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Example of syllogism used in the experiment, shown both in the Manipulated and Non-Manipulated alternatives.
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Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this "selective laziness," we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they wer...
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Context 1
... experiment consisted of two phases. In Phase 1, we presented the participants with five enthymematic syllogisms-syllogisms with an implicit premise-in succession (for an example syllogism see Fig. 1; all syllogisms can be found in the section "Materials" in the Supporting Information). For each syllogism, we asked the participants to choose which of five alternatives they thought was the valid answer and to explain why they gave their chosen answer (see Fig. ...
Context 2
... with an implicit premise-in succession (for an example syllogism see Fig. 1; all syllogisms can be found in the section "Materials" in the Supporting Information). For each syllogism, we asked the participants to choose which of five alternatives they thought was the valid answer and to explain why they gave their chosen answer (see Fig. ...
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Citations
... These heuristics bypass in-depth evaluation of information and may lead to incorrect or incomplete conclusions. When relying on heuristics, people may fail to evaluate the validity of their own arguments [36] accept politically congenial information as the truth without evaluating it [37], or fail to evaluate whether a news story is true or false, provided that the headline seems plausible [38]. ...
While conspiracy theories are treated as irrational fringe beliefs in popular culture, conspiracy belief is quite common. Given the disconnect between stereotypes about conspiracy belief and its prevalence, I tested whether people have difficulty recognizing the conspiracy theories that they believe as conspiracy theories. Across two studies I demonstrate that people have considerable difficulty identifying conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories, particularly when they do not take much time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. This is consistent with the notion that people experience “conspiracy blindness.” People have trouble recognizing the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories because they do not take the time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. In Study 2, I demonstrate that people can overcome their conspiracy blindness and recognize the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories when they are given a definition for “conspiracy theory” and asked to consider their answer. This suggests that people are typically ignorant of their own conspiracy beliefs, but capable of recognizing them when given the tools and motivation to do so. However, recognizing their beliefs as conspiracy theories does not reduce their adherence to those beliefs.
... Making pros and cons decisions in groups can be beneficial, as people are 'selectively lazy' in critical thinking to their own reasoning but not others' (Trouche et al., 2016). Group members challenging each other's options can balance out the selective laziness of each individual and may explain why groups make better decisions than individuals in certain situations (Kerr & Tindale, 2004;Larrick & Soll, 2006). ...
This article presents typology of coaching decisions based on the kinds of cognitive processes involved, with the aim of helping coaches improve their decisions by helping them better understand the many kinds of decisions they make. The typology has seven primary types – Snap, Simulation, Rule, Metaphor, Analogy, Story, and Pros and Cons – and another special type, Meta. The authors briefly describe each decision type and list some of their strengths and pitfalls.
... In accordance with the inter-personal view, people tend to produce very weak arguments for beliefs they already hold, until they are challenged through dialogue by others who hold different positions (Trouche, Johansson, Hall & Mercier 2016). When challenged, they either produce better arguments, to persuade their interlocuteurs, or change their minds when it becomes clear that there are grounds for the network to settle on a different course. ...
Coproduction has emerged as one of the key concepts in understanding knowledge-policy interactions and is associated with involvement, for example, of users of public services in their design and delivery. At a time of permacrisis, the need for transformative evidence-based policymaking is urgent and great. This is particularly important in highly distressed 'left-behind' communities targeted by the UK Government for Levelling Up, which constitutes an attempt to improve the infrastructural, economic, social and health of less affluent parts of the UK. Often, policymakers regard the transformative policies capable of addressing these crises as beyond the Overton Window used to describe actions consistent with public acceptability. In this article, we build on recent debates in Evidence & Policy on coproduction by outlining an embryonic approach to overcoming this Overton Window-based roadblock in evidence-based policymaking: adversarial coproduction, which involves working with opponents of evidence-based policy to develop means of persuading potential beneficiaries to support introduction. This emerging approach has been deployed in examination of public preferences with regard to welfare reform, but can be applied to a wide range of policy areas. We outline the history of coproduction, before setting out the process by which adversarial coproduction was developed. We then describe the impact of adversarial coproduction on public preferences on Universal Basic Income (UBI). This enables us to set out challenges and opportunities for those with an interest in addressing our crises, serving to stimulate genuine debate on longstanding assumptions about the limits of evidence-based policy and public opinion.
