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This report analyses how disinformation campaigns have evolved into more complex hostile narratives, taking Italy, France, and Spain as case studies to prove what has been observed and determined from analytical and numerical research.
During the last years, malicious actors have been able to rely on much more sophisticated and organized disinform...
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... shows a relative larger activity in France than in the other monitored countries. Figure 8 Timeline for EU on Sputnik Figure 9 Timeline on Migration for Sputnik Figure 10 Timeline for Intolerance and Sputnik ...
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... the many false stories shared in 2019 in the three monitored countries, two examples were chosen to illustrate how the combined effect of false and problematic content works in a disinformation campaign, and how Russian controlled media attempted to enhance chaos and diminish trust in mainstream media and democratic institutions. Figure 11 Timeline for Disinformation story about Muslim Brotherhood in France Figure 11 shows the development of a false story about French Member of Parliament Sonia Krimi, who was falsely accused of having pledged for the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. 62 After a TV appearance of Ms Krimi, far-right outlets began sharing the false story, reaching a peak in shares at the beginning of February. ...
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... the many false stories shared in 2019 in the three monitored countries, two examples were chosen to illustrate how the combined effect of false and problematic content works in a disinformation campaign, and how Russian controlled media attempted to enhance chaos and diminish trust in mainstream media and democratic institutions. Figure 11 Timeline for Disinformation story about Muslim Brotherhood in France Figure 11 shows the development of a false story about French Member of Parliament Sonia Krimi, who was falsely accused of having pledged for the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. 62 After a TV appearance of Ms Krimi, far-right outlets began sharing the false story, reaching a peak in shares at the beginning of February. ...
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... the false news spread rapidly in most part of Europe, pushed by far-right outlets. Figure 14 shows how the disinformation campaign spread in Italy. To an initial information neutral situation, on March 21st, the false story was shared to a wider audience, pushed by far-right outlets. ...
Citations
... As "unwilling crowds" (Starbird; Arif; Wilson, 2019) audiences not just passively consume misleading content, but share it, reshape it into a different format, or comment on it, contributing to its dissemination. Previous research has found, precisely, that the goal of disinformation campaigns is to move beyond like-minded audiences to reach broader publics, through multiple kinds of content and spreading strategies, continuously through time and aiming at social reproduction and remediation Starbird, 2020;Flore, 2020). Hence, as stated by Starbird, Arif and Wilson, "evaluating disinformation is less about the truth value of one or more pieces of information and more about how those pieces fit together to serve a particular purpose" (Starbird; Arif; Wilson, 2019, p. 3). ...
We present data from a survey conducted in Spain (N = 1003) in March 2022. We analysed fact-checker activity to obtain daily information regarding disinformation content encountered in the three weeks before the survey was launched. The research team analysed the material found to identify content that was related or that belonged to similar narratives. The goal was to identify the key disinformation narratives that were spreading before the survey, rather than just isolated content, to test the reach and impact of disinformation narratives, as well as spreading patterns, through survey research. Results point towards the fact that disinformation narratives were spread among a majority of respondents, with TV and social media being the main media responsible for spreading them. In addition, those that received the narratives before were more likely to believe them, indicating the disinformation narratives’ potential high impact.
... In line with the delegitimizing nature of many disinformation campaigns, malign information can be disseminated to amplify polarized divides in targeted states, sow discord, or cultivate distrust in the established order (e.g., Bennett & Livingston, 2018). Such antagonistic narratives may be used by hostile foreign or domestic political actors to confound and pollute public discourse, impede citizens' abilities to make well-informed political decisions, and hereby destabilize the political order (e.g., Flore, 2020). Destabilizing or delegitimizing narratives exploit socio-political weaknesses and vulnerabilities, such as cultural, ethnic or economic inequalities, uncertainties or (temporary) crises. ...
Although disinformation has become a popular concept, we lack an integrative conceptualization that connects the actors, intentions and techniques underlying deceptive information. In this article, we conceptualize disinformation as a context-bound deliberate act for which actors covertly deceive recipients by de-contextualizing, manipulating or fabricating information to maximize utility with the (targeted) outcome of misleading recipients. This conceptualization embeds fragmented accounts of disinformation in a networked and participatory information logic, and offers a comprehensive account of the conditions under which different actors may decide to deceive, how they deceive, and what they aim to achieve by deceiving recipients. Our conceptualization may inform (machine-learning) techniques to detect disinformation and interventions that aim to trigger suspicion by breaking through the truth-default state.
