Table 1 - uploaded by Gerald Brown
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We describe the industrial project that a "proliferator" would conduct to produce a first, small batch of nuclear weapons. From refining yellowcake ore to final weapons assem-bly, we highlight the project's tasks and their interactions. The proliferator can choose alternative production technologies that offer quicker completion, but at higher cost...
Citations
... In the few years prior to making this statement bin Laden had actively pursued nuclear capability, and his interest in nuclear weapons continued after this statement [2]. Nine years later, physicist Peter Zimmerman wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in which he described how a terrorist group that had been supplied with highly enriched uranium could build a nuclear weapon in a rented suburban home [3] just a few years after a similar account written by Brown et al (2006) appeared in a more academic publication. Zimmerman was not the first to suggest that terrorists might be able to build a nuclear weapon; this topic was explored in 1986, and likely earlier, by scientists with experience in this arena (Mark et al 1986) and a great deal of relevant information is available in the unclassified literature (e.g. ...
... Zimmerman was not the first to suggest that terrorists might be able to build a nuclear weapon; this topic was explored in 1986, and likely earlier, by scientists with experience in this arena (Mark et al 1986) and a great deal of relevant information is available in the unclassified literature (e.g. [4], Reed 2007Reed , 2009Reed and 2016Brown et al 2006). ...
In a 1998 interview with Time Magazine’s Rahimullah Yusufzai [1], Osama bin Laden stated that “Acquiring [WMD] for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.” In the few years prior to making this statement bin Laden had actively pursued nuclear capability, and his interest in nuclear weapons continued after this statement [2].
... A Bayesian pathway analysis method by Freeman involved complete proliferation, including weaponization, but focused solely on pathway likelihood, neglecting proliferation time.40,41 Case-based proliferation assessments do rigorously address proliferation time, although they are limited by being static, case-specific assessments (real world or hypothetical).42,43,44,45 These assessments are not generally applicable, require significant expert effort to reproduce or update, and are frequently based on classified information and opaque assumptions.Table 1. Ideal proliferation assessment characteristicsIt is clear that despite the substantial contributions of previous assessment methodologies, more development is needed. ...
This research uses an existing innovative fuel design (IFD) that has intrinsic safety features and enhanced economics over the current uranium dioxide (UO2) light water fuel design and evaluates its proliferation resistance capability by doping the fresh IFD with select actinides. The most robust approach for proliferation resistance is to denature these materials by adding a uranium or plutonium (Pu) isotope that hampers the usability of the materials in weapons. The proposed modifications to the IFD use this approach through elevated fractions of 238Pu. 238Pu generates large quantities of heat and neutrons through its radioactive decay and has been estimated to create a proliferation firewall at concentrations as little as 9%. Proliferation firewall nuclear materials have properties that create substantial technical barriers that would take significant resources and time to use these materials as the fissile component in a nuclear weapon. The IFD consists of an advanced metallic fuel design for use in current light water reactors. Due to the high fission density of this metallic fuel and the proposed uranium enrichment, the plutonium produced by irradiating this fuel has promising isotopic content for proliferation resistance. This proliferation resistance can be further increased
by adding 237Np, 238Pu, or 241Am to the initial fresh fuel composition that will result in increased 238Pu content in the used fuel.
... a Examples include: developing mathematical models that describe how different pieces of battlefield intelligence combine to determine the overall value of an intelligence report (Caldwell et al., 1961); constructing networks that describe tasks, their duration, and precedence relations required to enable the completion of an adversarial's project (Harney et al., 2006); and developing methods and processes to determine which policies, research and development, and programs to implement in military intelligence (Cesar et al., 1994). Recommendation #4-Call letter: As of September 2018, the overwhelming majority of studies conducted by CJOC OR&A are initiated through its call letter process. ...
Since 2014, the Canadian Joint Operations Command Operations Research & Analysis
team’s work program has been determined via an annual call letter process. While the
studies conducted by team have been aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness
of joint force employment within the Canadian Armed Forces, the question remains: Are
the team’s resources and skills being utilized to their maximum potential? To help answer
this question, the author conducted an assessment of the team’s ongoing studies in terms
of their status, near-term expected output, and relationship to Defence core missions, initiatives, and tasks. Based on this assessment, a series of recommendations are put forth that collectively aim to increase the team’s impact with regards to joint force employment.
... Проблема причин распространения ЯО и построения соответствующей модели является предметом рассмотрения большого числа работ ([5…22] и ряд других), однако, к сожалению, конструктивных среди них немного. Работы же, посвященные анализу и моделированию времени разработки ЯО, авторам неизвестны, за исключением работы [23], в которой на основе применения методов сетевого планирования оценивается минимальное время скрытной разработки малой партии образцов ЯО, работа которого основана на принципе деления высокообогащенного урана. ...
