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![Four types of classical social networks. For the parameters 0.5, 8 N σ ρ = = = , we assume these values by following Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) [12]. In addition, since σ measures the importance of leisure relative to consumption in the utility,](publication/327563644/figure/fig1/AS:669477465243648@1536627274015/Four-types-of-classical-social-networks-For-the-parameters-05-8-N-s-r-we.jpg)
Four types of classical social networks. For the parameters 0.5, 8 N σ ρ = = = , we assume these values by following Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) [12]. In addition, since σ measures the importance of leisure relative to consumption in the utility,
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It is well-documented that individuals care about how others around them are doing. This paper studies a production economy in which consumers provide labor supply to a representative firm to earn income for consumption, and their utility depends on their own leisure time, their own consumption level, as well as their neighbors’ consumption levels....
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... four network structures are described in Figure 1, where in the empty network every consumer is isolated from others (without any neighbor), in the ring network every consumer is connected to two other consumers, in the star network seven consumers (2 8 . Since α lies in (0,1) , the benchmark case we consider is to set α at the middle point of the (0,1) interval, that is 0.5 α = . ...
Citations
... However, as the figures show, variation in the QRE parameter alone may not fully explain our results. A number of previous experiments have shown that behavior can be influenced by social preference [30][31][32][33][34][35][36]. We have successfully found the appropriate social preference parameter α from the framework of [14] which can match the data. ...
The asymmetric matching pennies contradiction posits that contrary to the prediction of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, experimental subjects’ choices are, in practice, based heavily on the magnitudes of their own payoffs. Own-payoff effects are robustly confirmed in the literature. Closely following the experimental setups in the literature which support the contradiction, we conduct a series of asymmetric matching pennies games in China, hypothesizing play which is closer to equilibrium frequencies than previously found. Contrary to previous experiments which were conducted in the United States, we find that there are essentially no own-payoff effects among Row players who face large payoff asymmetry. In a Quantal Response Equilibrium framework allowing for altruism or spite, the behavior of our subjects corresponded to a positive spite parameter, whereas the results of previous studies corresponded to altruism. Our results may be consistent with recent psychology literature that finds people from collectivist cultures are substantially more adept at taking the perspective of others compared with people from individualist cultures, a feature of the reasoning needed to obtain mixed-strategy equilibrium.
... In this sense, our model is also related to the gain-loss utility proposed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) [10] which appends a Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 [11] ) style loss aversion utility term to the standard consumption utility. 1 Our model differs from theirs in that the gain-loss term is embedded in the consumption term for the good in question, and maintains a symmetric valuations of losses and gains relative to the other countrys consumption which serves as the reference point. Our preference specification follows Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) [15] , Alexeev and Chih (2015) [16] , Immorlica, Kranton, Manea, and Stoddard (2017) [17] and Feng, Lien and Zheng (2018) [18] , which is a commonly used functional form in the network and social comparison literature. Finally, we note that our paper utilizes a behavioral model which lies at the intersection of the social preference and reference-dependence models, and is thus related to a small but growing behavioral economics literature at this intersection, including Kuziemko, Buell, Reich and Norton (2014) [19] , Schwerter (2015) [20] , and Lien and Zheng (2015b) [21] . ...
... This gap, weighted by parameter λ 1 is added from the actual consumption term for good a. This modeling approach for social comparison borrows exactly from Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) [15] , Alexeev and Chih (2015) [16] , Immorlica, Kranton, Manea, and Stoddard (2017) [17] , and Feng, Lien and Zheng (2018) [18] , and is a widely accepted and tractable approach for modeling such preferences. ...
As consumers in countries around the world become increasingly aware of and sensitive to the products that their foreign counterparts consume, a natural question is what predictions do classic trade frameworks hold when incorporating social comparison‐based preferences? We analyze this question in a general equilibrium framework for a two‐country, two‐good world, in which the gap between domestic and foreign consumption of a product can enter into the representative consumer’s utility function. We consider nine exhaustive social comparison scenarios, which differ based upon the combination and origin of products that consumers of each country hold a social comparison over. We show that Home Comparison preference (social comparison over the home‐produced good) unilaterally brings consumption and welfare benefits to the home country, and global welfare is enhanced when both countries maintain such preferences (Dual Home Comparison). Moreover, Foreign Envy (social comparison over the foreign‐produced good) is disadvantageous to the home country, contributing negatively to welfare when the other country either prefers its own produced good or has no particular social preference. Mutual Foreign Envy however, tends to contribute positively to global welfare. Our analysis helps to explain the social welfare incentives of policy‐makers in promoting cross‐country comparisons of domestic goods among their own consumers, while advocating domestically produced goods as status symbols abroad.
