Figure - available from: European Journal of Law and Economics
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Source publication
This paper contributes to the question whether plea bargaining is compatible with the inquisitorial tradition. We stylize inquisitorial criminal procedure as a sequential game with two impartial investigators, judge and prosecutor. Both agents are subject to private investigation costs and seek a correct decision over a defendant of uncertain guilt...
Citations
Prosecution of criminals is costly and subject to errors. In contrast to adversarial court procedures, in inquisitorial systems the prosecutor is regarded as an impartial investigator and an aide to the judge. We show in a sequential prosecution game of a Bayesian court that a strategic interaction between these two impartial agents exists where each player may hope to free ride on the other one´s investigative effort. This gives rise to inefficient equilibria. The model demonstrates that the effectiveness of some policy measures that intend to curb the free-riding problem critically depends on the assumed benevolence of the prosecutor. We find that, if policy makers are unable to infer the true preferences of the prosecutorial body, the high burden of proof in criminal law may reduce the probability of court errors. Our analysis, therefore, substantiates claims made in the literature that inquisitorial procedures are introduced to avoid wrongful acquittals.
