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Example of minutiae ordering and vicinity alignment along the orientation O2

Example of minutiae ordering and vicinity alignment along the orientation O2

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Conference Paper
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Random projection provides a good diversification effect for biometric template protection but is drawing increasing security concerns under the token-stolen (or public parameter) case. We propose a dynamic random projection method to alleviate these security concerns due to the stolen token by increasing the computational complexity to search for...

Contexts in source publication

Context 1
... each minutia m i (i=1,2,…,M) in the original template consisting of M minutiae, 3 closest (in terms of Euclidean distance) neighboring minutiae are found around m i and the quadruplets (including m i ) are defined as a minutia vicinity V i . Denote the 4 minutiae in one vicinity as J j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) indexed in an ascending order of the Euclidean distance from m i (d(m i ,J ij ) as shown in Fig.2), thus J i1 =m i and the 6 orientations O l (l = 1, 2, …,6) can be defined between the minutiae pairs (e.g., pair m i and c i2 defining O 2 in Fig. 2) and along each orientation the remaining minutiae pair (c i1 and c i3 in the example in Fig. 2) can be geometrically-aligned (resulting J a3 and J a4 respectively). ...
Context 2
... m i ) are defined as a minutia vicinity V i . Denote the 4 minutiae in one vicinity as J j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) indexed in an ascending order of the Euclidean distance from m i (d(m i ,J ij ) as shown in Fig.2), thus J i1 =m i and the 6 orientations O l (l = 1, 2, …,6) can be defined between the minutiae pairs (e.g., pair m i and c i2 defining O 2 in Fig. 2) and along each orientation the remaining minutiae pair (c i1 and c i3 in the example in Fig. 2) can be geometrically-aligned (resulting J a3 and J a4 respectively). Mathematically, if the orientation O l is formed by two points J p and J q (1≤p,q≤4, p≠q) in the old coordinate system, the remaining 2 minutiae J j (1≤j≤4, j≠p, j≠q) will ...
Context 3
... 1, 2, 3, 4) indexed in an ascending order of the Euclidean distance from m i (d(m i ,J ij ) as shown in Fig.2), thus J i1 =m i and the 6 orientations O l (l = 1, 2, …,6) can be defined between the minutiae pairs (e.g., pair m i and c i2 defining O 2 in Fig. 2) and along each orientation the remaining minutiae pair (c i1 and c i3 in the example in Fig. 2) can be geometrically-aligned (resulting J a3 and J a4 respectively). Mathematically, if the orientation O l is formed by two points J p and J q (1≤p,q≤4, p≠q) in the old coordinate system, the remaining 2 minutiae J j (1≤j≤4, j≠p, j≠q) will be aligned ...
Context 4
... GMP l (corresponding to the o' in Fig. 2) is the geometric middle point of J p and J q ...

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