Table 1 - uploaded by Stephan Haggard
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Nowhere is the efficacy of economic inducements and sanctions more hotly contested than on the Korean peninsula. The signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994 successfully froze the operations of the Yongbyon nuclear complex but did not dismantle it. Economic inducements, including the construction of light-water reactors and regular shipments of hea...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... The constitutional revision of September 1998 further strengthened the power of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its chairman. 8 Table 1 outlines the membership of the NDC at two points in time (2003 and 2009) and is suggestive of the regime's dependence on the military, the security apparatus, and the military industrial complex. Clearly, these political forces are inclined to prioritize national defense over other objectives, including economic reform, and are less likely to be accommodative with respect to measures seen as diluting the country's military capabilities. ...
Citations
... The target of sanctions or inducements ultimately confronts a similar choice when facing either policy: choose between some economic benefit provided by the sender or continue some otherwise preferred policy (Baldwin 1971). North Korea serves as a case in which the US has employed inducements and sanctions at various times (Haggard and Noland 2012). The 1994 Agreed Framework is a classic example of an inducement, as the US provided fuel to North Korea and assisted construction of light water nuclear reactors in exchange for a freeze in development of heavy water reactors that could produce fuel for Despite some underlying similarities between sanctions and inducements, there appears to be a dramatic difference in the frequency with which each foreign policy tool is used. ...
When do US citizens express greater support for economic intervention abroad in response to violation of international norms? Under what conditions do they express greater support for punitive sanctions or positive inducements? Given that these policies rarely are studied together, we know little about whether and to what extent citizens offer greater support for sanctions compared to positive inducements and how contextual factors might alter support for each. We design a conjoint survey experiment to gauge support for an intervention-i.e., sanctions or inducements-using comparable counterfactuals. We compare long-enduring bad behavior to recent shocks, differently framed consequences of inaction, as well as varying expertise levels among policy proposal authors. We also consider preexisting attitudes about the target country. In a US sample, we find that policy proposals are generally supported to a greater extent when they involve sanctions as opposed to inducements, but that preexisting affinity towards the country has a strong conditioning impact. We also find that a "ticking clock" to disaster, as opposed to a prediction of steady future conditions, is associated with greater support for US economic intervention, particularly when it takes the form of sanctions.
For more than fifty years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the wider nuclear nonproliferation regime have worked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Analysts and pundits have often viewed the regime with skepticism, repeatedly warning that it is on the brink of collapse, and the NPT lacks many of the characteristics usually seen in effective international institutions. Nevertheless, the treaty continues to enjoy near-universal membership and high levels of compliance. This is the first book to explain why the nonproliferation regime has been so successful, bringing to bear declassified documents, new data on regime membership and weapons pursuit, and a variety of analytic approaches. It offers important new insights for scholars of nuclear proliferation and international security institutions, and for policymakers seeking to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and tighten international constraints on the spread of nuclear weapons.
This article explains China’s abortive attempt to stop North Korean nuclear development between 1993 and 2016. It attributes this failure to two international conditions. The first is geographical contiguity. As an adjacent great power, China had limited leverage over North Korea. Beijing’s threats of sanctions lacked credibility, as sanctions could trigger dangerous local instabilities. Its security inducements implied a risk of subordination, which Pyongyang was unwilling to accept. The second is the unipolar international system. Unipolarity curbed Beijing’s ability to protect Pyongyang from the United States, while simultaneously inducing China to pass the buck of restraining North Korea to the American unipole. This article corroborates these main arguments by drawing upon primary and secondary sources in Korean, Chinese, and English.
Why is making peace so hard and returning to confrontation relatively easy on the Korean Peninsula? By conceptualizing four types of institutional change –Cold War peace, Post Cold War peace, democratic peace, and developmental peace – the author suggests a better explanation of the peacemaking process in Korea than previous realist, liberal and functionalist approaches. The author argues that peace on the Korean Peninsula has been institutionalised on a low
level and in a negative way, and that the scale and density of socio-economic exchanges has been weak and insignificant. This is because the Panmunjom Regime, as an institutionalized armistice, was originally a negative peace created by external influences. However, internal actors have attained increasing importance in changing it into a positive peace. Lately, however, all actors have
faced the difficulties posed by domestic politics and North Korean nuclear development, which has made them choose a passive and negative set of policies. The second round of peace process at the moment shows complex combination of various motivations of South Korean democratic peace, North Korean and Chinese developmental peace mode of diplomatic position. New Cold War type of threat posed by the U.S. president of Trump may increse the importance of
domestic actors of each engaged countries in North East Asia.
