Fig 2 - uploaded by Barbara Osimani
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Loss aversion. The utility function has different curves for gains and for losses respectively. This explains why losing an amount of payoff 1 provokes much more distress (-6) than the satisfaction caused by gaining the same amount (+2) (adapted from Kahneman and Tversky 1984)
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The goal of this paper is to introduce a novel soft hyperstructure called multi-fuzzy soft hyperstructure. We investigate the notion of multi-fuzzy soft hypermodules and some of their structural properties are discussed. We discuss the behavior image and inverse image of a multi-fuzzy soft set under the multi-fuzzy soft function. According to Zadeh...
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... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
This chapter introduces the main idea and motivation behind precautionary principles (PPs) and gives an overview of different PP interpretations according to their functions: action-guiding, epistemic, procedural, and integrated interpretations are distinguished. The chapter then describes the main lines of arguments that have been presented in favor of PPs before presenting the most important objections that PPs face, along with possible rejoinders.
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
In this chapter, the actual application of reflective equilibrium in the form of the process of adjustments begins. The case study is divided into three different phases in order to allow me to focus on different aspects of applying RE. The present chapter describes phase 1, which focuses on how a new candidate system, i.e., a new principle, can be developed.
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
This chapter describes the second phase of a case study in which reflective equilibrium is applied with the goal of justifying a precautionary principle. It focuses on how the RE criteria can be used to comparatively assess different candidate systems, i.e., theory choice , and to adjust commitments and system with respect to each other.
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
In this chapter, the process of adjustments comes to a preliminary endpoint. A rights-based precautionary principle is developed as part of the resulting position. Through assessing the resulting position with the reflective equilibrium criteria, I argue that—given some assumptions—a position in reflective equilibrium was reached.
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
This chapter describes the theoretical foundations of the conception of reflective equilibrium that I adopt for the purpose of this book. According to this conception, reflective equilibrium is an imperfect procedural epistemology which is weakly foundationalist. I argue that there are six criteria that need to be met by an epistemic position to a sufficient degree in order to be in a state of reflective equilibrium.
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
This chapter describes the design of a case study for testing whether reflective equilibrium (RE) can be successfully applied. This includes defining the pragmatic-epistemic objective, specifying the RE criteria and the steps of the process of application, and identifying and describing the input of the RE application.
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
This chapter summarizes the main points of the book and asks what we can learn for reflective equilibrium (RE) and its use as a method in philosophy. It highlights that (1) reflective equilibrium could be specified as an applicable method which puts real constraints on justification; and (2) applying reflective equilibrium as a method did contribute to the desiderata for justifying a precautionary principle. Taking a step back from the case study, the chapter argues that while RE can be specified as a method, it might often be more fruitful to adopt it as a methodology .
... It has been argued that the underlying methodology of either rejecting or accepting hypotheses does not sufficiently allow for identifying and tracking uncertainties. If a PP is understood as a principle that relaxes the standard for the amount of evidence required to take action, then a new epistemology might be needed: one that allows an integrating of the uncertainty about the causal connection between, for example, a drug and a harm, in the decision (Osimani 2013). ...
This chapter discusses how we can obtain an applicable method of reflective equilibrium based on the theoretical foundations described in the previous chapter. It describes a methodological framework which identifies the tasks one has to complete in order to apply reflective equilibrium, the methodological decisions one has to make in order to be able to address these tasks, and the challenges one faces when making these methodological decisions.
... Unlike the risk-based approach, the precautionary approach does not require the certainty of a causal link between the action or the event and the possible harm, as it intervenes on non-measurable risks and on uncertain causal links: Baccording to the precautionary principle, lack of scientific certainty about the potential harm should no longer constitute an obstacle for riskpreventive actions^ [38]. ...
This article aims to explore the debate on human enhancement (HE) from the perspective of the evolutions of responsibility paradigms, and in particular from the perspective of the so-called Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach. The aim is not to explore the arguments pro or contra the ethical legitimacy and/or technical feasibility of human enhancement, but rather exploring if, and how, the RRI perspective can shape the debate on human enhancement (and vice versa).
In particular, the human enhancement debate will be read through the lenses of four main responsibility paradigms that we sketch by examining both, the historical and conceptual evolution of the responsibility idea and the dynamics of its ascription. In order to provide a useful scheme for interpreting human enhancement, RRI will be characterised as a distinctive responsibility model that can subsequently be used to frame the debate on HE with a particular emphasis on its normative implications, as well as on its social and political significance.
