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Final structural model, Study 2 development sample (N= 1,342).Note. 23 indicator variables and their measurement error terms are not displayed. (Ten objective knowledge items were parceled into three indicator variables, to reduce the overall number of parameters in the model). Standardized regression coefficients are presented in the figure. *p < .05; **p <.01; ***p < .001.
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Globalization affords greater opportunities to learn about foreign peoples than in the past. What impacts do interpersonal contact, media exposure to and knowledge about China have on the American people's China policy preferences? Two large surveys of U.S. citizens were conducted in the summers of 2008 and 2009 to explore whether knowledge about C...
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Context 1
... six statistically nonsignificant paths were then trimmed. The final structural model, displayed in Figure 2, had slightly better model fit, as can be seen in the sixth line of Table 2. Figure 2 reveals dual paths from direct and indirect contact to China policy preferences. Direct interpersonal contact was again associated with reduced prejudice toward the Chinese people, and had no impact on attitudes toward the Chinese government. ...
Context 2
... six statistically nonsignificant paths were then trimmed. The final structural model, displayed in Figure 2, had slightly better model fit, as can be seen in the sixth line of Table 2. Figure 2 reveals dual paths from direct and indirect contact to China policy preferences. Direct interpersonal contact was again associated with reduced prejudice toward the Chinese people, and had no impact on attitudes toward the Chinese government. ...
Context 3
... similar path via subjective knowledge and attitudes toward the Chinese government was also associated with greater containment scores. Figure 2 also reveals that objective and subjective knowledge were not that strongly related ( = .15), and that subjective knowledge had a greater impact on prejudice reduction than did objective knowledge. ...
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... For example, in their study, perceived threat mediated the association between political ideology and tolerance, but liberals and conservatives had different targets that they found threatening (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014). The link between the perception of out-group threat and tolerance is also influenced by information and knowledge about the threat (Fischer et al., 2011;Gries et al., 2011). For example, the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes among Czech citizens during the European migration crisis can be explained by a lack of knowledge about the topic (Drbohlav & Janurová, 2019). ...
... Scholars often consider the media an important factor in shaping attitudes, being both a source of political information for young people and a means for communication of political events (Sears & Levy, 2003). The precise influence of media can vary, although there is evidence from adult studies that media affect political trust (Memoli, 2020), following referendum campaigns (Gherghina & Bankov, 2020) and intergroup attitudes (Gries et al., 2011). Media are usually considered an important factor that shapes people's attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, mainly through their polarizing effect (Apetroe, 2016;Šlerka &Šisler, 2018). ...
Young people’s authoritarianism is usually associated with lower tolerance toward immigrants. This study tests several alternative pathways through which authoritarianism translates into intolerance. Besides perceived threat from immigration and political alienation, trust in alternative media, which often express anti-immigration sentiments, are considered as potential mediators. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze two-wave longitudinal questionnaire data from Czech adolescents and young adults (aged 15–25; N = 1,346). The results showed that authoritarianism longitudinally predicted perceived threat, which in turn mediated the negative effect of authoritarianism on tolerance. Authoritarianism also predicted higher trust in alternative media, but alternative media trust did not translate into young people’s tolerance. Despite their cross-sectional correlations, no longitudinal effects of authoritarianism on political alienation were found.
... The usual disclaimer applies: Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this manuscript are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of Roper, the Kaiser Family Foundation, the Washington Post, or Social Science Research Solutions/ ICR -International Communications Research. Crowson, and Cai 2011;Miller and Krosnick 2000). 10 There is also some precedent for using policy familiarity as a proxy for media activity: Block and Haynes (2015), Dow (2014), and Kahl (2009) employed similar approaches in their research on Michelle Obama's use of Mom-In-Chief rhetoric in her public appeals to cultivate support for Let's Move. ...
Because of the national conversation about her status as a role model, the former First Lady of the United States (FLOTUS) presents an opportunity to analyze an Obama effect—particularly, the idea that Michelle Obama's prominence as a political figure can influence, among other things, citizens’ impressions of black women in America. Using evidence from the 2011 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/ Washington Post survey, we demonstrate that Michelle Obama's status as a role model operates as a “moderated mediator”: it transmits the effect of the former FLOTUS’ media activities to respondents’ racial attitudes, and the degree to which role model status functions as a mediating variable differs by race (and, to a lesser degree, by gender). Thus, our research provides both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the Obama-effect literature.