This article aims to identify aid discourses as applied to the North Korean case, and examines whether or not international assistance has been promptly delivered. The aid discourse on fragile states in accordance with the New Deal, which focuses on strengthening a recipient country's foundation of development by alleviating its fragility, is deemed to be the relevant discourse because the international community considers North Korea to be a fragile state. However, the corresponding norms have not been applied by major international donors in the delivery and disbursement of aid to North Korea, despite its fragile state status and in spite of the fact that its fragility has not declined and is still perceived to be critical.
In diesem Kapitel wenden wir uns der internationalen Konflikt- und Kooperationslandschaft derjenigen Weltregion zu, die gelegentlich als pazifisches Asien bezeichnet wird und aus den – vielfach miteinander wechselwirkenden – Teilregionen (Nord-)Ost- und Südost-Asien besteht. Zusammen umfassen sie rund ein Drittel der Weltbevölkerung, verteilt auf 16 Staaten und Territorien (vgl. Übersicht 5.1). Mit der VR China und Japan gehören dazu die heute zweit- und drittgrößte Wirtschaftsnation der Welt, die ökonomische Dynamik der Region war und ist Gegenstand sowohl der globalen Berichterstattung wie der wissenschaftlichen Analyse (und Kontroverse über ihre Erklärung). Dies sind jedoch Fragestellungen der international vergleichenden politischen Ökonomie bzw. der Entwicklungsforschung, die uns hier nur insoweit beschäftigen werden, wie sie mit intraregionalen Beziehungen zu tun haben. Wie in den vorausgegangenen Kapiteln sind solche, konflikthafter Natur wie kooperativ, der zentrale Gegenstand des vorliegenden Kapitels.
The DPRK’s progressive nuclearization has evoked different responses in its Northeast Asian neighbors. A comparison across Japan, South Korea, and China offers a useful arena for addressing important debates in comparative and international politics. The three states differ with regards to their political systems and classical power disparities. The article distills general trends in their approach in light of—and sometimes in spite of—these differences. First, notwithstanding differences in regime type, there has been a shared secular trend away from positive inducements. Second, the precise mix of inducements differed significantly across all three cases in tandem with their domestic constraints and levels of political polarization. Third, classical neorealist drivers of international behavior have been rather secondary for explaining approaches to the DPRK’s nuclearization. Finally, the panoply of strategies spanning the positive and negative spectrum has failed to deliver desired objectives. This outcome highlights the centrality of the domestic regime type of target states to the effectiveness of inducements.
North Korea's nuclear weapons program has provoked much apprehension in the international community in recent years. The Six Party Talks were convened in 2003 to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. They brought together the US, China, Russia, Japan as well as North and South Korea in the effort to negotiate a multilateral resolution of North Korea's nuclear program but the parties had widely different views and approaches. This book will examine the Six Party Talks as a study in multilateral negotiation highlighting the expectations vested in them and their inability to develop a common approach to the issue. It holds out some important lessons for multilateral negotiation, diplomacy and dealing with North Korea.
Since 1989 when the North Korean nuclear issue first rose to global prominence, efforts by the international community to resolve the issue have not moved it meaningfully closer to the actual elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and weapon holdings. While North Korea has succeeded in getting the United States to the negotiation table by using the nuclear card and consolidating its own regime security, the process of resolving the issue has been locked in a cycle of negotiation, agreement, abrogation of agreements, the heightening of crisis, and renegotiation. Thus, whereas the Six-Party Talks have yielded agreements to end North Korea's nuclear programs, notably through the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement of 2007, North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear weapons program. It is therefore clear that the North Korean nuclear issue is showing little, if any, sign of being resolved despite pressure from the international community, including the South Korean government's suspension of economic assistance and cooperation with the North, and the UN Security Council sanctions against the North. This paper accordingly examines the North Korean nuclear issue-the most pressing security problem on the Korean Peninsula during the past two decades. This paper explores the recurring pattern of the North Korean nuclear crises and North Korea's negotiating behavior, analyzing the core and critical issues of dealing with the North Korean nuclear program and the difficulties that have arisen in the process. In so doing, policy priorities are identified that could help to bring about a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.
