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General map of Kyrgyzstan, showing the location of provinces, administrative centers, and other features of interest mentioned in the text. A number of small exclaves of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not shown within Batken province due to the small scale of the map.
Source publication
Two U.S. geographers review an array of intertwining political geographic issues that provide context and set the stage for deadly armed conflict between groups of ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the southern Kyrgyzstan city of Osh in June 2010. Applying a disaggregated and localized approach to understanding the ambiguous and complex factors underlyin...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... Uzbek businessman (now outside the country), who was believed to be seeking greater political autonomy for Uzbeks in the south (Boudreaux, 2010b). 5 The hostilities were concentrated primarily in Osh Province, and secondarily in two other provinces (Jalalabad and Batken) bordering Uzbekistan in southern Kyrgyzstan's portion of the Fergana Valley (Fig. 1). These are the provinces with the largest absolute ethnic Uzbek populations, as well as by far the highest Uzbek shares of the total population: 31 percent for Osh, 24 for Jalalabad, and 14 percent for Batken (see Rowland, 2002, pp. 547, 558). Proximity of Kyrgyzstan's ethnic Uzbek citizens to their co-nationals across the country's ...
Context 2
... Feliks Kulov, an erstwhile vice-president, security minister, and prime minister in the Akayev and Bakiyev regimes, is now positioning himself to play a role should the interim government survive the latest round of turmoil. Yet, as the outbreak of interethnic violence in June 2010 has shown, the latest regime change in Kyrgyzstan has been far from smooth, with the interim government in fact losing control of parts of the south and apparently lacking the full allegiance of the military (Levy, 2010c). ...
Context 3
... the Central Asian regimes have varying degrees of authoritarian tendencies, Uzbekistan has been particularly averse to cooperation and often makes unilateral decisions with regional repercussions (e.g., shutting down its borders without warning or explanation, intervention in Tajikistan's civil war; Horsman, 1999, p. 51). This has led observers to identify a certain "virtual cooperation," with regional cooperation organizations' tendency to lack substance-reflecting the regimes' lack of interest in "pooling some elements of their jealously guarded state sovereignty" (Allison, 2008, p. 186). The varying economic paths taken by the new states has also hampered cooperation. ...
Context 4
... Central Asia, "control over scarce water supplies has always been associated with power. Control over water supplies ensures control over irrigation systems, and thus the power of life or death over the mass of the rural population" (Lewis, 2008b, p. 100). Yet water in the region is not distributed or allocated equally among the five former Soviet Central Asian ...
Context 5
... Corruption and official complicity in the drug trade has a direct impact on governance, with traffickers causing state institutions to remain "weak and vulnerable to capture by criminal groups" (Lewis, 2008b, p. 178). Kyrgyzstan is a case in point; it is not clear, however, who has captured whom. ...
Context 6
... Uzbek businessman (now outside the country), who was believed to be seeking greater political autonomy for Uzbeks in the south (Boudreaux, 2010b). 5 The hostilities were concentrated primarily in Osh Province, and secondarily in two other provinces (Jalalabad and Batken) bordering Uzbekistan in southern Kyrgyzstan's portion of the Fergana Valley (Fig. 1). These are the provinces with the largest absolute ethnic Uzbek populations, as well as by far the highest Uzbek shares of the total population: 31 percent for Osh, 24 for Jalalabad, and 14 percent for Batken (see Rowland, 2002, pp. 547, 558). Proximity of Kyrgyzstan's ethnic Uzbek citizens to their co-nationals across the country's ...
Context 7
... Feliks Kulov, an erstwhile vice-president, security minister, and prime minister in the Akayev and Bakiyev regimes, is now positioning himself to play a role should the interim government survive the latest round of turmoil. Yet, as the outbreak of interethnic violence in June 2010 has shown, the latest regime change in Kyrgyzstan has been far from smooth, with the interim government in fact losing control of parts of the south and apparently lacking the full allegiance of the military (Levy, 2010c). ...
Context 8
... the Central Asian regimes have varying degrees of authoritarian tendencies, Uzbekistan has been particularly averse to cooperation and often makes unilateral decisions with regional repercussions (e.g., shutting down its borders without warning or explana- tion, intervention in Tajikistan's civil war; Horsman, 1999, p. 51). This has led observers to identify a certain "virtual cooperation," with regional cooperation organizations' tendency to lack substance-reflecting the regimes' lack of interest in "pooling some elements of their jealously guarded state sovereignty" (Allison, 2008, p. 186). The varying economic paths taken by the new states has also hampered cooperation. ...
Context 9
... Central Asia, "control over scarce water supplies has always been associated with power. Control over water supplies ensures control over irrigation systems, and thus the power of life or death over the mass of the rural population" (Lewis, 2008b, p. 100). Yet water in the region is not distributed or allocated equally among the five former Soviet Central Asian ...
Context 10
... Corruption and official complicity in the drug trade has a direct impact on governance, with traffickers causing state institutions to remain "weak and vulnerable to capture by criminal groups" (Lewis, 2008b, p. 178). Kyrgyzstan is a case in point; it is not clear, however, who has captured whom. ...
