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Cyber capabilities afford authoritarian regimes an asymmetric advantage over liberal democracies. This asymmetry is based on two variables; On the one hand, cyber capabilities allow authoritarian states that often possess less developed conventional militaries to level the playing field and neutralize their adversaries’ military-technological supre...
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"The Intelligence Technology and Big Eye Secrets: Navigating the Complex World of Cybersecurity and Espionage" is a comprehensive exploration of the intricate landscape of global intelligence and cyber security. It begins by dissecting the inner workings of intelligence and cyber security agencies, shedding light on their pivotal role in safeguardi...
Citations
... The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 7, Issue 1 infrastructure against targeted cyber-attacks from North Korea (Valeriano and Maness, 2015) and China, (Ernst & Lee, 2021), but also from state-sponsored groups that launch attaches from these territories (Ernst & Lee, 2021). Additionally, conflicts between India and Pakistan have found their way into the cyber domain, usually coinciding in the context of tit-for-tat moves or on important dates such as Independence Day (Shad, 2019) and the role of Taiwan in the semiconductor industry makes their cyber defense synonymous with national defense. ...
... The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 7, Issue 1 infrastructure against targeted cyber-attacks from North Korea (Valeriano and Maness, 2015) and China, (Ernst & Lee, 2021), but also from state-sponsored groups that launch attaches from these territories (Ernst & Lee, 2021). Additionally, conflicts between India and Pakistan have found their way into the cyber domain, usually coinciding in the context of tit-for-tat moves or on important dates such as Independence Day (Shad, 2019) and the role of Taiwan in the semiconductor industry makes their cyber defense synonymous with national defense. ...
As technology has advanced and our world has become increasingly interconnected, cyberspace has become a key battlefield in great-power competition. The Indo-Pacific has found itself vulnerable in this new reality-the paucity of institutions, heterogeneity in levels of development, and the region being the primary zone of US-China competition fueling these vulnerabilities. Cyberspace provides a multitude of security threats posed by states, non-state actors and state-sponsored actors. Despite this, cybersecurity takes a backseat to other security issues despite its critical importance. Using the concept of neo-middle power diplomacy, this paper examines why the limited cybersecurity cooperation among middle powers in the Indo-Pacific has taken the shape it has. This paper finds that the two most promising areas of cooperation for middle powers are through confidence-building measures and capacity-building measures. Through actively pursuing these two measures, middle powers can become more effective, capable, and autonomous stakeholders within the Indo-Pacific.
... However, specific states exploit these systems' vulnerabilities to advance their strategic national interests. Examples include suppressing their population to ensure their autocratic rule [Ernst and Lee, 2021], stealing knowledge in private companies and industry [PwC and BAE Systems, 2017], and for intelligence purposes in preparation to take over another country's territory [Deibert et al., 2012, Dickinson, 2021. Once the tanks are invading, the organisations of these states or their proxies continue to conduct offensive cyberspace operations for intelligence purposes and support the kinetic effort [Microsoft, 2022]. ...
Threat actors conduct offensive cyberspace operations for many purposes, such as espionage, to destroy information assets, and cybercrime. These operations are possible thanks to the innovation and development of information and communications technologies (ICT). Interconnected information systems have transformed societies positively. However, specific states exploit these systems' vulnerabilities to advance their strategic national interests. Therefore, it is important to know how a state can organise itself to defend against threat actors. The purpose of this research is to present how the smart state Sweden can through a whole-of-society approach organise for Offensive Cyberspace Operations. The intent is to conduct an active and independent foreign-, security- and defence policy, but also as a base for deterrence and defence. This article is based on a mixed methods approach. It uses the case study research strategy to discover new information. Fourteen men and women participated in individual semi-structured interviews. The respondents ranged in age from 40 to 65 with more than 20 years of experience in cyberspace operations, intelligence operations, military operations, special forces operations, and knowledge and understanding about information warfare and information operations. The analytic strategies include thematic analysis and quantitative methods to interpret the data. The results show many themes, but the article is especially focused on the themes of Operations, Capability, Policy & Governance, and Legal Frameworks. Finally, a conceptual map of a whole-of-society approach to organise for offensive cyberspace operations is presented inferred from the themes, codes, and content, and mapped to each responsible agency based on the interviews and codes. The answer to the research question is that Sweden should have a whole-of-society approach to organise for Offensive Cyberspace Operations to project power in and through cyberspace with the intent to conduct an active and independent foreign, security and defence policy and for deterrence, as described in Figure 2.
This paper examines China's international communication strategy during the initial phase of the global COVID-19 pandemic. In the spring of 2020, Western governments and media began criticising the systematic lack of transparency and accountability in the Chinese political system in relation to the failed containment of the Wuhan outbreak. Facing an unprecedented reputational crisis, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilised its foreign-language media in an attempt to influence the international discourse on COVID-19. Surveying the English and Chinese editions of the People's Daily, this study identifies CCP discourses aimed at foreign audiences and traces their evolution during the early stages of the pandemic. Overall, the study provides a comprehensive map of Chinese narratives on COVID-19 and generates fresh insights into CCP crisis communication.