2017 (СарФТИ, г.Саров, апрель 2017 г.) В проблеме распространения ядерного оружия (ЯО) вызывают интерес ответы на вопросы «Кто?», «Когда?» и «К чему это приведет?», т.е. какая страна может разработать ядерное оружие следующей, когда это может случиться и к каким последствиям это может привести? Казалось бы, сравнительно недавно вызывали интерес и обсуждались проблемы ядерного нуля в качестве элемента будущей модели мира, но сейчас больший интерес начинают вызывать указанные выше вопросы. Всячески приветствуя достижения в сфере нераспространения ЯО, уместно поставить вопросы, загнано ли ЯО в резервации и насколько далеко отошли мы от состояния ядерной неустойчивости, а также является ли необратимым ощущение стабильности в ядерной сфере? Модель времени разработки малой партии первых образцов ядерного оружия и результаты расчетов Обоснованный ответ на второй из поставленных вопросов дать сложно, но для ответа на первый вопрос, с точки зрения авторов, перспективы имеются. Для этого необходимо понять, в течение какого времени страна-пролифератор способна разработать ЯО и это понимание воплотить в модели, дающей достоверные результаты. Поскольку речь идет об оружии, правильным было бы под временем разработки понимать не просто время до момента проведения ядерного испытания, но до момента создания малой серии первых образцов ЯО. Проблема причин распространения ЯО и построения соответствующей модели является предметом рассмотрения большого числа работ ([5…22] и ряд других), однако, к сожалению, конструктивных среди них немного. Работы же, посвященные анализу и моделированию времени разработки ЯО, авторам неизвестны, за исключением работы [23], в которой на основе применения методов сетевого планирования оценивается минимальное время скрытной разработки малой партии образцов ЯО, работа которого основана на принципе деления высокообогащенного урана. Очевидно, что время разработки в указанном смысле в значительной степени определяется технологическими возможностями государства, которые могут рассматриваться как необходимые условия. Однако большинство из неядерных стран, имеющих такие возможности, в настоящее время добросовестно выполняют ДНЯО и не стремятся к созданию ЯО. Поэтому необходимые условия не могут рассматриваться в качестве достаточных. Очевидно, что близкие по уровню развития страны, имеющие необходимые условия для создания ЯО, но живущие в различных внешних условиях (с точки зрения степени интегрированности в мировое пространство, участия в соглашениях по нераспространению, наличия/отсутствия государства-оппонента и уровня конфликтности отношений с ним, характера политики в области ЯО ядерно-оружейных государств, участия в региональных конфликтах, гарантий обеспечения безопасности со
... To build nuclear weapons, a state must first produce the fissile material that fuels the nuclear explosion either by enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium from spent reactor fuel and then assembling this nuclear material into a functioning nuclear device. 11 Enrichment and reprocessing are difficult technical feats, made more complicated by the need to manufacture thousands of metal component parts to extremely high standards and very close tolerances at each stage, such as structures to hold the core of a nuclear reactor or the specially-designed rotating components of a gas centrifuge. 12 At present, nuclear suppliers are likely to deny requests for turnkey enrichment or reprocessing facilities, or their key component parts, due to the proliferation risks. ...
3-D printing will make it easier for countries to acquire nuclear weapons, providing a way to print pieces of the nuclear jigsaw puzzle indigenously before anyone notices. The United States should lead an international effort to prevent this avenue to a cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation before it is too late.
... A review of related literature on estimating proliferation time and latency suggests that the proposed APA process may omit factors that impact time, including the influence of budgets, proliferator goals, and organizational issues. [37], [45] As noted by a study on latency, "…if one uses [an engineering management] approach for specific known cases, the time predicted for a State to develop its first nuclear device tends to be incorrect" as "…pathway decisions are determined by various motivations and institutional impediments that often outweigh the pure engineering resource management decisions." [35] Difficulties in quantifying these omitted factors (e.g. ...
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards designed to deter nuclear proliferation continue to evolve to respond to new challenges. Within its State Level Concept, the IAEA envisions a State Level Approach for safeguards implementation that considers a State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole within the scope of the State's safeguards agreement to meet generic safeguards objectives. For a State with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, these generic safeguards objectives are to detect diversion of declared nuclear material in declared facilities or LOFs, to detect undeclared production or processing of nuclear materials in declared facilities or locations outside facilities (LOFs), and to detect undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State. Under the SLA, States will be differentiated based upon State-Specific Factors (SSF) that influence the design, planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities. Proposed categories of factors include both technical and legal aspects, spanning from the deployed fuel cycle and the related state's technical capability to the type of safeguards agreements in force and the IAEA experience in implementing safeguards in that State. SSFs related to a State's technical capabilities are captured through an Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) that identifies plausible routes for acquiring weapons-usable material. In order to achieve this goal, the APA will have to identify possible acquisition paths, characterize them and eventually prioritise them. A key issue affecting the SLC's ability to satisfy effectiveness, efficiency, and nondiscrimination principles is the objectivity of technical SSFs captured through the APA. A review of proposed APA methods and historical evidence indicates that assessments of a State's technical capabilities and pathway completion times may not be as objective as has been suggested. Process modifications are proposed to improve pathways characterization supporting the SLC, such as developing a sounder basis for technical plausibility, formalizing considerations of intrinsic technical difficulty, assessing uncertainties in collected information and issuing guidance on omitted SSFs that may influence pathway completion times.
