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This article examines the constitution of affective atmospheres that arise through the encounter of scientific and theatre practices. Using an autoethnographic approach, the presented work focuses on a collaborative theatre project on the climate crisis. Here, the author performed in the role of a scientific expert next to colleagues that have a cl...
This paper reports on the cooperative creation of an English language educational Noh play, which was performed during a workshop at the Performance in Education conference at Nanzan University in 2019. The paper shares the background to the collaboration and considers the way extant or current elements are built on during the creative process. Par...
Person re-identification (ReID) has been an active research field for many years. Despite that, models addressing this problem tend to perform poorly when the task is to re-identify the same people over a prolonged time, due to appearance changes such as different clothes and hairstyles. In this work, we introduce a new method that takes full advan...
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... It is also reminiscent of deterrence/accommodation models, such as Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). For empirical studies of strategic entry see Gil et al. (2019) (US drive-in cinemas), Schmidt-Dengler (2006) (MRI technology adoption in US hospitals) and Ellison and Ellison (2011) (pharmaceuticals with expiring patents). It also suggests that even though we observe rival studios release their new movies at the start of the season, for instance, there could still be a follower advantage; moreover, both studios might be better off if they could commit to not release their films until later. ...
We examine a timing game with complete information and observable actions when there is a second-mover advantage. Allowing for heterogenous payoffs between players and for both leader and follower payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic, we develop a new solution method to characterize the pure-strategy equilibria. Sometimes these resemble familiar second-mover advantage equilibria from the literature. However, we show, despite a follower advantage at all times for both players, that there can be a preemption equilibrium. Our generic solution method can be applied to a range of applications, such as market entry, innovation and holdout games for rival sellers of complementary assets.
... In the post-WWII years some geographic areas were more attractive for locating new drive-ins than others. Gil, Houde, and Takahashi (2015) examined the impact that existing drive-in theatres had on whether additional drive-ins would start-up in the same county. On the basis that drive-ins located in warmer climates would attract more patrons in a given year, market size was measured by the frequency of warm days. ...
Audience rules of conduct constitute an underexplored area of research for drive-in theatres. This research comprises two studies of drive-in theatres that remained open in 2019 and 2020, respectively. For drive-ins open during summer 2019 (i.e., before the COVID-19 pandemic) audience rules of conduct are often tied to enhancing the viewing experience and safety of moviegoers. These rules also improve the financial performance of drive-in theatres. For drive-in theatres open during summer 2020 there have been radical changes in how they operate in order to provide a safer experience for audience members in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
... An important point of comparison is that in 5 This type of equilibrium is reminiscent of deterrence/accommodation models, such as Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Also, for empirical studies of strategic entry see Gil et al. (2015) (US drive-in cinemas), Schmidt-Dengler (2006) (MRI technology adoption in US hospitals) and Ellison and Ellison (2011) (pharmaceuticals with expiring patents). ...
We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with
complete information and observable actions. We allow for
heterogenous payoffs between players, and for a leader's payoff
functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic. Assuming that the
follower's payoff is non-increasing with the time of the leader's entry, we
characterize all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the
two-player asymmetric model, showing that there are at most two equilibria. Firm heterogeneity allows for equilibria with different characteristics than previously examined in the literature. For example, a firm may wish to enter earlier blocking its rival's entry, so as to avoid an anticipated lower future payoff if it waited. A notable feature of this blocking equilibrium is that rents need not be equalized between the leader and follower. We also show that if the followers' payoffs are non-monotonic, the iterative incentives to block each other's product launch may lead to starkly inefficient early entry in a continuous version of the centipede game.
This paper studies the decentralized adoption of a technology standard when network effects are present. If the new standard is incompatible with the current installed base, adoption may be inefficiently delayed. I quantify the magnitude of “excess inertia” in the switch of the movie distribution and exhibition industries from 35mm film to digital. I specify and estimate a dynamic game of digital hardware adoption by theaters and digital movies supply by distributors. Counterfactual simulations establish that excess inertia reduces surplus by 16% relative to the first-best adoption path; network externalities explain 41% of the surplus loss. Targeted adoption subsidies or a mandate on digital distribution help bridge this welfare gap.
This paper studies the impact of competition on quality provision in the US airline industry exploiting a novel source of exogenous variation in competition. While mergers among market incumbents may stifle competition, a merger may increase the probability of entry if the merging airlines were not operating prior to merger in the market but each of them had presence at different route endpoints. We find non-merging incumbent airlines increase their flight frequency upon entry threat and accommodate entry of the newly merged airline by lowering flight frequency upon entry. While non-merging incumbents reduced arrival delays only upon entry of the newly merged airline, we find that incumbents decrease their cancelation rates and departure delays both upon merger announcement and entry of the newly merged airline. Our evidence suggests an increase in competition may increase consumer surplus, because non-merging incumbents increase quality and convenience, while keeping their prices unchanged.
We provide novel evidence on the effect of the threat of potential competition on the timing of entry in a new and growing industry. Exploiting a change in regulation in the Italian retail fuel market that generates exogenous variation in the number of potential entrants in the emerging Compressed Natural Gas segment, we show that markets with a higher number of potential entrants witness speedier entry decisions. We document that this result is likely driven by an increase in the incentives to preempt the market due to heightened risk of being anticipated by competitors.
We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. We allow for heterogenous payoffs between players, and for a leader's payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic. Assuming that the follower's payoff is non-increasing with the time of the leader's entry, we characterize all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player asymmetric model, showing that there are at most two equilibria. Firm heterogeneity allows for equilibria with different characteristics than previously examined in the literature. For example, a fi rm may wish to enter earlier blocking its rival's entry, so as to avoid an anticipated lower future payoff if it waited. A notable feature of this blocking equilibrium is that rents need not be equalized between the leader and follower. We also show that if the followers' payoffs are non-monotonic, the iterative incentives to block each other's product launch may lead to starkly inefficient early entry in a continuous version of the centipede game.