... construye algorítmicamente. De la misma manera, los algoritmos son centrales en la difusión del contenido manipulado, ya que pueden ser deliberadamente explotados para la distribución de contenido político polarizante (Flore, 2020). ...
La desinformación se combate de manera multilateral y desde la multiplicidad de herramientas: plataformas tecnológicas, políticas nacionales, medios de comunicación y plataformas de verificación. A medida que las técnicas desinformativas han ganado en sofisticación y que aumentan también los actores de la disrupción, la Unión Europea (UE) se ha sentido obligada a acelerar un proceso político y regulador que empezó a gestarse en 2015, cuando el Consejo Europeo invitó por primera vez a la Comisión Europea a actuar contra lo que consideraban una amenaza a los procesos democráticos en la UE y en sus estados miembros. Este artículo ofrece un análisis crítico de la evolución de las estrategias de la lucha contra la desinformación en línea en el marco de la UE y las implicaciones que esta voluntad de intervención ha tenido sobre las grandes plataformas digitales que operan en Europa.
... The erosion of trust -be that in the government and authorities, between citizens in a society, or in democracy itself -has been considered a vital goal for hostile actors aiming to harm target states through informational means (Ingram, 2020: 17). Similarly, the inciting of negative emotional states such as anger, fear, disgust, or confusion are often considered as destabilising psychological effects that result from such influence efforts in citizens (Flore, 2020;Wither, 2016: 83). Indeed, the aforementioned qualitative or correlational studies into psychological effects of Russian strategic narration have often centred on trust or emotional factors, such as Crilley and Chatterje-Doody's qualitative exploration of audiences' emotional responses to Russian media outlet RT's narratives of Russia's military intervention in Syria (2020) or Bērziņ a's correlational examination of political trust and Russian media consumption in Latvia (2018a). ...
Hostile political actors frequently engage in malign information influence, projecting antagonistic strategic narratives in targeted societies to manipulate the information environment and distort the perceptions of the citizens. Research examining malign information influence is growing, but more attention could be given to its psychological effects. Information operations are commonly assumed to affect the levels of trust and the emotional experiences of citizens who are targeted by them, but these notions are currently supported by limited evidence. We propose that experimental psychological research is a promising avenue to more clearly demonstrate these effects and individual differences of the target audience that may exacerbate these effects. This article discusses the knowledge gap regarding the psychological effects of malign information influence and suggests relevant psychological research that can be built upon when devising experimental studies that might address it. Finally, the article outlines key benefits that insights gleaned from this experimental research would offer to those seeking to counter malign information influence.
The emergence of generative artificial intelligence applications has triggered great interest in all areas of media studies. Its presence seems definitive and, although its rapid evolution makes it difficult to anticipate the way in which it will affect the media, it seems clear that it will transversally affect all its areas, from the production to the distribution of contents.
The application of AI is perceived, on the one hand, as an opportunity for the media to reduce production costs that facilitate their viability or as tools that free journalists from more mechanical tasks. But, on the other hand, there is also a perceived risk of increasing the precariousness of journalists' work and reducing the number of jobs. For audiences, having this new technology at hand is accompanied by new opportunities, such as greater personalization of content, but also threats, such as the presence of biases, the increase in existing gaps or an increase in the risk of misinformation.
The web of lies surrounding COVID-19 has been purposefully exacerbated by hostile actors, with researchers, analysts, and policymakers alike attempting to keep pace with unfolding disinformation narratives and subsequent effects on citizens. While the content of hostile disinformation narratives is relatively well-researched, how these narratives interact and are amplified to generate psychological effects requires further scrutiny. To address this gap, this study uses Russian COVID-19 disinformation combined with network methodologies to contextualize a novel hypothetical model of this process. Specifically, we conduct a content analysis of known disinformation articles about COVID-19 (N = 65) from Russian news sources (e.g. RT, Sputnik, New Eastern Outlook). Using co-occurrence network visualizations, we map the nexus between narrative and psychological effects to provide new insights and testable models of the effects of COVID-19 disinformation. Main findings show how hostile anti-Western narratives primarily target the emotions of anger, disgust, and confusion with the aim of undermining citizens’ trust in (supra-) governmental institutions and the media. This is the first step in a research agenda that can help media practitioners develop interventions and aid policymakers in bolstering societal resilience to hostile disinformation campaigns.