... In accordance with the inter-personal view, people tend to produce very weak arguments for beliefs they already hold, until they are challenged through dialogue by others who hold different positions (Trouche, Johansson, Hall & Mercier 2016). When challenged, they either produce better arguments, to persuade their interlocuteurs, or change their minds when it becomes clear that there are grounds for the network to settle on a different course. ...
Co-production has emerged as one of the key concepts in understanding knowledge-policy interactions and is associated with involvement, for example, of users of public services in their design and delivery. At a time of permacrisis, the need for transformative evidence-based policymaking is urgent and great. This is particularly important in highly distressed 'left-behind' communities targeted by the UK Government for Levelling Up, which constitutes an attempt to improve the infrastructural, economic, social and health of less affluent parts of the UK. Often, policymakers regard the transformative policies capable of addressing these crises as beyond the Overton Window used to describe actions consistent with public acceptability. In this article, we build on recent debates in Evidence & Policy on coproduction by outlining an embryonic approach to overcoming this Overton Window-based roadblock in evidence-based policymaking: adversarial coproduction, which involves working with opponents of evidence-based policy to develop means of persuading potential beneficiaries to support introduction. This emerging approach has been deployed in examination of public preferences with regard to welfare reform, but can be applied to a wide range of policy areas. We outline the history of coproduction, before setting out the process by which adversarial coproduction was developed. We then describe the impact of adversarial coproduction on public preferences on Universal Basic Income (UBI). This enables us to set out challenges and opportunities for those with an interest in addressing our crises, serving to stimulate genuine debate on longstanding assumptions about the limits of evidence-based policy and public opinion.
... When some groups (e.g., D, G) use miscarriage rates as a criterion for ranking cities and try to integrate the other evidence into their justifications, contradictions arise. However, unlike the findings of [41], instead of ignoring the inconsistencies, they overcome the "my-side bias" by addressing the weaknesses of their first position [44] and looking at the available evidence for another possible cause of miscarriages in Volantis: veganism, which "leads to a lack of nutrients and defences" (example of code IV in Figure 5). In terms of handling and relating new concepts, group F is unable to connect the data on "micronuclei" and "viable eggs". ...
... Open It is worth noting that some of the intermediate codes are higher than the final ones since in a natural conversation it is not necessary to justify many statements if learners assume that they share knowledge [38]; but if one needs to convince or refute a peer, it is when more data are related [44]. Furthermore, although only four groups (A, B, C, G) reach code VII, code VI appears in all groups except I, as it is easier to relate an effect to a cause than to explain multivariate causality, with multiple contributors to the same outcome(s) [46]. ...
... In contrast, group I starts by relating pollution (cause) to the occurrence of malformations or the transmission of viruses (HIV) and parasites (Anisakis) (code IV). After reading the report, they rank the cities based solely on food sources and the percentage of reproductive problems in humans (code III), since learners, for the sake of simplicity, tend to use evidence in isolation rather than linking data [44]. Table 11 shows the solutions proposed by each group. ...
Schooling should equip citizens with the scientific knowledge necessary to make informed decisions about health problems arising from the current environmental crisis. Given the scarcity of educational proposals that integrate evidence-based argumentation, One Health education and complexity-based solution proposals, this study aims to introduce a scenario linking the use of pesticides in agriculture to infertility, and to analyse the extent to which it promotes students to apply these three approaches. The activity requires 10th graders to rank 6 cities from most to least polluted, using evidence on the reproductive problems of different organisms in the ecosystem (humans, harlequin flies). Moreover, students have to propose solutions to avoid the toxic risk caused by pesticides. Group discussions are analysed to determine learners’ performance in using evidence and formulating causal explanations to justify their rankings, as well as in proposing reasoned solutions, considering different perspectives. The results show that most groups rank cities as expected. Although they do not use all available evidence, the design of the activity encourages students to establish frequent causal relationships between human, animal, and environmental health data (argumentation integrating the One Health approach). Moreover, most solutions are palliative rather than preventive, respond to an anthropocentric interest, and their consequences are rarely assessed. In doing so, students only foresee their environmental or economic impact, but not their ethical or political consequences. Educational implications are discussed.
... Past research has found that the effort-value phenomena is observed in a variety of contexts. People pay more for selfassembled products (Franke et al., 2010;Norton et al., 2012), report greater liking towards self-prepared food (Dohle et al., 2014(Dohle et al., , 2016, and over-value their self-generated ideas (Baer & Brown, 2012;Trouche et al., 2016). In addition to over-valuing one's creations, past research also shows that effort expenditure during the creation process can further increase perceived value. ...
