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This article explores the relevance of the Chinese experience of a
socialist market economy (SME) to the idea and viability of market socialism
(MS). It starts by reviewing the defining characteristics of MS as well
as the key policy challenges in the transition from state socialism to market
socialism and the debates around them. This is followed...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... explains why the Chinese stock market is sometimes described as a zhengce shi (¬Fµ¦¥«, literally policy-led market). Indeed, the market expanded enormously in the late 1990s (see table 1 and figure 1). Particularly in 2000, the year in which the three-year campaign reached its climax, the value of the Chinese stock market rose by some 45 percent, topping the global league table of stock markets. ...
Context 2
... the stock market made a rapid recovery, its future is by no means assured. The fact that only 33.8 billion yuan was raised in the domestic market in 2005, or 18.0 percent of the total (see table 1), is indicative of the depth of the problem. ...
Context 3
... the stock market has generated large sums of equity capital for SOEs, which is inherently less constraining than debts. If funds raised through overseas offering and listings are included, Chinese enterprises had raised a total of 1,352.526 billion yuan (or US$165.979 billion) by the end of 2005 (see table 1). In the peak year 2000 alone, stock market listing raised 210.3 billion yuan. ...
Citations
... Moreover, such focus towards industrial and business policies tends to marginalise the derivative socioeconomic cost incurred by the public and its effects on the living. Interestingly, recent scholarly work on China's adaptation of the capitalist model shows the combination of both models because of the identification of challenges brought about by State-led development initiatives (see Zhang 2006Zhang , 2013 leading to the coining of the term State Entrepreneurialism, a model where the State not only leads and regulates development practices but also functions similarly to an entrepreneur (see Wu, 2023;Yi et al, 2023). ...
This chapter aims to revisit some of the foundational questions that help create the domains often treated in exclusion or in silos, particularly those involving public, industrial, and economic policies, and proposed a new framework of which how the three could be integrated and synchronized by using experiences from the Brunei halal industry as a case study. This chapter is timely as the food industry is seen as one of the five main sectors aimed at diversifying the Bruneian economy and development envisioned in the Brunei Vision 2035, in tandem with some of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The study is based on the experiences of Brunei's food industry players. Adapting it to the principles of Islamic governance not only puts into context the logic of why such an integrated halal policy is crucial for the alleviation of poverty (SDG1) and the development of sustainable cities and communities (SDG 8) alike but also answers the calls towards responsible production and consumption (SDG 12) whilst supporting the decent work and economic growth promotion (SDG 11).
... Moreover, such focus towards industrial and business policies tends to marginalise the derivative socioeconomic cost incurred by the public and its effects on the living. Interestingly, recent scholarly work on China's adaptation of the capitalist model shows the combination of both models because of the identification of challenges brought about by State-led development initiatives (see Zhang 2006Zhang , 2013 leading to the coining of the term State Entrepreneurialism, a model where the State not only leads and regulates development practices but also functions similarly to an entrepreneur (see Wu, 2023;Yi et al, 2023). ...
This chapter aims to revisit some of the foundational questions that help create the policy domains often treated in exclusion or in silos, particularly those involving public, industrial, and economic policies and proposed a new framework of which how the three could be integrated and synchronized by using experiences from the Brunei halal industry as a case study. This chapter is timely as the food industry is seen as one of the five main sectors aimed at diversifying the Bruneian economy. Its development is also seen as a way of achieving the ideals stated under the Brunei Vision 2035 which ran in tandem with some of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Based on the research carried out on Brunei's food industry, and their interlinkages with government institutions and regional food producers alike, the proposed framework is established to further consolidate Brunei's position towards the achievement of the SDGs. Adapting it to the principles of Islamic Governance, not only puts into context the logic of why such an integrated halal policy is crucial for the alleviation of poverty (SDG1) and the development of sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11) alike but also answers the calls towards responsible production and consumption (SDG 12) whilst supporting the decent work and economic growth promotion (SDG 8).
... In 1984, the state announced the name change: the former "commune and brigade enterprises" became TVEs (Fan et al. 1996). In the 1990s, China changed its economic system from central planning to a market-oriented economy under the banner "socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics" (Zhang 2006). With the deepening of marketization, TVEs played an important role in the rapid growth of China's economy. ...
Since the economic reforms of the 1970s, local Chinese urban authorities have requisitioned rural land near cities. To protect their land from these practices, many urban village collectives have established a cooperative shareholding system, but their motives remain unclear. Neoclassical economics suggests that such enterprises seek to maximize profits. Guided by the original institutional‐economics approach, I investigate this question empirically by interviewing residents of Mengke village in Chaoyang city, Liaoning Province, northeast China. These data reveal four startling findings about the motives behind the shareholding system. First, collective economic organizations do not simply seek the maximization of profit. Second, the shareholding cooperative system adopted by village collectives helps villagers resist external threats such as land loss. Third, the collective economic organization is not merely a firm or a single market; it may work as a firm and a market simultaneously. Finally, managing of common property contributes to maintaining the identity of the collective. These findings suggest that the theories of neoclassical urban economics and new institutional economics fundamentally mischaracterize urban cooperatives.
... In China, what is usually called 'privatization' in the Western sense can better be described as 'marketization'. There has been widespread experimentation with markets in China, but public ownership retains its dominant role (Zhang, 2006). So, it is marketization process instead of privatization per se, which help to explain how the village collectives develop their 'property mind'. ...
