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Prepared for presentation at the 2006 Annual Meetings of the Southern Political ScienceAssociation. Atlanta, GA, January 5-7, 2006.
Citations
... Partisan influence was even present in early communications regarding emerging treatments for COVID-19 infections (Brunell and Maxwell 2020). There is a large body of work connecting individually-held political ideologies with their policy preferences (Converse 1964;Jacoby and Sniderman 2006;Zaller 1992) but the strength with which one holds such ideologies or partisan preferences matter. Culturally oriented beliefs appear to be related but distinct drivers of policy preferences among the public (Jackson 2015). ...
The Health Belief Model (HBM), a value-expectancy model, is a leading framework in health behavior and communication research. The model is intended to inform targeted communication strategies that promote positive health behaviors (Carpenter 2010). Individual beliefs associated with health risks such as perceived susceptibility and perceived severity are often incorporated into HBM as predictors of health behavior. However, recent studies point to limitations of the current model (Glanz, Rimer, and Viswanath 2008; Jones et al. 2015). At the same time, researchers have successfully used Cultural Theory (CT) to conceptualize, measure, and predict the cultural influences on health risk management (Tansey and O'riordan 1999). This study examines the relationship between HBM beliefs, more intrinsic value-based beliefs, and other theoretically relevant variables such as demographics and political party identification to understand behavioral intentions associated with COVID-19 among the general public in the United States.
... Values are "the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 1) and to "define what is 'good' and 'bad' in the world" (Jacoby, 2006, p. 706). Values are more general or abstract, and more stable, than particular policy or issue attitudes (Feldman, 2003, p. 479), and they can be ordered by importance (Schwartz, 1992, p. 4), yielding value rankings and value structures (Jacoby, 2006, p. 707; see also Jacoby & Sniderman, 2006). To the extent that worldviews incorporate values and avoid particular policy or issue attitudes, they may be expected to perform similarly to values. ...
Cultural theory (CT) developed from grid/group analysis, which posits that different patterns of social relations—hierarchist, individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist—produce compatible cultural biases influencing assessment of which hazards pose high or low risk and how to manage them. Introduced to risk analysis (RA) in 1982 by Douglas and Wildavsky's Risk and Culture, this institutional approach to social construction of risk surprised a field hitherto focused on psychological influences on risk perceptions and behavior. We explain what CT is and how it developed; describe and evaluate its contributions to the study of risk perception and management, and its prescriptions for risk assessment and management; and identify opportunities and resources to develop its contributions to RA. We suggest how the diverse, fruitful, but scattered efforts to develop CT both inside and outside the formal discipline of RA (as exemplified by the Society for Risk Analysis) might be leveraged for greater theoretical, methodological, and applied progress in the field.
... Political values are a significant motivation for political behavior and consequently are central to various research programs in political science and public opinion research (e.g., Elazar 1994;Ellis and Thompson 1997;Feldman 2003;Feldman and Johnston 2014;Feldman and Huddy 2014;Gastil et al. 2011;Goren 2005, Goren et al. 2009Graham, Haidt, Nosek 2009;Graham et al. 2011;Haidt and Joseph 2007;Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006;Inglehart 1990Inglehart , 2006Jackson 2014;Jacoby 2006Jacoby , 2014Jacoby and Sniderman 2006;Kahan 2012;Ripberger et al. 2011Ripberger et al. , 2012Ripberger et al. , 2014Schwartz 1992Schwartz , 2006Schwartz et al. 2012). But efforts to compare any two such research programs are rare (exceptions include Graham et al. 2011;Selle 1997, 1999). ...
... The procedure for obtaining rank-ordered value choices was first used in a political science context by Jacoby and Sniderman (2006). During the internet survey, the CCES respondents were presented with a screen showing the following statement: ...
This article examines the “culture war” hypothesis by focusing on American citizens’ choices among a set of core values. A geometric model is developed to represent differences in the ways that individuals rank-order seven important values: freedom, equality, economic security, social order, morality, individualism, and patriotism. The model is fitted to data on value choices from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The empirical results show that there is an enormous amount of heterogeneity among individual value choices; the model estimates contradict any notion that there is a consensus on fundamental principles within the mass public. Further, the differences break down along political lines, providing strong evidence that there is a culture war generating fundamental divisions within twenty-first century American society.
... Participants do not have to own a computer or have Internet access to be included in the panel-they are given the necessary equipment and instructed in its use once they agree to become members of the panel. Such panels have been used successfully in a number of studies in the areas of health and medicine, political and social sciences, and economics and public policy (Baker, Wagner, Singer, & Bundorf, 2003;Jacoby & Sniderman, 2006;Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischoff, 2003;Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006;Schlenger et al., 2002). Methodological studies have shown that data from such panels are comparable to the results obtained through traditional probabilistic sampling methods (Chang & Krosnick, 2009). ...
