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Party identification is notoriously “sticky,” yet over the last three decades the California electorate has changed tremendously. A once red state has become one of the most reliable Democratic strongholds in the nation. What explains this change? One common explanation rests with population shifts and macropartisan trends. Another claims the combi...
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Context 1
... understand this, it is important to get a sense of how partisanship in California varied from 1980 to 2002 among Whites and Latinos. Figure 1 presents the aggregation of the individual surveys by year to get a measure of macropartisanship of White Californians. The figure shows the variation between Republican, independent, and Democratic party identifica- tion by using cumulative percentages on the y-axis and year on the x-axis. ...
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Objective
The U.S. government continues to deport large numbers of undocumented Latino immigrants. We address the likely effects of these policies on Latino partisanship.Methods
We use a survey experiment to test the effects of information about mass deportations on partisan evaluations among young second-generation Latinos.ResultsYoung U.S.-born L...
Citations
... With the rapid change in the ethnic composition of the electorate, if political leaders or major parties deal with immigration problems, partisan divergence can grow within ethnic categories. For example, racially charged ballot measures (e.g., Proposition 187), usually targeting illegal immigrants, tend to split the electorate along racial, ethnic, and partisan lines (Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006;Dyck, Johnson, and Wasson 2012;Korey and Lascher 2006). Actually, previous research has shown that a series of ballot propositions handling the problems of illegal immigrants, sponsored by California GOP, make Latinos turn toward Democratic Party while driving old, non-Hispanic whites to align with Republican Party. ...
... Notes 1. In recent studies on party identification in California, as well as Dyck et al. (2012) find that racially charged ballot measures made Latinos more likely to identify with Democrats than with Republicans. These policy-and party-specific findings, again, strongly suggest that direct democratic institution can also shape the general extent of party identification. ...
This article presents the first investigation of whether and how party identification is influenced by direct democratic institutions. The concept of party identification is of central interest to political science. Despite declining partisan attachment and increasing dealignment among voters, little systematic evidence exists as to which factors influence individual party identification. Our article contributes to improving on this lacuna by considering the educative effects of direct democratic institutions. Theoretically, two competing hypotheses are plausible. On the one hand, direct democracy might strengthen political parties and promote the need for cues so that voters succumb to the allure of partisan attachment. On the other hand, direct democracy might provide an alternative to the representational function of political parties thus rendering party identification less essential. Drawing on recent data from the Swiss cantons, we estimate multi-level models. Our analyses, though giving support to the alternative hypothesis, yield some surprising findings.
Macropartisanship is a measure of aggregate trends in party identification in the mass public that allows researchers to track partisanship dynamically. In previous research, macropartisanship was found to vary in concert with major political events and forces like presidential approval and the economy. However, studying macropartisanship as an aggregate trend assumes that group dynamics within the measure are equivalent. We present a series of new measures of macropartisanship using Stimson’s (2018) dyad ratio approach disaggregated by race and ethnicity. We detail the creation of measures for White, Latino, and Black macropartisanship from 1983 to 2016 using more than 500 surveys from CBS News and CBS/New York Times. The resulting data collection is publicly available and can be downloaded in monthly, quarterly, or yearly format. Our initial analysis of these data show that thinking about macropartisanship as a single aggregate measure masks important and significant variation in our understanding of party identification. Change in the measures are uncorrelated. Latino macropartisanship is more volatile and responds more to economic conditions, Black macropartisanship is very stable and has become more Democratic in response to increased polarization, while White macropartisanship has become less responsive to economic conditions as has become more Republican as Republicans have moved to the right.
Economic arguments against immigration suggest that immigrants undermine the culture, institutions, and productivity of destination countries. But is that true? Nowrasteh and Powell systematically analyze cross-country evidence and case studies of the potential negative effects of immigration on economic freedom, corruption, culture, and terrorism. They find that immigrants do not destroy the institutions responsible for prosperity and, in some cases, even improve them.
Economic arguments against immigration suggest that immigrants undermine the culture, institutions, and productivity of destination countries. But is that true? Nowrasteh and Powell systematically analyze cross-country evidence and case studies of the potential negative effects of immigration on economic freedom, corruption, culture, and terrorism. They find that immigrants do not destroy the institutions responsible for prosperity and, in some cases, even improve them.
The American public has overwhelmingly supported the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act since 2001. The support is widespread and cuts across race, ethnic, and party lines. Given the United States’ anti-immigrant/ immigration sentiment in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, support for the DREAM Act is perplexing. To that end, political scientists, sociologists, and education scholars, among others, have pointed to the exceptional framing of the DREAMAct as the primary predictor of support. However, a significant portion of non-Hispanic white Americans who support the DREAM Act also support restrictive and often punitive immigration policies. What influences most white Americans to support DREAM Act legislation? And what leads a subset of these same individuals to simultaneously support restrictive immigration policies that hurt DREAMers and their families? I argue that predispositions explain these two contradictory policy preferences. Data from the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES) and the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) demonstrates that white Americans use racial resentment and egalitarianism as justifications to support both policies. However, the effects are conditioned on partisanship.
Cambridge Core - Sociology of Race and Ethnicity - Dangerously Divided - by Zoltan L. Hajnal
Perceived discrimination (PD) is reliably and strongly associated with partisan identity (PID) among US immigrant minorities such as Latinos and Asian Americans. Yet whether PD causes PID remains unclear, since it is possible that partisanship influences perceptions of discrimination or that other factors drive the observed association. Here, we assess the causal influence of group-level PD on PID using five experiments with Latino and Asian American adults. These experiments varied in important ways: they took place inside and outside the lab, occurred prior to and during Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, and tested different manifestations of PD and partisan attitudes (total n = 2,528). These efforts point to a simple but unexpected conclusion: our experiments and operationalizations do not support the claim that group-targeted PD directly causes PID. These results have important implications for understanding partisanship among immigrants and their co-ethnics and the political incorporation of Latinos and Asian Americans.
Objective
I test the hypothesis that immigration status itself is a predictor of Democratic Party affiliation and vote choice, even controlling for other attributes. I further test whether having immigrant parents and grandparents has a similar effect.
Method
To examine these questions, I created single‐ and multilevel models of party affiliation and vote choice using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.
Results
Even after controlling for a myriad of individual and contextual attributes, immigration status was a statistically significant and substantively important predictor of Democratic affiliation. This was also true of the children and grandchildren of immigrants, but this effect weakened over multiple generations.
Conclusion
Immigration status itself appears to be an important determinant of voting patterns, which is highly consequential, given the large and growing foreign‐born population in the United States.
The question of how partisanship is influenced by exogenous factors has been vigorously debated, yet this debate is less frequently noted in the literature on Latino partisanship. This study analyzes the 2006 Latino National Survey with geographic identifiers to explore how the political context of a county influences Latino partisan self-identification. There are a variety of reasons why the political environment might influence Latinos’ partisan choice. First, a substantial proportion of the adult Latino population in the United States is foreign-born, potentially lessening the influence of parental partisan socialization. Second, increased migration to areas outside the Southwest has exposed Latinos to new and different social, political, and economic environments. Using subgroup analysis, interactive logit models, and regression discontinuity, we find that the local political context influences the party attachment of Latino immigrants in predictable ways. However, for Latinos born in the United States, our analysis does not provide evidence of a causal connection between partisan environment and an individual's partisan identification.