Urban village collectives, as one of the stakeholders of land requisition and development in urbanized China, have gradually been driven into real estate development. This transformation has raised an important question regarding how villagers develop their ‘property mind’. From 2015 to 2017, guided by an abductive institutional economics approach, which holds both original and new institutional economics in dialogue, we addressed this question by conducting fieldwork in Xiaojia village, Northeast China. In Northeast China, unlike in the southern cities, there was no foreign investment and the population was in decline. Nevertheless, the villagers developed housing, first for their own use and then for the market. The resulting evidence indicates the following: 1) property rights are social relations and constructed socially and institutionally; 2) markets are not independent, they are conditioned by the institutional context.
... This article attempts to work in the interface between the literature of the firm-regional relational nexus and the thesis of the developmental state by analysing the restructuring process of SOEs in a transitional socialist economy such as China. Statistically, while SOEs in China have since the economic reforms experienced a continuing decline in terms of their relative shares in 564 Fox Z. Y. Hu and George C. S. Lin industrial output generation, regional employment provision and government revenue contribution, they remain a major force in the Chinese industrial economy and a key link in the reform of China's banking and financial sectors (LARDY, 1998;CHIU and LEWIS, 2006;ZHANG, 2006). By virtue of their dominance of heavy industry and the capital-intensive sectors of the economy, SOEs are still leading economic players in some old industrial regions experiencing the throes of transition from a planned economy to a market economy. ...
Hu F. Z. Y. and Lin G. C. S. Placing the transformation of state-owned enterprises in North-east China: the state, region and firm in a transitional economy, Regional Studies. This study examines the nature of firmregion nexus in the transformation of state-owned enterprises in the Chinese transitional economy. A case study of the machinery sector in the Shenyang city-region of north-east China reveals a close relationship between the organizational transformation of state-owned enterprises and a regionally specific institutional environment featured by a productmarket orientation toward some large, key construction projects and political commitment to achieving key equipment indigenization with a heavy reliance upon the internal labour market. The study advocates a more contextualized analysis of the positionality, interests and motivations of China's state-owned enterprises grounded in different regional and institutional contexts.
... Turning Shanghai into a global city has been characterised as a 'strategy-based state project' (Wu 2009 Xiaoping. The Party decided then to adopt a 'Socialist Market Economy', where significant public ownership of productive assets would co-exist with a dominant role of the market in resource allocation (Zhang 2006). This created an impetus for the publication of an influential research report by the Municipality (Leading Group 1994) 1 , Shanghai Towards the 21 st Century, in which an ambitious economic and social development strategy (1996-2010) was presented (see Table 1 for key planning targets). ...
This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the role of the state in influencing the formation of global cities in emerging economies. It highlights the complexity of this role due to challenging external environments, divergent interests of state actors and socioeconomic and institutional constraints that these actors are under. At an empirical level, it examines the progress of Shanghai in its state-led development as an emerging global city and the respective roles of the national and local governments in this process.
The question of whether the contemporary Chinese economy is more accurately characterized as market socialist or market capitalist depends to some extent on semantic issues pertaining to the meaning of terms such as capitalism, socialism, and the market. Adding to these complications is the fact that there are several market socialist plans, quite different in their specifics, extant in the systems literature produced by Western economists. The present contribution attempts to shed a more focused light on this question by comparing the contemporary Chinese economy to a specific plan of market socialism known as ‘pragmatic market socialism.’ While obviously not a perfect match, there appears to be sufficient overlap for the Chinese economy to be considered a reasonable approximation to pragmatic market socialism.
The debate on the vitality of the commons remains unsettled, but the attempt by the Chinese state to develop a marketized property rights system to address the so‐called tragedy of the commons has backfired. In Shanghai and other major Chinese cities, the economic transformation has led to an ambiguous property rights system that creates complex and uncertain property relations between the state and private land developers. The resulting ineffective uses and conflicts in the commons are well known, but how to address them is contested. Can privatization drive better use of urban land in China? How do the ambiguous property relations between the state and the private sector affect the spatial design, management, use, and quality of the urban commons in Chinese cities? This article addresses these questions by engaging theoretical debates on how the commons should be held, analyzing the origin and key features of the ambiguous property relation in China, and drawing on a property rights approach to investigate the empirical case of a specific privately owned and managed urban park in Shanghai. The results show that not only does the commodification of property create inherently pervasive ambiguity in the land market, marketization also denies citizens their rights to public space. These findings raise fundamental questions about the idea that marketizing land is a sure tonic to address social problems. The article puts the case for reconsidering the institutionalization of the urban commons.
Análisis de las transformaciones de la economía China post-Mao: ¿más allá del capitalismo y socialismo de mercado? RESUMEN: A partir del año 1978 y tras el fallecimiento de Mao, el partido comunista chino comienza una nueva etapa de reformas orientadas a la apertura del mercado y modernización del país. Estas reformas apuntan a la transformación desde una economía central planificada hacia una economía socialista de mercado. Es-tos cambios tuvieron un fuerte impacto en diferentes áreas de la sociedad como la movilidad social, migraciones campo-ciudad, sistemas organizacionales, etc. Si bien, durante esta nueva etapa se mantuvo una fuerte intervención estatal en diferentes aspectos de la sociedad China, muchos autores occidentales consideran que China dejó de ser una economía comunista para dar paso a una economía marcadamente capitalista. En este sentido surgen inte-rrogantes: ¿Dónde se ha movido la economía China post-Mao? ¿Puede una economía socialista de mercado retener los principios del socialismo mientras se incorporan gradualmente elementos del capitalismo? El siguiente artículo aborda estas preguntas revisan-do los principales elementos distintivos del sistema capitalista y socialista de mercado, y analizando las transformaciones que ha enfrentado China tras la época de Mao.
