitucional en las que el propio Poder Judicial se daba así mismo las competencias del Poder Legislativo. (Boersner 2020b;Marsteintredet 2020;Trak 2020). Por su parte, desde enero de 2019, la administración de Donald Trump incrementó las sanciones económicas, lo que produjo el estancamiento de las iniciativa de negociación que impulsaba la comunidad internacional mediante el Grupo de Contacto Internacional (Bull y Rosales 2020). ...
Durante el 2021, el gobierno dio pasos hacia un aparente proceso de apertura política. Desde la Asamblea Nacional electa en 2020 se nombraron nuevas autoridades electorales con la participación de la sociedad civil y se convocó a elecciones regionales y municipales con presencia de observación internacional. Así mismo, se inició un proceso de negociación en México con el propósito de reinstitucionalizar el país. Sin embargo, aún cuando la oposición regresó a la arena electoral, la apertura política quedó truncada toda vez que el gobierno se retiró de la negociación en México, anuló el resultado de la elección en Barinas y mantuvo las prácticas autoritarias de los años anteriores. El objetivo del artículo es hacer un análisis de la situación sociopolítica venezolana en 2021, teniendo como telón de fondo este intento de liberalización política.
... In 2019, the Venezuelan opposition decided to seek regime change through the establishment of an "interim-government" (IG) led by Juan Guaidó, whose national legitimacy derived from the 2015 legislative election (Boersner 2020). Yet, despite having achieved a formidable majority in the National Assembly (NA) that garnered significant international support for the IG in the wake of a non-competitive presidential election in 2018, the opposition, instead of delivering on its promise to oust the autocrat, began to crumble and Nicolás Maduro has now consolidated his grip on power. ...
... Secondly, there have been significant strategic inconsistencies within the Guaidó-led opposition up to the point where it is not clear how exactly the opposition he represents plans to oust Maduro. In 2019, Guaidó proposed a three-step guideline towards a transition -cessation of usurpation, transitional government, free elections-which did not prosper (Boersner 2020). Although participating in elections as a means to pressure the government and pursuing an integral negotiation with the government had previously been elements of a way out of the crisis (i.e. ...
... In this context, there is a wealth of scholarship that has explained the evolution of the Venezuelan economic collapse that occurred since 2013 ( Sanctions therefore contributed to further shrinking the government's sources of income as well as international markets from traditional partners, thereby forcing changes to the country's economic policies. New studies are emerging about the government responses to this crisis and the different policy changes that have taken place as a response to sanctions (Sutherland 2019;Boersner 2020). In the past few years, the Venezuelan government has undertaken stark and pragmatic economic reforms that have transformed some of the pillars of the Bolivarian economic model, which was based on strong state controls and interventions in the economy with redistributive goals. ...
In 2020, Venezuela has gone through a process of autocratic consolidation. This consolidation has taken place amid substantial economic reforms that have allowed the government of Nicolás Maduro survive sustained international and domestic pressure. In this article, we analyze this process of autocratic consolidation. We explain how, by focusing on the establishment of an "interim-government" in 2019, the Venezuelan opposition has been unable to coordinate an inclusive strategy to successfully bring about a democratic breakthrough and instead became further divided. We address the economic transformations witnessed in the country as policies of fragmented liberalization through opaque privatizations and an uneven multi-currency system, which have resulted from a deep recession, the collapse of the oil economy and sanctions. Finally, we discuss the implications of these political and economic processes for the social fabric of the country. We highlight that despite the government's attempts at criminalizing autonomous activism, the relative strengths of civil society allowed the survival of minimal democratic spaces that have spurred dialogue and resistance.
This research deals with a historical overview of the relations between Venezuela and Bolivia. These relations began at the end of the nineteenth century, but they were on a limited scale and did not develop due to the internal circumstances of both countries. At the beginning of the rule of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, there was a clear development in relations between the two countries, especially during the period between 2006 and 2013, when President Evo Morales took power in Bolivia. After the death of Chavez, the new Venezuelan President Maduro and Bolivian President Morales tried to continue the same previous cooperation during the Chavez era, but the internal conditions in both countries prevented this. Venezuela suffered from an economic crisis and protests from the opposition, and Bolivia also suffered from protests that led to the resignation of Morales in 2019, and supporters of the United States policy, which is considered the number one enemy of Venezuela, took power. In accordance with the wishes of the Americans, the new Bolivian government severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela. These relations were not restored until after the victory of the Bolivian Union for Socialism party in the 2020 elections.
This article offers an analysis of the domestic and international factors shaping the Russo–Venezuelan alliance. We provide a comprehensive analysis to understand the evolution of this alliance and to consider how the political leadership, the regime type, the military sector, the economy, and the presence of China and the United States in Latin America are vital determinants in this alliance. At the policy level, Russia and Venezuela's relationship has opened an opportunity for the Venezuelan government to consolidate power, while for Russia, this alliance has helped offset the influence of the United States in Latin America.
Guyana, a small oft-forgotten country in South America, has seen its prospects shift markedly in recent years. Previously lauded as a world leader in environ- mental conservation and avoided deforestation initiatives, Guyana recently made international headlines when significant oil discoveries were made in its territorial waters. Using a model of convergence, stasis and reverberation, this article posi- tions these developments historically and politically. In it, I argue that Guyana’s shifting fortunes are reflective of broader regional and international shifts and con- testations around post-colonial development and climate policy. The article shows how different forms of vulnerability coalesced over time to position Guyana as both vulnerable and as agential. The state’s vulnerability lies in its susceptibility to natural disasters through climate change, imperialism in the wake of colonialism, and ethnic strife through race-based politics. Its agency, on the other hand, lies in its deployment of its natural resources and its geographic location to negotiate changing geo-political arrangements and efforts to address climate change. In de- veloping this argument, the article views, and positions Guyana as a microcosm of several pressing and overlapping global crises – a metaphorical eye of the storm.
