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Geography makes ballistic missile flight times between India and Pakistan very short. This has serious consequences for the feasibility and utility of possible early warning systems that could be set up in India or Pakistan to detect incoming missiles from the other side. In this article, we show how one can estimate the time taken for a missile fl...
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... not exactly known, approximate values for most quantities of interest are available from the public record. The one quantity that is usually not speci fi ed is η , the angle between thrust and velocity as a function of time. 79 In solving these equations, we will vary η to obtain the desired range or minimize the time of fl ight. The drag coef fi cient C d during boost phase is assumed to be the same as the measured values for the V-2 rocket and is shown in Figure 3 as a function of the ratio of the velocity of the missile to the local sound velocity. 80 We will assume that the missile jettisons the propellant tanks at the end of the boost phase. In that case all that would be left would be the missile nose cone, which is assumed to be a hemisphere mounted on a blunted cone. The drag coef fi cient C d of the missile during reentry then is given by: C d = 2 sin 2 ( α ) + ( r r n b ) 2 (1 − 2 sin 2 ( α ) − sin 4 ( α )), where α is half the cone opening angle, r n is the radius of the frontal hemisphere and r b is the base radius of nose cone. 81 The density of air and the local speed of sound (needed to calculate the drag coef fi cient) as functions of altitude are taken from the 1976 U.S. standard atmosphere and are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. 82 Consider a simple example in which we have, in the earth- fi xed frame, a launch site r B and a target r T , both at the ground level, at the same latitude L and separated by a longitude difference of ψ 0 . As the earth rotates, r B ( t ) and r T ( t ) will both change with time in any fi xed inertial frame. Let us choose the inertial frame as one whose spherical polar angles coincide with the geographical latitude and longitude at t = 0. Then at the start of the missile trajectory, the azimuthal angle separation ψ t = 0 between launch and target is just the longitude difference. As the missile travels the target moves along the azimuthal direction due to earth ’ s rotation, reaching a fi nal azimuthal angle separation ψ given ...
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... The system may work but with unreliably low efficiency. However, in case of nuclear-tipped ballistic missile launches from off-shore submarines, the flight times are about 10e15 min which make the BMDs unworkable [58]. ...
Outer space can be used for military and strategic purposes. The growing dependence of militaries on outer space assets in pursuit of operational and communicational undertakings make them productive assets and plausible targets for adversaries. Such threats push the states to take measures to secure their space assets. India is developing its dedicated military satellites for C⁴ISR capabilities. The progress in military assets in outer space, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, Antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, surveillance and intelligence capabilities are a major concern for Pakistan. Strategic stability in South Asia is under question, and there is a need to analyze the changing security dynamics of the region. This paper provides a detailed overview of India's recent development on BMD system and other space assets of India and Pakistan. The emerging technologies will have serious implications for strategic stability in South Asia. This paper is an attempt to understand the potential security scenarios between India and Pakistan and concludes that the technological asymmetries may lead to strategic instability.
... Deploying missiles mated to warheads sets the stage for at least two serious dangers. The first and greatest danger is that once nuclear weapons are in a state where they can be used at short notice, then they might be used accidentally, for example because of a false alarm, or by unauthorised personnel, especially during a crisis, and this danger is particularly relevant to South Asia because of the short missile flight times between Pakistan and India (Rajaraman, Ramana, and Mian 2002;Ramana, Rajaraman, and Mian 2004;Mian, Rajaraman, and Ramana 2003). The second danger is that of serious accidents involving nuclear weapons themselves or their delivery vehicles such as missiles and aircraft Rajaraman 2000, 2001). ...
One of the cornerstones of India’s official nuclear policy is No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons, which has a long history in Indian nuclear debates and discussions. The country’s stated doctrine from January 2003 includes a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first but with a significant caveat, that nuclear weapons could be used if Indian forces are attacked with biological or chemical weapons. The NFU policy has often been held up by Indian diplomats, government spokespeople, and various strategists as proof of India’s status as a responsible nuclear power. At the same time, there is also a history of strategists, military leaders, and, more recently, government officials questioning, or calling for the abandonment of, the NFU commitment. Statements by various policy makers and officials suggest that their understanding of how nuclear weapons should be used does not fit the strict interpretation of a NFU policy, and that India might well be the first to initiate a nuclear attack during a military crisis. The development and deployment of nuclear warheads mated to missiles would create the material grounds for first use of nuclear weapons and create risks of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war.
... The model is based primarily on a synthesis of statements regarding the U.S. and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals, doctrines, and systems for early warning and C3I, which were made by analysts that used unclassified information and interviews to construct their own models in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Marsh and Wallace et al. 25 It presumes that the assumptions of its model continue to apply to the United States and Russia, which seems roughly consistent with descriptions of both U.S. and Russian forces over the past two decades. 26 It is also assumed that at the level of analysis presented here, Soviet/Russian early-warning systems and response procedures can be reasonably approximated as being functionally equivalent to those of the United States 27 despite some known differences (e.g. as succinctly summarized by Mian et al. 28 ). ...
