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... rating history in Latin America and the Caribbean: initial and latest credit rating as of 31 Table 2 Credit rating history in Latin America and the Caribbean: best and worst credit rating assessments by country and agency ........................................................... 15 Table 3 Credit rating history in Latin America and the Caribbean: number of credit rating actions by country and agency ... Table 5 Initial and latest credit ratings by Standard & Poor's as of 31 December 2017 ............. 18 Table 6 Initial and latest credit ratings by Moody's as of 31 December 2017 ............................ 19 Table 7 Initial and latest credit ratings by Fitch as of 31 December 2017 .................................. 21 Table 8 Credit ratings by subregion : 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 ....................................... 24 Table 9 Impact of credit ratings on bond spreads: literature comparison (selected papers) ........ 30 Table 10 Estimation time span by country . Table 11 EMBIG spreads (in basis points) by country: descriptive statistics ............................... 32 Table 12 Number of credit rating upgrades and downgrades by agency ...................................... 33 Table 13 Share of credit rating upgrades and downgrades by agency . ...

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