... For the first mediator, prejudice decreases as the individual has knowledge of other groups (Allan & Johnson, 2008;Stephan & Stephan, 1984). However, the mediation effect of this knowledge tends to be weak compared to the other two mediators (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008) and unreliable (Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 2011). Meanwhile, anxiety (Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007;Blair, Park, & Bachelor, 2003) and empathy towards outside members of the group (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011;Batson et al., 1997) can be considered consistent mediators. ...
As one of the most established theories, the contact hypothesis has been well-researched throughout decades of investigations. However, there have been few attempts to investigate individual factors that may influence interaction processes that may lower prejudice. The present study attempts to find the individual factors that can moderate the contact – prejudice effect, that is, individual moral values. Previous researches have noted that individuals with high moral loyalty, authority, and sanctity may resist interacting with outgroups. Consequently, these individuals may possess higher prejudice. Thus, we hypothesize that individuals with higher levels of those three moral values may experience the contact effect more profoundly, in which there is stronger contact – prejudice effect. 594 Moslem participants participated in the online survey we administered. We found that moral authority and purity can moderate the contact – prejudice effect, consistent with our hypotheses. These patterns were found only for the contact – subtle prejudice effect. However, moral loyalty cannot moderate this effect. We discuss the implications by examining the Indonesian current sociopolitical conditions and how the three moral values influence the dynamics of intergroup contact.
... For the first mediator, prejudice decreases as the individual has knowledge of other groups (Allan & Johnson, 2008;Stephan & Stephan, 1984). However, the mediation effect of this knowledge tends to be weak compared to the other two mediators (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008) and unreliable (Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 2011). Meanwhile, anxiety (Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007;Blair, Park, & Bachelor, 2003) and empathy towards outside members of the group (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011;Batson et al., 1997) can be considered consistent mediators. ...
As one of the most established theories, the contact hypothesis has been well-researched throughout decades of investigations. However, there have been few attempts to investigate individual factors that may influence interaction processes that may lower prejudice. The present study attempts to find the individual factors that can moderate the contact – prejudice effect, that is, individual moral values. Previous researches have noted that individuals with high moral loyalty, authority, and sanctity may resist interacting with outgroups. Consequently, these individuals may possess higher prejudice. Thus, we hypothesize that individuals with higher levels of those three moral values may experience the contact effect more profoundly, in which there is stronger contact – prejudice effect. 594 Moslem participants participated in the online survey we administered. We found that moral authority and purity can moderate the contact – prejudice effect, consistent with our hypotheses. These patterns were found only for the contact – subtle prejudice effect. However, moral loyalty cannot moderate this effect. We discuss the implications by examining the Indonesian current sociopolitical conditions and how the three moral values influence the dynamics of intergroup contact.
... Our manipulation of a multicultural experience may resemble a form of media exposure more than actual interactions with diverse cultures in a foreign land. Media exposes us to foreign cultures all the time, but prejudice still persists (indeed, greater media exposure may sometimes increase negative outgroup attitudes; Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 2011). One possibility is that our operationalization of multicultural exposure was relatively neutral or nonthreatening, compared to media portrayals of foreign cultures to which most people are exposed. ...
Across two studies we test the prediction that multicultural experiences reduce
intercultural prejudice by increasing Openness to Experience. In
Study 1, frequency of self-reported multicultural experiences was associated
with greater openness and less ethnic prejudice, and openness explained the
relationship between multicultural experiences and ethnic prejudice. In
Study 2, we experimentally manipulated a multicultural experience. Compared
to those in a control condition, participants exposed to the cultural
members and elements of foreign cultures reported being higher in Openness
to Experience and expressed less prejudice toward these cultural groups.
There was also some evidence that multicultural exposure, through openness,
caused secondary transfer effects in prejudice reduction. Our findings
suggest that exposure to multicultural environments can improve intercultural
attitudes by personality shifts to Openness to Experience.
