FIGURE 4 - uploaded by Matthew Kosuta
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... Despite his efforts to promote his government as a patron of Buddhism (Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit 2014), the Buddhist citizens still gravitated to the Buddhist royals. As Kosuta (2019) argued, non-royal leaders cannot claim to accumulate the divine essence of kingship the same way Buddhist kings do. ...
... Similarly, Phibun sought to align himself with King Naresuan of Ayutthaya, renowned for his military campaigns against the Burmese and celebrated his declaration of Siam's independence. Naresuan's legacy, particularly his victory in an elephant duel (Kosuta 2019), symbolised the war valour and independence that Phibun wished to embody. Despite initial plans for a monument and stupa commemorating Naresuan's victories being stalled years earlier due to financial and political uncertainties, the project was revived in 1950 and approved in 1952 under Phibun's government. ...
... By contrast, the monuments to Taksin and Naresuan have a more direct connection to war achievements despite the incredible nature of their military exploits. Despite not being traditional war memorials, these monuments draw on the pre-First World War European tradition of honouring military leaders' valorous acts (Kosuta 2019). They detach the heroes from the outcomes of their victories, including the casualties of their campaigns, and imbue them with a charisma that serves state interests, particularly in legitimising military rule by restoring monarchical prestige. ...
In this article, I survey the landscape of war memorials in Thailand throughout the twentieth century, examining the complex dynamics between the military and the monarchy in moulding the nation’s identity and political landscape. I interrogate how memorialisation efforts, commissioned by both royal and military leaders, diverge to meet specific objectives, thus shedding light on Thailand’s complex engagement with its wartime past. I find that the memorialisation of Thai kings in the post-war era was strategically employed to divert attention from the military leadership’s controversial roles during the Thai-Franco and Asia-Pacific Wars, positioning monarchs to legitimate political and military authority. This diversion resulted in the silencing of the contentious aspects of Thailand’s wartime narrative. Ultimately, the analysis posits that war memorials were instrumental in Thailand’s nation-building process, as sites of commemoration and tools for reshaping the contemporary interplay of power within the country.
... As a civilian, he can never have the same perceived divine qualities as the king. Although there was an effort on the part of Phibun's government to be a public patron of Buddhism (Baker & Pasuk, 2014), this proved ineffective, as Buddhist citizens appear not to support appeals to their religion since they believe that civilian leaders, unlike Buddhist kings, cannot claim to accumulate merit and legitimacy through their past divine lives (Kosuta, 2019). ...
... Vajiravudh to the site, a royal consecration ceremony was held. The restoration of the stupa and the building of a monument was ordered, but due to the lack of finances, political instability, and doubts over the site's authenticity, the project was shelved indefinitely (Kosuta, 2019). In 1950, the plans to build the stupa and the monument were revived, and in 1952, the project was approved by Phibun. ...
... Akin to Taksin, Phibun sought royal legitimation, but since he was unwilling to yield to a living king, he wished to derive such power from ancient and mythical kings that had seen a resurgence of popularity earlier in recent times (Wong, 2000;Kosuta, 2019). However, Phibun would not see through the building of the stupa and monument. ...
The twentieth century saw the launch of nation-building projects in Southeast Asia. Backdropped by colonialism, world wars, wars of independence, and the Cold War, it is undeniable that the war experiences of these nations played a role in shaping national myths that legitimized and rationalized their respective states. However, there is a marked variance among the countries’ use of their war pasts to visualize their nations. Why is war memorialization emphasized, suppressed, highlighted, or relegated by the state? What makes one war more memorialized than the other? This dissertation investigated the war memorialization and nation-building projects of three pro-Western, anti-communist Southeast Asian countries of the twentieth century: the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, by analyzing the production contexts and visual semiotic resources of their numerous state-sponsored war monuments and memorials. It is argued that the use and abuse, promotion and relegation, and official remembering and forgetting of war memories follow the hegemonic dictates of the state. National monuments and memorials illustrate a distinct memory and heritage politics that reflected the state’s decision to silence or highlight remembrance as a matter of international and domestic politics and agenda. For many Southeast Asian countries, these domestic and international objectives are crucial as they emerge as states internally legitimized and externally poised to claim their place in the international order.