... SNs provide the means of interaction between users and it is well-documented that individuals care about how others around them are doing or behaving [137]. There exist studies that report a production economy in which consumers provide a labor-type supply to a representative firm to earn income for consumption, and their utility depends on their own leisure time, their own consumption level, as well as their relative's consumption levels. ...
Graph theory (GT) concepts are potentially applicable in the field of computer science (CS) for many purposes. The unique applications of GT in the CS field such as clustering of web documents, cryptography, and analyzing an algorithm’s execution, among others, are promising applications. Furthermore, GT concepts can be employed to electronic circuit simplifications and analysis. Recently, graphs have been extensively used in social networks (SNs) for many purposes related to modelling and analysis of the SN structures, SN operation modelling, SN user analysis, and many other related aspects. Considering the widespread applications of GT in SNs, this article comprehensively summarizes GT use in the SNs. The goal of this survey paper is twofold. First, we briefly discuss the potential applications of GT in the CS field along with practical examples. Second, we explain the GT uses in the SNs with sufficient concepts and examples to demonstrate the significance of graphs in SN modeling and analysis.
... In this sense, our model is also related to the gain-loss utility proposed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) [10] which appends a Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 [11] ) style loss aversion utility term to the standard consumption utility. 1 Our model differs from theirs in that the gain-loss term is embedded in the consumption term for the good in question, and maintains a symmetric valuations of losses and gains relative to the other countrys consumption which serves as the reference point. Our preference specification follows Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) [15] , Alexeev and Chih (2015) [16] , Immorlica, Kranton, Manea, and Stoddard (2017) [17] and Feng, Lien and Zheng (2018) [18] , which is a commonly used functional form in the network and social comparison literature. Finally, we note that our paper utilizes a behavioral model which lies at the intersection of the social preference and reference-dependence models, and is thus related to a small but growing behavioral economics literature at this intersection, including Kuziemko, Buell, Reich and Norton (2014) [19] , Schwerter (2015) [20] , and Lien and Zheng (2015b) [21] . ...
... This gap, weighted by parameter λ 1 is added from the actual consumption term for good a. This modeling approach for social comparison borrows exactly from Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) [15] , Alexeev and Chih (2015) [16] , Immorlica, Kranton, Manea, and Stoddard (2017) [17] , and Feng, Lien and Zheng (2018) [18] , and is a widely accepted and tractable approach for modeling such preferences. ...
As consumers in countries around the world become increasingly aware of and sensitive to the products that their foreign counterparts consume, a natural question is what predictions do classic trade frameworks hold when incorporating social comparison-based preferences? We analyze this question in a general equilibrium framework for a two-country, two-good world, in which the gap between domestic and foreign consumption of a product can enter into the representative con-sumer's utility function. We consider nine exhaustive social comparison scenarios, which differ based upon the combination and origin of products that consumers of each country hold a social comparison over. We show that Home Comparison preference (social comparison over the home-produced good) unilaterally brings consumption and welfare benefits to the home country, and global welfare is enhanced when both countries maintain such preferences. On the other hand, Foreign Envy (social comparison over the foreign-produced good) is disadvantageous to the home country, contributing negatively to welfare when the other country either prefers its own produced good or has no particular social preference. Mutual Foreign Envy however, tends to contribute positively to global welfare. Our analysis helps to explain the social welfare incentives of policy-makers in promoting crosscountry comparisons of domestic goods among their own consumers, while advocating domestically-produced goods as status symbols abroad.
A novel field experiment shows that learning activities in pairs with a greater spread in abilities lead to better individual work performance, relative to those in pairs with similar abilities. The positive effect of the former is not limited to their performance in peer learning material, but it also spills over to their performance in other areas. The underlying improvement comes from the increased performance of those whose achievements were weak prior to peer learning. This implies that exogenously determining learning partners with different abilities helps improve productivity through knowledge sharing and potential peer effects.