... Preexisting perception about a different culture sets expectations and guides our intercultural communication with people from that culture. While traditional stereotype research focuses on relationships between different racial or ethnic groups within a culture, more and more recent studies have examined people's perception of other national groups (e.g., Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 2011;Zhang, 2010). The current study employs focus group to elicit discussion about national stereotypes of Chinese people and U.S. Americans. ...
This paper employs a focus group approach to examine stereotypical perceptions of Chinese and U.S. Americans from each other's perspective. Eight focus groups were conducted involving 34 undergraduate participants from two universities in the U.S. and China. Group discussions were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for emerging themes. Results showed that there were converging and diverging perceptions between Americans and Chinese. Specifically, both Americans and Chinese perceived Americans to be individualistic and independent, and Chinese to be family oriented and collectivistic. However, Americans and Chinese differed in the extent to which Americans are perceived as social and Chinese as quiet. Sources of people's stereotypical perception were also explored. Theoretical and practical implications of the study were discussed.
... Individuals who have any tertiary qualification are more likely to view China as a military threat, even though they are less threatened economically by China. This finding is consistent with earlier research by Gries et al (2011) who demonstrated that although greater knowledge of China was associated with less prejudice toward the Chinese people, it was also positively correlated with greater negativity toward the Chinese government. This may be due to the fact that highly educated individuals, those that hold tertiary level qualifications, will have more exposure to information and arguments regarding the potential geopolitical and international security implications of China's economic rise and expansionist intentions in the South and East China Seas. ...
... This suggests that holding cosmopolitan values does not equate to support for regime type. Indeed as Gries et al. (2011) found in their study of American perceptions of China, individuals hold much more positive feelings toward the Chinese people than they do toward its government. ...
Will China’s rise be peaceful? One of the key reasons for an optimistic outlook is the extensive economic ties which exist
between China and its neighbors. According to a venerable strand of thought among policymakers and scholars alike, trading
ties ought to foster bonds of amity among nations and thus reduce the chances of war. Here, we test this proposition using
spatial economic data and survey research on opinion toward China as a security threat in Australia. The structure of Australia’s
economy, its reliance on exports to China, and the concentration of these exports in a small number of sectors make it an
ideal venue for such a test. Consistent with previous literature on public opinion and globalization, but in contrast to an
individual interests based account of the trade–peace relationship, we find that outgroup hostility, not economic interdependence,
is the key factor in shaping voters’ fears of a Chinese security threat.
... In the context of international relations, a recent study showed that subliminal presentations of images of American pop culture to the Chinese generate pro-US attitudes only among those with relatively weak identification with China [50 ]. Increased coverage of Chinese news in the US deepens Americans' understanding of China, which in turn increases their liking for the Chinese but lowers Americans' evaluations of the Chinese state [51,52]. ...
... Such heuristic devices, social psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2011, 97) has argued, help us "generate intuitive opinions on complex matters." This helps explain how Main Street Americans, in the absence of much knowledge about China, can nonetheless form consistent-if consistently different-opinions about it (see also Gries, Crowson, and Cai 2011;Gries 2014, 129-131). Figure 3 reveals that all four of the dimensions of US ideology that we measured shaped China policy preferences-and in the same direction. ...
Based on a 2011 national survey, I argue that while US conservatives feel somewhat cooler toward the East Asian democracies than US liberals do, they feel much cooler toward China. Greater average conservative
than liberal prejudice lingers, cooling attitudes toward the “Yellow Peril” of all Asian countries, but communism is a larger source of ideological differences over China. For cultural, social, economic, and political reasons, conservatives feel substantially cooler than liberals toward both communist countries in general and “Red China” in particular. I conclude by suggesting that with gerrymandering and ongoing ideological sorting, these ideological differences over China on Main Street may come to play a greater role in the making of US China policy.
... Social media, either traditional or online, could have significant impacts on people's attitudes' toward foreign countries. A recent study (Gries, Crowson, & Cai, 2011) showed that Americans with more interpersonal contact and knowledge about China have less prejudice toward the Chinese people, and attitude toward the Chinese people is a stronger predictor of foreign policy preference than is the attitude toward the Chinese government. Exposure to media news coverage of China has a mixed impact on policy preference. ...