Interviewers are often confident in the validity of their interview questions. What drives this confidence and is it justified? In three studies, we found that question creators judged their own interview questions as more valid than when the same questions are judged by an evaluator. We also found that effort expenditure inflated the perceived validity of interview questions but not question quality. Question creators’ perceptions of validity were primarily driven by their self-confidence, and not the question quality. As an intervention, we nudged participants into holding more favourable attitudes towards better questions (i.e., structured questions) by allowing them to choose a subset of them from a pre-written list. Together, we found that while effort expenditure was responsible for the illusion of validity when evaluating unstructured (i.e., low-quality) questions, the same mechanism could also be used to improve interviewers’ acceptance of structured questions. Implications for structured interviews and the scientist-practitioner gap are discussed.
... Past research has found that the effort-value phenomena is observed in a variety of contexts. People pay more for self-assembled products (Franke et al., 2010;Norton et al., 2012), report greater liking toward self-prepared food (Dohle et al., 2014(Dohle et al., , 2016, and over-value their self-generated ideas (Baer & Brown, 2012;Trouche et al., 2016). In addition to over-valuing one's creations, past research also shows that effort expenditure during the creation process can further increase perceived value. ...
This manuscript has been accepted for publication at European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology. This version is not the final copy and may not reflect the final, authoritative version of the article. Please cite this as: Zhang, D.C., & Kausel, E.E., (2022, in press). The illusion of validity: How effort inflates the perceived validity of interview questions. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology. Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to Don C. Zhang, Department of Psychology, Louisiana State University. Email: zhang1@lsu.edu.
... We fully agree that epistemic vigilance and sensitivity to social context are adaptive. However, the strategies that one uses upon perceiving low credibility in others might vary in their adaptiveness: they might be reasonable, as when people put further deliberation into scrutinizing the responses of others who they perceive to be biased (Janssen et al., 2021;Mata, Fiedler, et al., 2013;Trouche et al., 2016); but they might also be less reasonable, as when they uncritically give the opposite response, as in the present studies. ...
Expertise is a reliable cue for accuracy-experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case-ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance.
... They displayed a confirmation bias. 3 Using a similar experimental set-up, Trouche et al. (2016) found that subjects also tend to exhibit a selective 'laziness' in their critical thinking: they are more likely to 3 It might be proposed that when participants in the experiment seek reasons for their judgments, perhaps they take themselves already to have formed the judgements for good reasons and then wonder what these reasons might have been. Why would they seek reasons against a view that they have formed (by their own lights) for good reasons? ...
... This contributes to a thorough exploration of them that is less likely with less committed thinkers. Additionally, since individuals appear to have a particular strength in detecting flaws in others' arguments (Trouche et al. 2016), open social criticism within the group should ensure that the group's conclusions remain reliable even if some, or at times most, of its members are led astray by their confirmation bias (Smart 2018: 4190;Peters 2018: 20). Mercier and Sperber (2011: 65) themselves already float the idea of such a social "division of cognitive labor". ...
... To convince others, one would perhaps need to anticipate objections. But if the bias functions to boost primarily only one's own conviction about particular beliefs so as to facilitate SFPs then 'laziness' in critical thinking about one's own positions (Trouche et al. 2016) shouldn't be surprising. ...
Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias.
... In general, people tend to be less critical and impartial judges of their own views and arguments than those of others, presumably because they find it hard to distance themselves from their views (cf. Trouche et al. 2016). 13 They may not reflect at all on the credentials of the views they agree with, or may do so only superficially. ...
In their own way, inferentialists and interactionists both trace the roots of reflective reasoning to practices and skills for making, assessing and responding to public performances in communicative practices of giving and asking for reasons. Inferentialists have developed the idea mostly on conceptual grounds. Interactionists ask, in a more empirical spirit, why and how such practices and skills might have evolved. Thus they promise complementary "anthropological" insights of foremost interest to inferentialists. But interactionist theories advance a number of controversial claims that deserve careful scrutiny. In this essay I focus on one such claim: namely that confirmation bias can be plausibly explained as a design feature that promotes postulated functions of interactive reasoning. And I argue that each of three extant proposals fails to make the claim good.
