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Scholarly research assumes populism enhances democratic inclusion by giving voice to groups that are not represented by political elites and by obliging them to be more attentive to their preferences. Empirical studies have focused on this dynamic more indirectly looking at the emergence of new conflict dimensions, leaving the representation of mar...
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Context 1
... higher levels of poverty lead to lower attention towards the poor in the absence of challengers, while the opposite seems to be the case in the presence of a challenger party. To help interpret correctly the coefficients of the interaction terms Figure 3 shows the corresponding average marginal effects (AMEs). Concerning the regional poverty rate, the effect for the absence of populist challengers is as expected negative, whereas in the presence of 0.523 0.557 DV, Poverty issue attention (percentage of quasi-sentences that is devoted to the issue of poverty in regional election manifestos).*p ...
Context 2
... the regional poverty rate is low, we see only slight differences between establishment parties facing or not facing populist challengers. As indicated by the results in Table 1 and Figure 3 this difference significantly increases to almost 1.9 scale points when the poverty rate is over 35% (Andalusia and the Canary Islands in 2015). These values can be compared to the empirical range of the dependent variable, which is about 5.2. ...
Context 3
... higher levels of poverty lead to lower attention towards the poor in the absence of challengers, while the opposite seems to be the case in the presence of a challenger party. To help interpret correctly the coefficients of the interaction terms Figure 3 shows the corresponding average marginal effects (AMEs). Concerning the regional poverty rate, the effect for the absence of populist challengers is as expected negative, whereas in the presence of challengers it is positive. ...
Context 4
... in all these dynamics provide evidence for the conditional hypotheses H2a and H2b. 7 [ Figure 3 about here] ...
Context 5
... the regional poverty rate is low, we see only slight differences between establishment parties facing or not facing populist challengers. As indicated by the results in Table 1 and Figure 3 this difference significantly increases to almost 1.9 scale points when the poverty rate is over 35% (Andalusia and the Canary Islands in 2015). ...
Citations
... German subnational party organizations have been particularly keen in using their relatively strong autonomy when drafting their programmes (Stecker 2015). Following the literature (Alonso et al. 2012;Däubler 2012;Dolezal et al. 2012;Gross, Krauss, and Praprotnik 2023;Scantamburlo 2019), we choose subnational parties' election manifestos as the main documents to measure party policy positions in regional elections for at least three reasons: first, manifestos are 'authoritative statements of party preferences and represent the whole party, not just one faction or politician' (Alonso et al. 2012, 1). Second, manifestos are published regularly for each election, which enables a systematic comparison of programmatic changes over time and space. ...
In recent years the ‘cost of governing’ has significantly increased for some mainstream political parties. In a context of financial uncertainty, multiple crises and growing constraints exerted by global forces, being a ‘natural’ party of government is no longer regarded as an electoral advantage. This is particularly true for parties that have moved from a position of clear dominance within ruling coalitions to a more subordinate role. In this article, focusing on the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and using an original dataset, we aim to provide a more nuanced assessment of the effects of incumbency by examining regional electoral performance since 1990. It appears that sub-national incumbency can be beneficial in regional elections, especially when a party faces significant costs of governing at the national level. However, this advantage is only applicable if the party holds a leading position in the regional executive. On the contrary, being a junior coalition partner at both national and regional levels may further exacerbate electoral decline for the party.
... Spain's two-party system began to shatter in 2014 with the rise of two new parties on the left and center-right, Podemos and Ciudadanos. The emergence of these parties conferred an exceptional character to the 2015 regional elections, which marked the starting point of a new electoral cycle in Spain (Lagares Diez et al., 2019;Scantamburlo 2019). Yet, the newest arrival has been the radical right party Vox, that in December 2018 secured 12 seats in the Andalusian Parliament and five months 2. Regional presidents have the prerogative to call a snap election, but this has happened just once: ...
