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Joint operation planning process (adapted from JP 5-0, Figure III-3 and FM 3-21.91, Figure 2-1)

Joint operation planning process (adapted from JP 5-0, Figure III-3 and FM 3-21.91, Figure 2-1)

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Article
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Business continuity has expanded into a discipline that spans most functional areas of large enterprises. Both the military and financial sectors have consistently demonstrated an aptitude to expand the boundaries of continuity planning and crisis mitigation. A comparison of both enterprises is provided to see how their respective methodologies com...

Contexts in source publication

Context 1
... process is comprised of multiple steps and sub-steps (see Figure 4), that aid a commander and staff in the communica- tion of a common understanding of a mis- sion along a commander's intent. The commander's intent in military planning serves as 'a concise expression of the pur- pose of the operation and the desired end state'. ...
Context 2
... the joint operations planning process is an overarching, macro- level planning tactic, troop-leading proce- dures can be employed at a more tactical level of response in any scenario. As is demonstrated in Figure 4, the two processes work in tandem to provide for optimal response time by multiple stake- holders. What is important to understand is that, while strategic and operational effects focus on larger aspects of a variety of systems and subsystems, tactical effects are typically associated with direct and indirect results that tend to yield immedi- ate, observable outcomes. ...
Context 3
... communication of orders and planning guidance related to the decision of a course of action will take place sequentially to allow other com- mands opportunity to maximise plan- ning activities which will typically be accomplished in a parallel, collaborative and iterative fashion rather than sequentially. 10 Finally, the plans that are developed through the joint operations planning process will encompass the strategy for deploying, employing, sup- porting and sustaining operational forces once operations begin (Figure 4). ...

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Citations

... Our DOTF was divided into domain groups looking at manpower, intelligence, operations, and logistics matters, corresponding to the key staff functions of a military organization [12][13][14]. This use of a military format has been advocated as a systematic and effective method for handling a crisis [15]. Briefly, the military staff structure and functions are divided into eight domains from G1 to G6 and G8 to G9 (G stands for general staff and there is no G7) where G1 is responsible for personnel or manpower issues, G2 is in charge of intelligence gathering, G3 is responsible for operations, G4 looks after logistics, G5 is responsible for mid-to long-term planning, G6 is in charge of signal/ communications, G8 is responsible for financial management, and G9 deals with civilian affairs [13]. ...
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The coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak poses a serious public health risk. To date, the disease has affected almost all countries in the world. The enormous scale of the outbreak and the relative lack of knowledge and information regarding a new virus, as well as the unpredictability of events, make it challenging for leadership teams to respond. This paper shares how we have reconfigured our radiology leadership team into a smaller disease outbreak task force (DOTF) to respond and coordinate all related efforts during this ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The DOTF format is modelled after the military with domain groups looking at manpower, intelligence, operations, and logistics matters on a daily basis so that timely decisions can be made and action plans executed promptly. In managing the DOTF, discipline, flexibility, and teamwork are key principles, and these are built upon a strong foundation of focus on infection prevention and control, and patient and staff safety as well as staff well-being. The DOTF has positioned us well to confront the many challenges to date. We believe it will also help us navigate the complex issues that will arise with future surges in cases and in formulating strategies to manage exit from the present and future lockdowns. KEY POINTS: • In a pandemic, regular and directed meetings by a smaller leadership core group are required, for prompt decision making and execution of action plans. • The military format, with domain groups to look at manpower, intelligence, operations, and logistics matters, is useful in managing a pandemic. • Discipline, flexibility, and teamwork with strong focus on infection prevention and control, and patient and staff safety as well as staff well-being are key principles for leadership teams managing a pandemic.
... The basic 4 part model as illustrated in Figure 142 (and developed from Figure 39, p275) doesn't fully illustrate the increasing dependency exhibited with our military communication networks (Brass, Galaskiewicz, & Greve, 2004) and their service architectures (Lund, Eggen, Hadzic, & Hafsoe, 2007) which has significantly heightened concerns regarding their reliability (Soliman & Janz, 2004); security (Phillips, Ting, & Dem, 2002); dependability (Al-Kuwaiti, Kyriakopoulos, & Hussein, 2009); impact to business continuity (Sikich, 2003;VanVactor & Gill, 2010) and operational effectiveness (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998). There is a critical dependency on these complex (Lukasik, 2003;Luiijf, Nieuwenhuijs, & Klaver, 2008), highly connected, interacting systems where their interoperability may inherently produce major consequential impact upon critical and cross domain operational infrastructures from minor/simple network intrusion, failure and security violations (Qian, Joshi, Tipper, & Krishnamurthy, 2008). ...
Thesis
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The military has 5 domains of operations: Land, Sea, Air, Space and now Cyber. This 5th Domain is a heterogeneous network (of networks) of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) which were designed and accredited to meet Netcentric capability requirements; to be robust, secure and functional to the organisation’s needs. Those needs have changed. In the globalised economy and across the Battlespace, organisations now need to share information. Keeping our secrets, secret has been the watchwords of Information Security and the accreditation process; whilst sharing them securely across coalition, geo-physically dispersed networks has become the cyber security dilemma. The diversity of Advanced Persistent Threats, the contagion of Cyber Power and insecurity of coalition Interoperability has generated a plethora of vulnerabilities to the Cyber Domain. Necessity (fiscal and time-constraints) has created security gaps in deployed CIS architectures through their interconnections. This federated environment for superior decision making and shared situational awareness requires that Bridging the (new capability) Gaps needs to be more than just improving security (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) mechanisms to the technical system interfaces. The solution needs a new approach to creating and understanding a trusted,social-technical CIS environment and how these (sensitive) information assets should be managed, stored and transmitted. Information Assurance (IA) offers a cohesive architecture for coalition system (of systems) interoperability; the identification of strategies, skills and business processes required for effective information operations, management and exploitation. IA provides trusted, risk managed social-technical (Enterprise) infrastructures which are safe, resilient, dependable and secure. This thesis redefines IA architecture and creates models that recognise the integrated, complex issues within technical to organisational interoperability and the assurance that the right information is delivered to the right people at the right time in a trustworthy environment and identifies the need for IA practitioners and a necessary IA education for all Cyber Warriors.