Citations
... About the 4.4% (8150 km 2 ) of the country is covered by lakes and reservoirs, with a total of 6800 km 2 of lakes, 21.5 km 3 of dam capacity Fig. 1. Map of Kyrgyzstan with study area indicated (adapted from Bond and Koch, 2010). and total renewable water resources estimated at 23 km 3 /year (Alpiev et al., 2013). ...
... In contrast, other members of CIS, particularly the Central Asian countries, faced challenges in effectively integrating with their neighboring countries due to political instability, ethnic and regional conflicts, and security risks. Examples of such conflicts include the Tajik civil war, ethnic unrest in Kyrgyzstan, popular uprisings in Uzbekistan, and revolutions in Kyrgyzstan (Bond & Koch, 2010). These conflicts and political instability have significantly affected the economy and hindered economic integration. ...
... The perpetrators of violent attacks were prosecuted. Since the 1990 episode of violence, communities with a high percentage of Uzbeks have been potential conflict areas, and disputes over land and water distribution are increasingly reported to have an ethnic dimension [13,[16][17][18]. ...
How does ethnic inequality shape victimization in violent conflicts? Our case study of the 2010 conflict in Kyrgyzstan tests whether communities with higher ethnic inequalities in education experienced more intense displacement. We find that local inequality in education between Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic majority and its largest minority robustly predicts patterns of forced displacement, controlling for alternative approaches like ethnic spatial segregation or polarization. By decomposing inequality, we observe that local educational advantage towards the other ethnic group is associated with a lower likelihood of displacement. Ethnic Uzbeks with low education levels relative to Kyrgyz in their area have the highest displacement rate.
... Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, underwent its third revolution in 15 years, with protests in late 2020 resulting in an annulled election and "President-assumed" Sadyr Japarov taking leadership of the country (confirmed in new elections in January 2021). While Japarov is staunchly pro-Russian in his dealings, his turn towards consolidating power in the hands of the Presidency echoes moves of Kurmanbek Bakiyev after the 2005 Tulip Revolution (Bakiyev being deposed after a bloody series of protests in 2010); in any event, Kyrgyzstan remains poised for more political instability, as the underlying issues behind 2005, 2010, and 2020 (mainly the tension between Kyrgyzstan's urban north and agricultural south) continue to fester (Bond & Koch, 2010;Ryabkov, 2008). ...
The process of authoritarian regionalism, where illiberal or similarly restrictive governments undertake a process of economic integration amongst each other, has emerged in the past two decades as a rival to existing liberal multilateral organisations. Emblematic of this approach is the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a grouping of post-Soviet states which has borrowed heavily from the experience of the EU but has set itself up as an alternative form of regionalism. Using the concept of institutional resilience, this article shows how the EaEU has been buffeted by three major shocks that have reduced its attractiveness as a viable development alternative to the West. Crises of economic integration, regional security, and, above all, of domestic stability have exposed the reality that the EaEU may be highly susceptible to shocks and, as a result, is less attractive as an alternative developmental model.
... Faranda and Nolle's (2003) research has revealed that the ethnic social distance between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks is wider than that of the Kyrgyz and Russians. This happened because Kyrgyz-Uzbek contradictions are multifaceted and are (among other reasons) based on territorial factors (Megoran 2013), economic and demographic horizontal inequalities (Commercio 2017), and regional clan competitions (Bond and Koch 2010;Rezvani 2013). All these challenges have forced the ethnic Uzbek minorities to develop their own survival strategies to cope with their unstable and vulnerable position in the country (Fumagalli 2005(Fumagalli , 2007Ismailbekova 2013Ismailbekova , 2019. ...
The article examines the small group of Dungan people in Osh, South Kyrgyzstan, who used their ethnic identity as a strategy to maximize their chances of survival by orienting themselves towards different available dominant groups (Uzbeks and Kyrgyz) at different points in time, in contrast to similar Dungan groups in other places. Unlike existing research that suggests that ethnic switching derives from an individual’s need, this study conceptualizes the notion of ethnicity as a collective choice through a conceptual framework combining the relational theory of ethnic identity based on a psychological approach and its key concepts such as accessibility, fit, variation and flexibility.
... Thirdly, the social structure in the region causes political corruption: nepotism and dominance of clans are widespread throughout the region (Aslam, 2011;Berdikeeva, 2006;Bond & Koch, 2010;Bowser, 2001;Karymshakov & Abdykaparov, 2008). ...
In recent years, one of the major problems that Kyrgyzstan witnesses is rising Sinophobia among the local people due to problems related with increasing Chinese economic presence in the country. While Sinophobia surfaces as anti-Chinese public demonstrations and violent assaults against Chinese citizens residing in Kyrgyzstan, political corruption scandals around China’s economic activities shape perceptions of the Kyrgyz people negatively toward their government officials and Chinese companies operating in Kyrgyzstan. This thesis explores political corruption in Kyrgyzstan and reasons of Sinophobia among the Kyrgyz people specifically referring to the impact of political corruption in anti-Chinese public demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan.