Doctors have been increasingly encouraged to involve patients in decision making rather than pursuing the paternalistic model in which they make the decisions for their patients. But do patients want to participate in making decisions about their health? Is there a relationship between their preferences for shared decision making and numeracy skills? Are those preferences different in countries with different medical systems, and for different age groups? Extant studies cannot answer these questions because most are based on nonprobabilistic, highly selective patient samples that prevent generalizations to a broader population.
In a survey on probabilistic national samples in the United States and Germany, we interviewed participants with low numeracy skills (Germany: n = 127, mean numeracy = 37; United States: n = 117, mean numeracy = 36) and high numeracy skills (Germany: n = 133, mean numeracy = 96; U.S.: n = 121, mean numeracy = 91).
Usual and preferred role in medical decision making.
A significant number of people with low numeracy in both the United States (35%, SE = 8.2) and Germany (30%, SE = 6.1) preferred to be more passive than they currently were. High-numeracy people, in contrast, were mostly satisfied with their current role. On average, Americans were more active than Germans. Middle-aged participants preferred to be more active compared to both younger and older ones.
Shared decision-making preferences are related to numeracy skills, country, and age. Education efforts to increase numeracy, as well as using nonquantitative communication formats, may foster involvement of low-numeracy patients in decisions about their health.
... Still others propose that differing support for the political values of liberty and equality (Rokeach, 1973) or equality and order (Janda et al., 2002) define dimensions generating four ideological types. Finally, there are political scientists who, rather than focusing on ideological multidimensionality, study the relationship between value structures, including different rankings of liberty, equality, and order, and left-right, liberal-conservative ideology (see, e.g., Jacoby, 2002Jacoby, , 2006aJacoby, , 2006bJacoby & Sniderman, 2006). Many other political scientists have studied the relationship between political values taken one at a time and political attitudes and/or unidimensional ideology (see Feldman, 1988Feldman, , 2003Goren, 2005;Jacoby, 2006a, for reviews and citations). ...
... None investigate the relationship between value structure and political attitudes varying in two dimensions. Some show that values vary in two or more dimensions (Boaz & Kirby, 2006;Jacoby & Sniderman, 2006;Rokeach, 1973;Schwartz, 1992), others that political attitudes vary in two or more dimensions (Boaz & Kirby, 2006;Chong et al., 1983;Layman & Carsey, 2002;Maddox & Lilie, 1984;McClosky & Zaller, 1984), and still others that differences in value structure are related to liberalism and conservatism (see, e.g., Jacoby, 2002Jacoby, , 2006aJacoby, , 2006bJacoby & Sniderman 2006), but none investigate the relationships between value structure and attitudinal structure in two or more dimensions. This is what we will do here. ...
... None investigate the relationship between value structure and political attitudes varying in two dimensions. Some show that values vary in two or more dimensions (Boaz & Kirby, 2006;Jacoby & Sniderman, 2006;Rokeach, 1973;Schwartz, 1992), others that political attitudes vary in two or more dimensions (Boaz & Kirby, 2006;Chong et al., 1983;Layman & Carsey, 2002;Maddox & Lilie, 1984;McClosky & Zaller, 1984), and still others that differences in value structure are related to liberalism and conservatism (see, e.g., Jacoby, 2002Jacoby, , 2006aJacoby, , 2006bJacoby & Sniderman 2006), but none investigate the relationships between value structure and attitudinal structure in two or more dimensions. This is what we will do here. ...
In this study, we investigate four attitudinal structures (including liberal, conservative, and libertarian configurations) associated with two ideological dimensions among American voters and demonstrate that these attitudinal structures are related in expected ways to differential preferences for the values of freedom, order, and equality/caring. Liberals are inclined to trade freedom for equality/caring but not for order, whereas conservatives are their opposites—willing to trade freedom for order but not for equality/caring. In contrast, libertarians are generally less willing than others to trade freedom for either order or equality/caring (although they probably prefer order to equality/caring). The fourth ideological type is more willing than the others to relinquish freedom, preferring both order and equality/caring. Depending on how our results are interpreted, this fourth type may be characterized as either communitarian or humanitarian. These findings help close the gap between unidimensional conceptions and multidimensional evidence of ideological organization in political attitudes by demonstrating that value structure and attitudinal structure are strongly related in two ideological dimensions.
Political ideology has been a confusing topic for social analysts, and those who attempted to eschew judgmental reductions of others' conceptions and develop a non-polemical political psychology found ideology behaving in ways that defeated their theories of political reasoning. I argue that political ideology can best be understood as actors' theorization of their own position, and available strategies, in a political field.
Individual preferences among core values are widely believed to be an important determinant of political attitudes. However, several theoretical perspectives suggest that people experience difficulties making choices among values. This article uses data from the 1994 Multi-Investigator Study to test for hierarchical structure in citizens' value preferences. The empirical results show that most people make transitive choices among values and that their value preferences have an impact on subsequent issue attitudes. To the extent that citizens exhibit intransitive value choices and/or apparent difficulties in the “translation process” from value preferences to issue attitudes, it is due more to low levels of political sophistication than to the existence of value conflict.