This article develops a mathematical modeling framework using fault trees and Poisson processes for analyzing the risks of inadvertent nuclear war from U.S. or Russian misinterpretation of false alarms in early warning systems, and for assessing the potential value of options to reduce the risks of inadvertent nuclear war. The model also uses publicly available information on early warning systems, near-miss incidents, and other factors to estimate probabilities of a U.S.–Russia crisis, the rates of false alarms, and the probabilities that leaders will launch missiles in response to a false alarm. The article discusses results, uncertainties, limitations, and policy implications.Supplemental materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Science & Global Security to view the free online appendix with additional tables and figures.
... The development of missiles carries grave risks in south Asia. Geography makes ballistic missile flight times from India or Pakistan to the other country's cities as short as five minutes and possible warning times would be shorter [Mian, Rajaraman and Ramana 2003]. There would be no time at all for decision-makers to check the facts, to assess the situation, to consult, or weigh options. ...
India and Pakistan have been talking peace since 2003, yet they have continued to expand their nuclear arsenals. This suggests a failure both of imagination and of political will to seriously engage with the nuclear danger. The peace process does not seem to recognise the fact that since the two countries conducted their nuclear tests in 1998 there has been a war and a major military crisis, both prominently featuring nuclear threats. Nuclear denial in south Asia is not a symptom of inattention, or passivity in the face of an overwhelming problem. It is deliberate blindness to the contradiction between word and deed. India and Pakistan talk of peace while pouring scarce resources into developing their nuclear arsenals, the infrastructure for producing and using them, and doctrines aimed at fighting a nuclear war.
... The development of missiles carries grave risks in South Asia. Geography makes ballistic missile flight times from India or Pakistan to the other country's cities as short as five minutes and possible warning times would be shorter (Mian, Rajaraman, and Ramana 2003). There would be no time at all for decision-makers to check the facts, to assess the situation, to consult, or weigh options. ...
Source: Japan Focus As the current Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh risks his administration on a bid to override massive public opposition to entering into a nuclear power deal with the United States, hyped as an "historic" accord that will emancipate India's economy and boost its international status, Japan Focus examines a decade of India-Pakistan maneuvering for advantage in the South Asian nuclear sweepstakes. MS "We in America are living among madmen. Madmen govern our affairs in the name of order and security. The chief madmen claim the titles of general, admiral, senator, scientist, administrator, secretary of state, even president. . . . Soberly, day after day, the madmen continue to go through the undeviating motions of madness: motions so stereotyped, so commonplace, that they seem the normal motions of normal men, not the mass compulsions of people bent on total death. Without a public mandate of any kind, the madmen have taken it upon themselves to lead us by gradual stages to that final act of madness which will corrupt the face of the earth." Lewis Mumford (1946), in response to the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the announcement of additional nuclear weapons tests.
Zusammenfassung
Kernwaffen spielen in der Verteidigungspolitik Indiens und Pakistans eine immer stärkere Rolle. Beide Staaten rüsten auf und modernisieren ihre Nukleararsenale. Dieser Trend hat auch die maritime Dimension erfasst und zeigt sich an den Bestrebungen Neu-Delhis und Islamabads, U‑Boot-gestützte Kernwaffen zu entwickeln. Unabhängig von den jeweiligen Motivationen, die dem Aufbau dieser Systeme zugrunde liegen, werfen solche Waffen zentrale Fragen für die Stabilität zwischen Kernwaffenstaaten auf.
Omówiono zakres irańskiego programu nuklearnego, uwarunkowania wewnętrzne Islamskiej Republiki Iranu i międzynarodowa opodwiedź: w ramach reżimu nieproliferacji Międzynarodowa Agencja Energii Atomowej oraz dyplomatycznych inicjatyw ze strony UE i USA. W pracy zwrócono uwagę na znaczenie sankcji, a w szczególności współpracy USA i UE do wypracowania dyplomatycznego rozwiązania zbyt rozbudowanego zakresu irańskiego programu atomowego.
Pakistan is located at the eastern edge of Huntington's Islamic civilization fault line and functions as a "conduit state" that linked the security agendas of the Middle East, North Caucus and South Asia. Pakistan has made arrangements about the safety, security and command and control of nuclear weapons to understand the three main risks concerning nuclear weapons such as the risk that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists, the risk of unintentional or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and lastly, the dangers of loss of escalation control in a crisis or conventional conflict with its more powerful rival India. Pakistan relies on a variety of space and land-based communication systems assuring nuclear connectivity and the continuity of centralized control. The said country is heavily dependent on copying US technologies, practices and procedures ensuring the safety and security of its nuclear weapons and has use secrecy and deception in protecting its nuclear infrastructure. Additionally, Pakistan utilized systems for screening personnel, authenticating codes, physical security measures, secrecy to provide high degree of assurance against the possibility of unintended or unauthorized use of weapons. However, Pakistan could lose centralized control of its nuclear weapons in an escalating crisis or conventional war with India.