Keywords: Sinophobia, Political Corruption, Kyrgyzstan, China, Central Asia
... The tapestry of ethnic diversity includes other groups. In the latest census, conducted in 2009, 71% of the Kyrgyz population identified themselves as Kyrgyz, 14% as Uzbek, 8% as Russian and 7% as members of other ethnic groups. 2 Importantly, although the titular group is by far the largest, many Kyrgyz are fluent in Russian and, especially in urban areas, continue to use it in daily communication (Bond & Koch 2013). Although immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 Kyrgyz replaced Russian as the state language, the latter regained its status of an official language in the late 1990s (Pavlenko 2008). ...
This study examines the effects of social embeddedness on interest in politics and electoral behaviour using data from a nationally representative survey conducted shortly after the 2011 presidential election in Kyrgyzstan. We find that interest in politics is positively associated with community trust, public sector employment and a sense of national belonging. Controlling for the effects of interest in politics, community trust and public sector employment are also positively associated with voting in this election, whereas evidence on ethno-cultural inclusion is mixed. These findings highlight the role of social embeddedness in political participation in young post-communist democracies.
... The reasons for that should be searched in Kyrgyzstan's social and political structures. The presence of Kyrgyzstan in the Post-Soviet hybrid regime (Mcmann, 2006;Ismailova, Muhametjanova, 2016), anxiety of democratization and ethnic problems (Bond and Koch;Watchtel, 2013;Hanks, 2011) and the use of communication devices and social media in social movements provide differentiation in terms of secrecy (Srinivasan, 2009;Kulikova, Perlmutter, 2007). ...
In this study, an effort will be made to show how social network users manage the issue of personal secrecy and privacy, how they view the matter of others’ personal secrecy and privacy, and especially the issue of one’s privacy being learned by someone else with the help of social networks in the digitalizing society. In the study, a survey was used as the data collection tool based on the quantitative approach. Survey questions consisted of the measures of individuals’ social networking behaviors and attitudes, the demographics category, and the level of privacy and secrecy scale. The data obtained from participating university students in Kyrgyzstan and Turkey were analyzed statistically. Accordingly, the biggest sources of anxiety for students on the Internet were viruses, identity theft and hackers. Females’ level of anxiety and concern in social media was higher than that of male students. Turkish students were observed to pay more respect for personal information, legal privacy and security of Internet sites on social media platforms than Kyrgyz students. In terms of privacy behavior, Turkish students were found to be more open than Kyrgyz students. On the other hand, Kyrgyz students tended to hide their true identity more in social media.
... The reasons for that should be searched in Kyrgyzstan's social and political structures. The presence of Kyrgyzstan in the Post-Soviet hybrid regime (Mcmann, 2006;Ismailova, Muhametjanova, 2016), anxiety of democratization and ethnic problems (Bond and Koch;Watchtel, 2013;Hanks, 2011) and the use of communication devices and social media in social movements provide differentiation in terms of secrecy (Srinivasan, 2009;Kulikova, Perlmutter, 2007). ...
In this study, an effort will be made to show how social network users manage the issue of personal secrecy and privacy, how they view the matter of others' personal secrecy and privacy, and especially the issue of one's privacy being learned by someone else with the help of social networks in the digitalizing society. In the study, a survey was used as the data collection tool based on the quantitative approach. Survey questions consisted of the measures of individuals' social networking behaviors and attitudes, the demographics category, and the level of privacy and secrecy scale. The data obtained from participating university students in Kyrgyzstan and Turkey were analyzed statistically. Accordingly, the biggest sources of anxiety for students on the Internet were viruses, identity theft and hackers. Females' level of anxiety and concern in social media was higher than that of male students. Turkish students were observed to pay more respect for personal information, legal privacy and security of Internet sites on social media platforms than Kyrgyz students. In terms of privacy behavior, Turkish students were found to be more open than Kyrgyz students. On the other hand, Kyrgyz students tended to hide their true identity more in social media. •
... 3. Space constraints do not permit a full discussion here of these events, but for more on the Tulip Revolution, see especially the special issue edited by Sally Cummings in this journal (Cummings 2008). On the 2010 events, see especially Bond and Koch (2010) and Megoran (2013). 4. For Kazakhstan, these were collected from archives of the Akorda Presidential website and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as news articles published on BNews.kz, ...
Across Eurasia, authoritarian leaders have sought to justify their 'strong-hand' approach to government by framing instability as a security threat and the strong state as a guarantor of political stability. Such 'regimes of certainty' promote a modernist valorization of order, the flip side of which is a demonization of political disorder instability, or mere uncertainty. Examining the spatial and temporal imaginaries underpinning such narratives about in/stability in Central Asia, this paper compares official discourse in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where state-controlled media and official publications have stigmatized political instability in Kyrgyzstan as indicative of the dangers of political liberalization and a weak state. Ostensibly about the 'other', these narratives are also about scripting the 'self'. I argue that official interpretations of 'disorder over the border' in Kyrgyzstan are underpinned by a set of spatial and temporal imaginaries that do not merely reflect regional moral geographies, but actively construct them.