... Constraints (15) enforce the upper limit on aggregate flow on each arc. Constraint (17) requires defensive investments to adhere to a general budget constraint. ...
... If the operator is managing a large industrial project, the operator model can take the form of a project scheduling problem, which can represent the operator's decisions and resource allocations to keep the project moving (e.g., Dimitrov and Morton [40]). This type of model has application in many settings that are a step beyond a single infrastructure system, such as nuclear proliferation (e.g., Brown et al. [17,20]). In this case the operator tries to build their first nuclear weapon as quickly as possible, possibly hiding his actual development plan by starting multiple similar projects. ...
... In a follow on work, Brown, Carlyle, Harney, Skroch, and Wood (2009) look specifically at the interdiction of a nuclear weapons development project. Using data from (Harney, Brown, Carlyle, Skroch, & Wood, 2006) they develop and solve the interdiction model from the point of view of the leader, identifying which project tasks should be interdicted to cause maximal delay in the project completion. ...
We consider project scheduling where the project manager’s objective is to minimize the time from when an adversary discovers the project until the completion of the project. We analyze the complexity of the problem identifying both polynomially solvable and NP-hard versions of the problem. The complexity of the problem is seen to be dependent on the nature of renewable resource constraints, precedence constraints, and the ability to crash activities in the project.
... As noted by the developers of the Program Evaluation Research Task process for project management, " The status of a developmental program at any given time is a function of several variables: resources, in the form of dollars, or what 'dollars' represent-manpower, materials, and methods of production, technical performance of systems, subsystems, and components, and time. " [29] These types of engineering assessments can serve as a means allocating safeguards resources by identifying processes whose disruption would delay progress towards weapons-usable nuclear material.[30] The certainty to which engineering assessments can estimate ease and speed varies with the type of pathway under consideration. ...
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards designed to deter nuclear proliferation are constantly evolving to respond to new challenges. Within its State Level Concept, the IAEA envisions an objective-based and information-driven approach for designing and implementing State Level Approaches (SLAs), using all available measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. The main objectives of a SLA are a) to detect undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State, b) to detect undeclared production or processing of nuclear materials in declared facilities or locations outside facilities (LOFs), c) to detect diversion of declared nuclear material in declared facilities or LOFs. Under the SLA, States will be differentiated based upon objective State-Specific Factors that influence the design, planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities. Proposed categories of factors include both technical and legal aspects, spanning from the deployed fuel cycle and the related state's technical capability to the type of safeguards agreements in force and the IAEA experience in implementing safeguards in that state. To design a SLA, the IAEA foresees the use of Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) to identify the plausible routes for acquiring weapons-usable material and to assess their safeguards significance. In order to achieve this goal, APA will have to identify possible acquisition paths, characterize them and eventually prioritise them. This paper will provide an overview of how the use of open source information (here loosely defined as any type of non-classified or proprietary information and including, but not limited to, media sources, government and non-governmental reports and analyses, commercial data, satellite imagery, scientific/technical literature, trade data) can support this activity in selected aspects of a typical APA approach.
... Brown et al. (2009) look specifically at the optimal interdiction of a nuclear weapons development project. Using data from Harney et al. (2006), they develop and solve a model to identify the project tasks to interdict to cause maximal delay in the project completion. Their assumption is that the PM is minimizing the duration of the project. ...
... In §3 we analyze an informative special case. In §4 we conduct a set of numerical experiments based on the example of a nuclear weapons development project outlined in Harney et al. (2006) to illustrate some of the properties of secret project management. We conclude in §5. ...
... We use the project example from Harney et al. (2006) to illustrate how a nuclear proliferator may schedule activities in order to minimize the time to exposure. Our purpose in using this example is purely illustrative. ...
We study project scheduling in a competitive setting taking the perspective of a project manager with an adversary, using a Stackelberg game format. The project manager seeks to limit the adversary's opportunity to react to the project and therefore wants to manage the project in a way that keeps the adversary “in the dark” as long as possible while completing the project on time. We formulate and illustrate a new form of project management problem for secret projects where the project manager uses a combination of deception, task scheduling, and crashing to minimize the time between when the adversary initiates a response to the project to when the project is completed. We propose a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation for the problem and determine characteristics of optimal schedules in this context. Using a detailed example of nuclear weapons development, we illustrate the interconnectedness of the deception, task scheduling, and crashing, and how these influence adversary behavior.
