Table 1 - uploaded by Wolfgang Radax
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In the case of multiple choice-issues we highlighted our choice with bold typeset.

In the case of multiple choice-issues we highlighted our choice with bold typeset.

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Context 1
... stated in Table 1 we aimed for distributional equivalence which Axtell et al. (1996) defined as two models producing distributions of results that cannot be distinguished statistically. We compared the results of both models in respect to the numbers of cooperators and defectors for Runs 1 and 2 by using t-tests for the equality of means of two samples with the same unknown variance -an approach already used, for instance, by Wilensky and Rand (2007). ...

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In the present article we emphasize the importance of modeling time in the context of agent-based models. To this end, we present a (selective) survey of the Cellular Automata-literature on updating and draw parallels to the issue of agent activation in agent-based models. By means of two simple models, Schelling's segregation model and Epstein's demographic prisoner's dilemma we investigate the influence of choosing different regimes of agent activation. Our experiments indicate that timing is not a critical issue for very simple models but bears huge influence on model behavior and results as soon as the degree of complexity increases only so slightly. After a brief review of the way commonly used ABM simulation environments handle the issue of timing, we draw some tentative conclusions about the importance of timing and the need for more research towards that direction, similar to the concerted effort on updating in cellular automata. Comment: Prepared for the World Congress on Social Simulation WCSS 2010 in Kassel, Germany, September 6-9, 2010