FIGURE 4 - uploaded by Bertha Vallejo
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Context 1
... illustrated in Figure 4, automotive industry production is divided into two broad categories: passenger cars (includ- ing SUVs) and heavy vehicles (including heavy duty vehi- cles and buses and coaches). ...
Context 2
... main im- porter of Belarusian automotive production is the Russian Federation, acquiring about 65% of completely assembled heavy commercial vehicles and tractors. 86 Figure 14 illustrates that although global heavy commer- cial vehicles production has increased by about 1 million units during the last 5 years, Belarusian production has de- creased by about 40% for heavy trucks compared with the 2005 level. However, tractor production in Belarus has in- creased about 7% compared to the 2005 level. ...
Context 3
... the case of tractors, almost 99% of the production is exported. Fig- ure 14 illustrates that in the last 10 years there has been a decrease in not only truck production but also the share of truck production that is exported. While in 2000 about 68% of truck production was exported, in 2010 this share had fallen to about 52% of total production. ...
Context 4
... use of installed capacity has declined during recent years. In the case of heavy vehicle manufacturing, the re- duction in production presented in Figure 14 illustrates this issue. In the automotive parts sector, companies re- ported that in the last 3 years (2007)(2008)(2009)(2010) only about 68% of their installed capacity has been used. ...
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Citations
... During the 1980s, Belarus was third (after Russia and Ukraine) within the Soviet Union in terms of motor vehicle production, with an annual production of 40,000 commercial vehicles, most of which were trucks and agricultural vehicles (Vallejo, 2011). The evolution of the automotive industry in this country since 1991 has three major characteristics. ...
... The state has maintained ownership, control, and management of its automobile companies. For instance, in 2004, all firms producing motor vehicles in Belarus, except for the joint venture MAZ-MAN, were state-owned, whereas more than 84% of parts manufacturers were more than 50% government-owned (Vallejo, 2011). Second, there were several attempts to adopt global production technologies via joint ventures with foreign automakers (Ford, Samand, Geely), but these were mostly unsuccessful. ...
... Third, the Belarusian automotive industry is concentrated in the production of heavy commercial vehicles and largely depends on the Russian market. In 2010, 65% of the vehicles produced in Belarus were exported to Russia (Vallejo, 2011). Changes in technical requirements, import tariffs, financial fluctuations, and economic slowdowns in the Russian economy all have the potential to strongly impact the automotive industry in Belarus. ...
This paper discusses the impact of industrial policy on the development of the automotive industry in five post-Soviet countries since 1991 (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan). By using foreign trade and production statistics as well as qualitative data on automobile companies from business news, this paper highlights three different paths: success in post-2000 Russia and Uzbekistan, stagnation and struggle for survival in Belarus and Kazakhstan, and failure in pre-2000 Russia and Ukraine. The existence of an automotive industry before 1991 was not a factor in success because most pre-existing firms collapsed after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Instead, the growth of these post-Soviet automotive industries has essentially relied on the presence of global car makers. This research demonstrates that inward foreign direct investment and licensing agreements were fostered by the combination of protectionist policies that made importation uncompetitive and access of global firms to the large Russian market (both direct access and indirect access via a country with privileged access to Russia). This paper also highlights different strategies adopted by foreign firms: whereas the largest Western and Japanese companies invested directly in Russia, companies from China and Korea used Central Asia and Belarus as back doors to enter the Russian market.