The 2019 regional elections in Spain were held in a context of political instability and polarization in the country and just 28 days after the national elections. Taking advantage of this unprecedented quasi-simultaneous electoral setting, this article analyzes vote-switching between regional and national elections, both at the aggregate and individual levels. Specifically, it explores whether the 2019 regional elections match the expectations of the second-order election model. The results show that quasi-simultaneity between regional and national elections did not entail a higher level of election congruence. In addition, while most of the predictions of the second-order election model regarding aggregate election results hold for the 2019 regional elections, our findings suggest that dual voting at the individual level does not respond to the logic of the second-order election model but rather to regional political considerations.
... Its remarkable electoral outbreak in the European elections was later confirmed in the 2015 and 2016 general elections, when it came third with more than 5 million votes (Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016). The electoral platform of Podemos has been characterized by two main elements: a strong anti-mainstream politics stance, and a set of policy proposals identified with 'classical left-wing socialism' (Ramiro andScantamburlo, 2019;Polk et al., 2017). 4 This has been so even if the leaders of the party, especially in the beginning, have often claimed that a 'people-elite' division of the political space was preferred over a more classical left-right one (Ramiro and.The emergence of Podemos brought populism to the forefront of the political debate responding to a conscious strategy. ...
Evidence indicates that populist attitudes matter for voting decisions, but findings are still inconclusive about whether this happens regardless of individuals' positioning on more traditional dimensions of electoral competition. This article focuses on the probability of voting for populist parties in Spain, a country where only left-wing populist parties (LPPs) existed in 2015-2016. Therefore, not all populist individuals, who were spread across the left-right axis, had a natural voting option that combined their populist and left-right preferences. Although this situation could make it more likely that stronger populist attitudes increase likelihood of voting populist regardless of preferences on other political dimensions, the results of this analysis show otherwise. Stronger populist attitudes significantly increase likelihood of voting for LPPs only among individuals located in the left-side of the ideological axis. The effect seems largely influenced by preferences related to economic redistribution.
... Indeed, previous research has shown that those who are termed 'losers of globalisation' have a higher tendency to vote for and, thus, seek representation from radical right populist parties (Kriesi et al., 2012). Where mainstream governments tend to adopt the discourse of the wealthy (Elsässer, Hense, & Schäfer, 2018), populist parties can fill the representational gap by focusing on the interests of the poor (Scantamburlo, 2019). However, representation does not end with policy offers during electoral campaigns. ...
The spread and success of radical and populist parties has triggered a profound debate on the state of democracy. Not only are these parties described as the outcome of a democratic malaise in which democratic regimes had ceased to integrate, represent and engage all their citizens. At the same time, questions arose as to the consequences of these parties for existing representative democracies. Could radical and populist parties be a (partial) cure to the woes of established democracies? Or would they make the democratic malaise even worse, further poisoning an already sick patient? Could it be that these parties act like a placebo that exists because of the democratic malaise but does not actually change anything except for those who desperately want to believe in an effect? The contributions to this Special Issue address questions of the impact of radical and populist parties on representative democracy. This introduction systematise their findings along party functions and draws broader conclusions.
This article opens a Special Issue on Democratic Stress. Against the background of recent debates on ‘democratic crisis’, we argue that the concept of ‘democratic stress’ provides a useful way to understand the diversity of pressures that representative democracy faces in the contemporary context, as well as a valuable ‘organising perspective’ for developing more nuanced analyses. We then map out the main contributions of the articles included in this special issue, and survey the way in which they further this agenda, conceptually and empirically.
Are populist parties bad for representative democracy or are they filling a representative gap? While it has been broadly established that the emergence and success of populist parties is not merely a sign of protest, there is still a sparsity of empirical investigations into whether these parties represent hitherto under- or unrepresented social groups or whether they offer a policy profile that was in demand but not present. Using Pitkin’s concepts of symbolic, descriptive and substantive representation, this article opens up the dimensions in which populist parties might challenge or aid democratic representation. It then places the articles in the Special Issue ‘Populist Representation of, by and for the People?’ along these dimensions and highlights their specific contributions.
